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ABSTRACT
A DEFENSE OF MATERIALISM AGAINST ATTACKS BASED ON QUALIA
FEBRUARY 1998
JEFFREY C. BEALL, B.A., GROVE CITY COLLEGE
M.DIV., PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Lynne R. Baker
Qualia— the “what it’s like features” of minds — pose a great challenge to a
materialist view of the world. The two strongest and most popular objections to
materialism based on qualia are the Zombie Argument and the Knowledge Argument.
The current dissertation defends (minimal) materialism against these two popular
arguments.
I argue that if zombie worlds exist, then qualia cause no physical events— they’re
epiphenomenalp, or epiphenomenal with respect to the physical domain of our world. I
argue, however, that there is good reason to reject the view that qualia are
epiphenomenalp, and thus that there is good reason to deny the existence of zombie
worlds. In turn, I argue that the Knowledge Argument likewise requires the existence of
zombie worlds, and thus that the Knowledge Argument should likewise be rejected.
vi
PREFACE
This project stems from a frustration I’ve had for the last four years. The
frustration comes from Australia in the work of Frank C. Jackson- in particular,
Jackson’s infamous Knowledge Argument against materialism. 1 For the last four years,
I ve thought of various objections to the argument but none of them ultimately satisfied
me. (The most frustrating part was the recurring pattern of thinking that this objection is
the one
’
only t0 dlscover a few days later that that objection couldn 7 be one at all.)
Along the way, I also consulted the objections of others. These, too, were ultimately
unsatisfactory. But despite all these unsatisfactory objections, I still believed that
something, somewhere, had to be wrong with the Knowledge Argument, though I
couldn t exactly put my finger on it. Soon, frustration grew into disgust, and I was all but
ready to solve the problem by ignoring it— which, of course, is a psychological
solution but makes for no philosophical progress.
During this near-quitting period, I began to notice a tremendous surge of interest in
what is now called the Zombie Argument against materialism. Keith Campbell (another
Australian) used this sort of argument against materialism in 1977, but not much more
was made of it— until very recently. During the last year and a half, the Zombie
Argument against materialism has become a very hot topic, both in (hardcopy) literature
and electronic journals, discussion lists, et cetera. Much of this popularity has to do with
the popularity of David Chalmers’ (yet another Australian!) Zombie Argument, published
in his The Conscious Mind (1996). But irrespective of its origins, the Zombie Argument
1
All of Chapter 4 is devoted to Jackson’s argument, so I don’t bother giving references here in the Preface.
has taken off; and it's now perhaps the most popular, and in many ways the most
fundamental, argument against materialism today.
Not long after soaking myself in zombie literature did I realize that I finally had a
solid response to Jackson's Knowledge Argument. As it turned out, the response I came
up with against the Zombie Argument has an immediate application to the Knowledge
Argument. Thanks to discussion with Jay Garfield - who, at the time, happened to be
thinking about the same topic— my response to both arguments were quickly sharpened
into their present form.
This project presents these arguments. The basic thesis is that materialism is
threatened by neither the Zombie Argument— which, for reasons that will be clear in the
main discussion, takes center stage— nor the long-dreaded Knowledge Argument. This
result is both philosophically and, of course, psychologically satisfying— at least to me!
In some ways, this discussion is a narrow debate— a debate between so-called
zombiephiles and minimal materialists. The framework of the debate will be made clear
in both Chapter I and Chapter II. The heart of the project lies in Chapter III, and extends
into Chapter IV. Chapter V, finally, is offered in response to general objections to the
overall project objections that will be clear as things progress. But despite its potential
narrowness, I do hope that the current discussion is of value to those whose views fall
outside of its bounds. I hope so, anyway.
viii
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CHAPTER 1
MINIMAL MATERIALISM, THE MIND, AND QUALIA
The main theme of this discussion is qualia versus materialism. Materialism says
that our world is wholly physical. Qualia, however, are features of our world that pose
grave difficulties for materialism. When you have an iteh, there's someth,ng it’s like to
have an itch. Similarly with pains, tickles, and so on; there’s something it’s like to be in
these states. These “what it’s like” features— the itchiness of itches, the painfulness of
pain, et cetera— are called ‘qualia’. And it’s these features, as said, that (allegedly) pose
unavoidable problems for materialism.
This theme— qualia versus materialism— has been an important one in
philosophy, and in some ways science, for a long time. The overall aim of this project is
a defense of materialism against the threat posed by qualia. But before any of this can be
understood, quite a bit of background must be filled in. The aim of this chapter is to fill
in the requisite background.
Subchapter 1.1 introduces the view called ‘materialism’ and, along the way, other
key notions. Subchapter 1.2 introduces what is meant by ‘qualia’, and also gives a sense
of the debate over qualia and materialism. Finally, subchapter 1.3 offers a brief review,
in addition to a brief preview of what’s to come. Turn, then, to subchapter 1.1.
1.1 Materialism and The Mind
Materialism is a big, broad metaphysical view of our world. Materialism, at
bottom, offers an answer to the big, broad question: “What sort of world is our world?”
1
The answer materialism provides is that our world is a physical world through and
through. But what, exactly, does this mean?
The key to understanding materialism and its claim that our world is exclusively
physical rests with the notion of supervemence. The key to understanding supervemence
rests with the notion of broadly logical possibility. Consequently, the task in this
subchapter is to get straight on the relevant notions of possibility, supervemence and,
finally, materialism.
1.1.1 Broadly Logical Possibility
Possibility is a very common word but it’s equally ambiguous. Consider the
following claims:
1
. It’s not possible to travel faster than the speed of light.
2. A square circle is not possible.
Is (1) true?
1
Well, it depends. In particular, it depends on which sense of ‘possible’ is
being used.
If ‘possible’ is treated as nomological possibility, specifically physical possibility,
then (1) is true. Nomological possibility is a function of laws. IfX is a set of laws, then
1 A note about a convention is in order, here. I don’t want to get side-tracked by issues havmg to do with
the bearers of truth-values— whether they’re sentences, statements or propositions. For convenience. I'll
adopt the framework according to which propositions— or statements, where here they’re the same thing
— are truth-bearers. Moreover, if S is a sentence, then S is true just in case the proposition expressed by S
is true. Numerals will frequently be used to name expressions; and numerals flanked by ‘(‘ and *)’ will
name the proposition (or statement) expressed by that sentence. In any event, those who maintain that
sentences, rather than propositions (or statements), are the truth-bearers, they can easily interpret (say)
‘(125)’ to abbreviate ‘the sentence named by ‘125”.
2
p is nomologically possible if the conjunction of p and all oil's members could be true. 2
IfX is a set of physical laws- laws of the physical sciences- then p is physically
possible if p and all oil's members could be true; otherwise, p is physically impossible.
As travel in excess of light-speed indeed contradicts physical laws, (1) is accordingly true
if ‘possible’ is read as ‘physical possibility’.
On the other hand, (1) is false if ‘possible’ is treated as broadly logical possibility.
This sense of possible’ is far more liberal than nomological possibility. If p is
conceivable without any internal inconsistencies or contradictions, then p is broadly
logically possible. Consider, for example, the idea of a person with 257,831 heads.
There’s no actual person like this, and perhaps there couldn’t be any such person in the
sense of ‘physical possibility’. Still, such a person is conceivable without any internal
inconsistencies or contradiction. Similarly, travel in excess of light-speed, though
physically impossible, is certainly possible in the broadly logical sense of ‘possibility’
or so it seems.
Note that the epistemology of broadly logical possibility is an issue distinct from
possibility itself. In many cases, it’s very difficult to know for sure whether something is
broadly logically possible. (Frege s infamous unrestricted axiom of comprehension
serves as a good reminder.) In many cases of so-called unactualized or counterfactual
possibilities, our only guide to whether the case is genuinely broadly logically possible is
conceivability. As conceivability isn’t perfectly reliable, we may at times be mistaken
2 The alert reader asks about the relevant meaning of ‘could’, here! As it turns out, ‘could’, in this context,
is to be understood in terms of broadly logical possibility, a notion treated below.
Some, like Lewis (1986), would contest this by saying that various principles of recombination, rather
than conceivability, serve as guides to what is broadly logically possible. One such principle, for example,
is the Humean denial of necessary connections: any two distinct entities could exist together and fail to
3
about what we take to be broadly logically possible, regardless of how “clear and
distinct” the situation may appear.
At the same time, we do have a straightforward way of showing that a situation is
not broadly logically possible. Suppose someone claims to conceive of a square circle.
They claim that the idea harbors no internal inconsistency or contradiction. In this case,
the claim can be refuted. All we have to do is show that there is a contradiction in the
claim. Thus:
3. x is a square only if x contains 4 right angles.
4. x is a circle only if x contains no right angles.
Given the truth of (3) and (4), a square circle— something that’s both a square and a
circle is incoherent. This is why (2) is true if ‘possible’ is read in terms of broadly
logical possibility.
The notion of conceivability without internal inconsistency is admittedly fuzzy.
Still, the notion is common enough, especially among philosophers and philosophically
minded mathematicians, that I 11 proceed without attempting any further clarification. 4 In
the end, if something seems to be conceivable, then the burden is on the denier to show
that it isn’t. None of this intends to hide the epistemic difficulties of broadly logical
possibility; instead, it merely attempts to permit discussion to continue.
exist together. Though I, myself, am quite sympathetic to such principles of recombination, it seems to me
that their ultimate justification rests on some prior sort of “conceivability.” In any event, conceivability,
though admittedly fuzzy, is less controversial than Humean or Lewisian principles of recombination;
accordingly, I present the epistemics of broadly logical possibility in terms of conceivability. (There’s
another reason for doing this, too; namely, so-called zombiephiles, my key opponents in this debate, take
conceivability, as sketched above, to be the relevant criterion. I discuss this in later sections.)
4
For a good discussion of broadly logical possibility and the epistemology thereof, see Yablo (1993).
4
So, there are at least two important senses of the term ‘possible’: Physical
(nomological) possibility and broadly logical possibility
.
5
For convenience, broadly
logical possibility will sometimes be called ‘logical possibility’. This brings up a minor
qualification.
Some philosophers use the term ‘logical possibility’ as a relative term; in particular,
a term relative to some logical system. In this usage, p is logically possible if it can be
derived or deduced within some consistent logical system. (If the system is inconsistent,
then of course anything can be derived. 6) Call this relative notion of logical possibility
‘systematic possibility’. Systematic possibility, then, is not the sort of possibility
discussed above. Broadly logical possibility, as sketched above, is distinct from and
perhaps even conceptually prior to systematic possibility. When axioms or inference
rules are justified at all, they re usually justified by appeal to broadly logical possibility.
Perhaps, in the end, systematic possibility and broadly logical possibility are similar in
many ways. The issue is difficult. For present purposes, it’s important to note that
logical possibility does not imply the existence of some formal deductive system. In
other words, p may be logically possible despite the nonexistence of any formal system
of which p is a theorem .
7
Before turning to supervenience, there’s one more preliminary topic to discuss;
namely, possible worlds. Possibility of any stripe is normally discussed in terms of so-
called possible worlds. What possible worlds are, exactly, is a difficult and controversial
5
There are other senses of ‘possible’; for example, epistemic possibility, which is a function of some set of
beliefs. These other senses are less relevant to the current project than nomological or broadly logical
possibility and, so, aren’t treated here.
0 We’re talking about standard systems, rather than “deviant” ones.
5
subject. Some philosophers take them to be consistent sets of sentences or propositions;
some take them to be properties of various sorts; some take them to be concrete entities
just like our world. There are many other views of possible worlds but, for our purposes,
we needn’t get into the ontology of possible worlds.8 Instead, the only pressing topic is
to adopt some terminology.
If p is possible (for some proposition p), then there’s some possible world in which
- or at which— p is true. So, for example, if it’s possible that you are reading this
sentence before the year 2000, then there’s a possible world— or, simply, a world— in
which you’re reading this sentence before the year 2000. Furthermore, if p is not only
possible but necessary or necessarily the case, then p is true in— at— every possible
world. In other words, if something is necessarily the case, then there’s no possible
world in which it isn t the case. Similarly, ifp is impossible, then there’s no world in
which p is true. This makes sense; for if p is impossible, then it’s necessarily not the
case, in which case every world is such that p is false.
In a similar fashion, more narrow senses of ‘possible’ gain a place in the possible
worlds framework. Take nomological possibility, and let / be the relevant laws. Let an
/-world be any world in which / holds— that is, in which all members of/ hold. Then
p is /-impossible if and only if there’s no /-world in which p is true. Thus, if / consists
of the physical laws of our world, then p is physically possible if and only if there’s some
/-world in which p is true; physically impossible if and only if, not.
7
See Plantmga (1974) for a very good discussion of broadly logical possibility and its differences from
systematic and other sorts of possibility.
8
For an excellent introduction to possible worlds, their ontology, etc., see especially Loux (1979) but also
Schwartz (1977).
6
With all this in mind, let us turn to the notion of supervenience.
1.1.2 Supervenience
Unlike ‘possibility’, ‘supervenience’ is not a common word— at least not in its
philosophical uses. Like ‘possibility’, however, ‘supervenience’ is ambiguous between
various senses. The aim, in this section, is simply to introduce the relevant senses of
‘supervenience’.
The notion of supervenience is used by philosophers to express various related
ideas. In general, supervenience is a relation between sets of properties. Sometimes,
however, it s convenient to speak of supervenience as a relation between sets of facts—
a convention to be explained below. In either case, supervenience is supposed to be a
relation of both dependence and determination.
Let J and (? be sets of properties. IfJ supervenes on Q, then the members off
depend on and are determined by the members of (g
,
in some sense of ‘depends’ and
‘determines’. But what sense? This is precisely where the varieties of supervenience
enter.
Here are a few relevant definitions of supervenience
,
9
where again J and (g are
sets of properties:
SS. J strongly supervenes on (g just in case necessarily for each x
and each property Fej7
,
if x has F then there’s some property
GeC? such that x has G; and necessarily if any y has G, y has F.
9 from Kim (1993)
7
GS. J globally supervenes on g if and only if any two worlds with the
same distribution of g-properties have the same distribution of T-
properties.
There are other senses of ‘supervenience’, but these are the most relevant here. The big
difference between (SS) and (GS) is that while (SS) quantifies over inhabitants of worlds,
(GS) doesn’t. In the next section, we’ll see this difference at work. For now, a few
general comments
.
10
Note that in (GS), same distribution’ is taken to indicate sameness of distribution
throughout time and space . 1
1
In other words, the members ofJ have the same
distribution in worlds a and p if and only if there’s no time or place at which some
element ofJ is instantiated in a but not p (and vice versa). Note, also, that where J
supervenes (in either sense) on <g, the elements ofJ are said to be the supervening
properties while the elements of (g
,
the subvenient properties.
Now, in either version, supervenience expresses the idea that there couldn’t be a
difference of one sort without a difference of the other. If J- supervenes on (g , then there
couldn’t be an ^-difference without a ^-difference. Moreover, ifJ supervenes (in
either sense) on (g , then the instantiation of ^-elements is sufficient for the instantiation
of J’-elements. For example, consider the properties of being married and having a
spouse, and name each property ‘F’ and ‘G\ respectively. If, as is the case, {F}
supervenes (in either sense) on {G}, then F implies G— where property F implies
property G if, and only if, necessarily any x instantiates F only if x instantiates G. That
10
Note that (GS) is boxed with a double-line rather than a single-lined box, as in (SS). The reason is that
(GS), in the end, is most important to the current discussion, so it’s highlighted a bit more.
8
subvement properties imply their corresponding supervenient ones is an important idea to
keep in mind, especially when we turn to materialism.
The notion of supervenience will be spelled out a little bit more in the next section.
For now, a terminological convention needs to be briefly introduced.
I said, above, that supervenience is generally a relation between sets of properties.
Nonetheless, it s frequently convenient, and in many ways less awkward, to speak of
supervenience as a relation between facts. Fortunately, no major modification of (SS) or
(GS) is required to pull this off. In short, treat facts as instantiations of properties. (If
one disagrees with this, then simply treat the claim as a stipulation for current usage of
fact
.) We can then say that a (7-fact is the instantiation of some (7-property. In this
way, iff supervenes (in either sense) on Q, then the f-facts supervene on the £-facts.
Suppose, for example, that (GS) is true with respect to f and Q. Then no two ^-worlds
— worlds with the same distribution of ^-properties— differ with respect to the
instantiation of ^-properties. Given that facts are instantiations of properties, this
implies that no two (7-worlds differ with respect to j^-facts. Suppose, on the other hand,
that the f-facts globally supervene on the (7-facts. Then no two (7-worlds differ with
respect to their jF-properties or, at any rate, instantiations thereof. Thus, we can speak of
facts supervening on other facts, provided that we keep the foregoing convention in mind
— namely, that ‘J7- facts’ is short for ‘instantiation of ^-properties’.
With all this in mind, we can now turn to the relevant characterization of
materialism.
11
See Pauli & Sider (1992) for an excellent discussion of (GS).
9
1.1.3 Materialism As Supervenience
Materialism says that our world is physical through and through. Alternatively,
materialism says that everything in our world is physical. What this amounts to can be
spelled out in terms of global supervenience. But, first, what does ‘physical’ mean, here?
For purposes of this discussion, the meaning of ‘physical’ is to be understood
relative to contemporary physics. To begin, all properties of contemporary physics are
physical properties. Thus, the likes of mass, spin and charge, among many others, are
physical properties.
Unfortunately, contemporary physics is incomplete. Consequently, unless the
remaining, unknown properties are to count as non-physical, more must be said by way
of what makes a property physical. The best available option, here, is to appeal to
completed physics. In short, a property is physical just in case it’s included in the
completed physics of this world.
Clearly, the notion of included in must be spelled out. First, though, a brief note
about completed physics is in order . 12
Suppose that, contrary to reasonable expectations, the outstanding questions of
physics cannot be correctly answered without an appeal to angels. Then completed
physics will include (in a sense to be explained below) angels, in which case, by the
above proposal, angels are physical entities! This, however, runs counter to the relevant
sense of ‘physical’. Indeed, in this case, being physical amounts to little more than being
12
This responds to objections from Mellor & Crane (1990).
10
whatever is needed to fully explain everything, in which case materialism amounts to a
tnvial view indeed. What’s needed, here, is a qualification to the effect that ‘completed
physics is to be understood in terms of a reasonable extrapolation from current,
incomplete physics. Stating this qualification is very difficult, but the idea should be
clear enough. In the end, properties that are paradigmatically non-physical should not be
included in the extension of ‘completed physics’ - at least as the term is used in defining
‘physical property’. This is admittedly rough, but I hope it’s clear enough for discussion
to continue
.
13
What, now, of the notion of included ini The idea, here, is this. Consider some
theory, T. Consider the set, P
,
of the properties expressed by T’s predicates. Then a
property, F, is included in T just in case { F } at least globally supervenes on P . Thus,
the running definition of physical property has it that F is a physical property just in
case { F } at least globally supervenes on completed physics.
For simplicity, let’s assume the uncontroversial thesis that all properties of
macrophysics at least globally supervene on the properties of microphysics. Moreover,
for simplicity, let’s assume the same for completed physics; namely, that the properties of
completed macrophysics at least globally supervene on the properties of completed
microphysics. With this assumption, the definition of ‘physical property’ can be
tightened a bit as follows:
13
See section 1.4 for further discussion.
11
Dpp F is a Physical property iff {F } at least globally supervenes on the
properties of completed microphysics
.
14
Thus, macrophysical and microphysical properties are physical. (Note that, of course, all
properties in completed microphysics at least globally supervene on themselves.)
What about other properties of our world? What about properties like baldness?
What of love? What of money-orders, bank statements or beliefs? Are these physical
properties?
According to materialism, all properties of our world are physical properties.
Given Dpp , this amounts to the claim that all properties of our world at least globally
supervene on completed microphysics
.
15
What this amounts to requires repeating.
Materialism, at a minimum, is the view that our world is physical through and
through. By Dpp , this is the view that all properties of our world at least globally
supervene on microphysics. This, in turn, is the claim that the microphysical way
things are entails all the other ways things are in our world. Alternatively, the claim is
that all facts of our world at least globally supervene on the physical facts of our world.
This idea is very important.
14
‘iff is short for ‘if and only if.
15
1 will sometimes say things like “Such and such properties globally supervene on completed
microphysics.” This is short for ‘...globally supervene on the properties of completed microphysics’, etc..
Ib
For convenience, I will sometimes write ‘supervenes on microphysics’ as short for ‘supervenes on
completed microphysics’. Context should tell whether ‘microphysics’ is being used as short for ‘completed
microphysics’ or not.
12
Entailment, here, is to be understood as a relation between facts or propositions
.
17
In short, a fact or proposition,/?, entails a (not necessarily distinct) fact or proposition, q,
just in case necessarily,/? implies q. As above, ‘necessarily’ is to be understood in terms
of possible worlds. Specifically, ‘necessarily,/?’ means ‘/? is true at all possible worlds’.
Thus, necessarily,/? implies q ’ means ‘at all worlds,/? implies q\ At this point,
however, care must be taken with respect to ‘all’ in ‘all possible worlds’.
The expression all
,
of course, is a relative or scoped term. In particular, an
occurrence of all is relative to some domain— sometimes called a ‘domain of
discourse’. Thus, I speak truly by saying “All politicians are crooks” if the domain of
discourse contains only crooked politicians; I speak falsely if the domain contains all
politicians— or one would hope that I speak falsely! In any event, the same sort of
relativity applies to materialism’s entailment thesis.
The expression ‘all’ must be restricted to relevant worlds when we’re talking about
materialism’s main entailment thesis— namely, that the microphysical facts of our world
entail all the facts of our world. But which worlds are the relevant worlds?
The relevant worlds, at a minimum, are so-called physical duplicates of our world.
This idea is important enough to warrant its own special definition:
D
Pd For any worlds a and P: a is a physical duplicate of P just in
case a and P are indiscernible with respect to physical facts —
i.e., distribution of physical facts.
17
Given the going convention governing ‘facts’, it’s perhaps best to likewise treat propositions as
instantiations of properties. Some, however, will find this to be less than desirable; if so, simply treat
entailment as a relation between facts. This still allows us to say that facts are true and that propositions are
the relevant “truth-bearers.” In this case, x is a true fact if and only if x is the instantiation of bemg a true
proposition.
13
Thus, given Dpd , if p is a physical duplicate of a, then for any physical property, F, [3 has
F if and only if a has F. To say that p has F is to say that something in p instantiates F.
Accordingly, the worlds relevant to materialism’s entailment thesis are worlds that differ
from our world with respect to no physical fact— or, as above, instantiation of physical
property.
Of course, Dpd is an instance of a more general definition of duplicates which is
also worth laying out:
Dd For any worlds a and p, and any set of properties J7 : a and p
are ^-duplicates iff for any F eJ7 , a has F just in case P has F.
Note that, of particular importance, where J in Dd is the set of all properties
(instantiated) in some world, a and P are said to be duplicates simpliciter— i.e., they
differ with respect to no facts, or instantiations of properties, whatsoever.
So far, then, materialism is the claim that all facts of our world at least globally
supervene on the microphysical facts of our world. This yields the claim that all facts of
our world are entailed by the microphysical facts of our world. In turn, entailment, here,
is understood to be restricted to physical duplicates of our world. With all this,
materialism can be put initially as follows:
Dm Any physical duplicate of our world is a duplicate of our world
simpliciter.
Consider some physical duplicate of our world. By Dm , materialism is false if the given
world differs with respect to any fact whatsoever. This almost gets at the heart of
14
materialism. Almost. Trouble is, materialism, by all accounts, is false if Dm is all there is
to it.
The trouble can be seen this way. Consider a physical duplicate of our world
call it ‘a,’. Suppose that a, contains some extra, non-physical stuff— ectoplasm, as it
were. Minus the ectoplasm, our world and a, are duplicates simpliciter if, as materialism
has it, all facts at least globally supervene on the physical facts of our world. Given only
Dm , however, materialism is clearly false in the face of a,. The reason is that a, isn’t a
duplicate simpliciter, though it’s a physical duplicate.
Now the trouble with Dm is this. Materialists can— and should! — grant that there
are physical duplicates of our world which are not duplicates simpliciter. Worlds like a,
aren t hard to come by. Indeed, for any two ^"-duplicates in general, simply add some
extra non-J stuff to a world to get an J"-duplicate that isn’t a duplicate simpliciter. In so
doing you’ve described at least two J’-duplicates that aren’t duplicates simpliciter. The
task for the materialist, then, is to formulate materialism in such a way that worlds like aj
don’t falsify materialism.
This task is accomplished through the notion of minimal physical duplicates
.
18 The
idea is straightforward but highly important to present purposes. In short, a minimal J"-
18
Here and above, I follow Jackson (1993, 1994) and Chalmers (1996) who follow Lewis (1986) and,
ultimately, Horgan (1982). The expression ‘minimal physical duplicates’ and the forthcoming definition in
terms of it is due to Jackson (1993).
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duplicate is an J-duplicate with no “added stuff" The best way to understand this is via
the metaphor of “building worlds .” 19
Consider some possible world— cc2 . Suppose, now, that you set about to build a
duplicate of a2 . You take every property, relation, law, etc. and duplicate it, thus making
a property for property, relation for relation, etc., duplicate of cc2 . Call your duplicate
(X 3 . So far, 0,3 is a duplicate simpliciter of a 2 . You now have two options: (A) STOP!
or (B) ADD EXTRA STUFF! If you choose (A), a 3 will be a minimal J-duplicate of a2
for any set J of properties instantiated in a2 . If you choose (B), a 3 will be an J-
duplicate of a2 for any set J of properties instantiated in a2 but not a minimal J-
duplicate— and certainly not a duplicate simpliciter.
In the end, then, a minimal J-duplicate of some world, a, is what you get when
you build a perfect duplicate of a and then STOP. Accordingly, there are two immediate
but important results that follow. First, ot is a minimal J-duplicate of (3 only if ot is an
J-duplicate of (3. Second, a is a minimal J-duplicate of (3 only if there’s no element of
J in a that isn’t in (3— that is, all J-elements instantiated in a are instantiated in p, if a
is a minimal physical duplicate of p. Thus, given that a is a minimal J-duplicate of p, it
follows that a differs from p with respect to no J-properties whatsoever. This is
obvious from the foregoing, but it’s very important for later stages of this discussion.
Given the notion of minimal J-duplicates, we easily get the idea of minimal
physical duplicates. In short,
19 Some philosophers mightn’t call this a metaphor at all but, instead, call it the sober metaphysical truth
16
Dmpd a is a minimal physical dup licate of (3 if and only if a contains all
and only the physical properties instantiated in [3.
With this in hand, materialism can be tightened up to avoid the problem of “extra stuff.”
Specifically, the official formulation of materialism is this:
Dm Any minimal physical duplicate of our world is a duplicate
simpliciter.
20
Notice, of course, that Dm is simply an instance of (GS); it’s a specific instance in which
the relevant worlds are restricted to minimal physical duplicates. Accordingly, should
some properties of our world fail to at least globally supervene on the physical properties
of our world— as understood in Dpp— then there’s at least some world that isn’t a
duplicate simpliciter of our world. In that case, DM and, thereby, materialism is false.
Notice, too, that in order to undermine materialism, one must produce a minimal
physical duplicate of our world that is not a duplicate simpliciter. Describing a world
that’s almost a minimal physical duplicate of our world but not quite won’t do; a
refutation of materialism, at least as understood by Dm, must produce a genuine minimal
physical duplicate of our world that nonetheless differs from our world in some respect.
about the origins of possible worlds. This issue, however, needn’t concern us. Metaphor or not, the idea of
building worlds is heuristically valuable.
20
This is from Jackson (1993), who made this version of materialism popular. See, however, the
references in footnote #18, above, for the genealogy of this version of materialism— stemming at least to
Horgan (1982).
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Whether DM is indeed the “best” formulation of materialism is a separate but important
issue— an issue discussed later
.
21
For now, by way of review, we have it that any minimal physical duplicate of our
world is a physical duplicate with no extra stuff. If materialism is true, any minimal
physical duplicate of our world is a duplicate simpliciter— indiscernible in all physical
respects and all other respects as well. According to materialism, once you’ve specified
the complete physical nature of our world you’ve thereby specified the complete nature
of our world. But if there’s any description— whether physical or not— true of our
world but not true of a minimal physical duplicate of our world then materialism is
false .
22
Are there any alleged descriptions true of our world but false of some minimal
physical duplicate of our world? Yes. The most challenging such alleged descriptions
concern the mind and, in particular, qualia.
Before turning to these alleged “defeaters,” as it were, a few potential objections
should be discussed.
1.1.4 Objections and Replies
There are two important, related objections that might be raised so far. These are
objections to the given account of physical properties and to the official formulation of
21
I discuss this issue both in subchapter 3 of the current chapter and, also, near the end of the work in a
section concerning general objections to the project.
220f course, an alternative way of saying this is to say that, if materialism is true, then all the facts of our
world are entailed by the physical facts of our world. Indeed, DM entails this given our convention about
‘facts’.
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materialism. In this section I'll briefly treat each objection; the latter objection will be
taken up again much later in the discussion.
0.1. The objection to Dpp : According to Dpp , any property at least globally
supervening on the properties of- included in- completed microphysics is a physical
property. Granting the intelligibility of completed microphysics, Dpp still faces a
problem, namely, circularity. The trouble is, how do we explain what microphysics is?
In the end, microphysics is the study of the fundamental physical features of our world.
Obviously, if this is right, then microphysics cannot be used to define ‘physical’ on pain
of circularity. If it’s not right, then it’s not clear what microphysics is— in which case,
again, Dpp has conspicuous problems.
R. 1 . Response to 0.1: My response to 0. 1 is to admit, first, that it’s not at all easy
to define microphysics’; but, second, it’s not clear that ‘microphysics’, in principle,
cannot be defined without appeal to ‘physical properties’. Consider the following.
By my lights, it seems that any theory can be identified with its “theorems.” By
‘theorems’, here, I mean to indicate only the truths of the given theory— no formal
system need be involved, though a formal system would make things much easier. Let ‘T
be the set of all, and only, the truths of microphysics. 23 Then ‘microphysics’ can simply
be defined in terms of “T : Microphysics is the theory containing (and nothing else).
In order to get completed microphysics, we examine 'T and make some reasonable
extrapolation of the sorts of truths yet to be added to “T
.
In this way, ‘microphysics’ and
23
Yes, there is circularity in the way I’m putting this; but it’s not vicious circularity. To get around using
the term ‘microphysics’, imagine a list of the truths of microphysics. Then we let T be the set of all truths
on the given list, etc..
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'completed microphysics’ can be explained stnctly in terms of its truths and without any
appeal to physical properties— at least in principle.
So, it seems that 0.1 fails. In the end, though, I do assume of the reader some
familiarity with microphysics. Thus, I grant that Dpp mightn’t serve to teach one the
relevant meaning of ‘physical’ if one weren’t at all familiar with microphysics. But, as
said, I also assume that Dpp is sufficiently clear for those who do have at least a rough
acquaintance with microphysics.
Also, note that the greatest rival to Dpp has it that ‘physical’ is to be defined in
terms of spatial extension. 24 This, however, faces at least two problems. The first is
similar to that noted in 0.1; namely, circularity. The main trouble is that ‘spatial
extension is ambiguous between physical space and temporal space— let alone so-
called mathematical space. Hence, this route may well find circularity unavoidable. The
second problem, however, is that some properties— like being a void! — may lack
spatial extension in the relevant sense, while nonetheless being part of the story of
physics. If this is right, then on the going account physics appeals to non-physical
entities or properties, which at the very least seems to be prima facie paradoxical.
Finally, there’s another reason to accept Dpp— at least provisionally for current
purposes. In short, this is the definition provided by the main opponents of this
discussion— so-called zombiephiles, to be introduced in Chapter 2. As my aim, in large
24
See Moser & Trout (1995) for a good discussion.
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part, is to show that zombiephiles maintain an inconsistent view, I want to grant Dpp as
the relevant account of physical properties. 25
0.2. Objection to Dm: The main objection to Dm is that it’s too weak. In
particular, DM says nothing at all about how properties are distributed among individuals
in possible worlds, and thus says nothing about the exact relations— laws, for example
— governing microphysical and higher-level properties. 26 But this is a very weak
materialism indeed! Too weak! ! Any worthwhile materialism must say something about
what determines what; it must say something about which properties determine which.
But Dm, being a mere global as opposed to (say) strong— supervenience thesis,
speaks softly if at all on this matter. Such a materialism is too weak to be worth
discussing.
R.2. Response to 0.2: 0.2 is an important and frequently heard objection. There
are four main responses I will make to 0.2.
The first response is to grant that materialism says nothing at all about how
properties are distributed among individuals in possible worlds. I also grant that DM is
compatible with the absence of so-called bridge laws between the respective subvenient
and supervenient properties/ 7 Given these features. Dm certainly formulates a minimal
sort of materialism. For simplicity, the materialism formulated by DM can simply be
25
1 discuss this further in the next subchapter of Chapter 1, as well as in Chapter 2.
26
See Baker (1993, 1996) for a good discussion of these points. Note, though, that Baker certainly
wouldn’t endorse this objection, though she would agree with some of its premises.
27 NOTE: If by 'bridge laws’ we simply mean ‘entailment’ — i.e., entailment of higher-level properties by
lower-level— then I deny that DM is compatible with the absence of such bridge laws. Above, I"m taking
bridge laws to be necessary biconditional between natural kind terms. This goes beyond mere entailment;
and Dm is certainly compatible with the absence of these bridge laws. See section 1.4.2 for further
discussion.
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called ‘minimal materialism'. By my lights, minimal materialism shouldn't be rejected
on the basis of its minimal nature; and indeed, its minimal nature may be preferable to
stronger versions, as suggested in section 1
.4.3, below. Meanwhile, it’s important to see
that minimal materialism, contrary to 0.2, does say something about “what determines
what.” This topic makes up the second response.
As a second response, I deny that DM says nothing about determination. After all,
the relevant subvement properties entail the supervenient ones but not vice versa. In
other words, ifDM is true, then every property of our world is entailed by the
microphysical properties of our world; however, not every property of our world entails
the microphysical properties. A useful way to consider the matter resorts, again, to
world-building. If you want to build a perfect duplicate of our world, then, ifDM is true,
all you need to do is duplicate the microphysical bits of our world— the rest comes
along for free! This “free deal” is ensured by the truth ofDM ; and any such deal reflects
at least some significant sort of determination. Whether more determination is wanted is
another story which, again, will be touched on later in this project. 28
Along this vein, the third response is to note that a materialist of any stripe is
committed to Dm. For suppose that Dm is false." 9 Then some minimal physical duplicate
of our world differs in some way from our world. But by Dmpd , it follows that our world
contains something non-physical, which by any account of ‘materialism’, undermines
materialism. Thus, any materialist must affirm DM . That all materialists must endorse
28
See Chapter 5.
" 9
This follows Jackson & Braddon-Mitchell (1996).
22
Dm serves as another reason to call the relevant matenalism ‘minimal materialism.’ In
this case, DM is at least a necessary, minimal condition of materialism.
The charge of 0.2, of course, is that minimal materialism isn’t enough, or isn’t
sufficient, for genuine- perhaps “macho”- matenalism. My response is that whether
“enough” or not, minimal materialism has a better chance of being true than some
stronger version. Indeed, very little reflection on the probability calculus is required to
see that the smart money goes on minimal materialism versus any stronger sort. Besides,
there s plenty of alleged difficulties with minimal materialism that must be addressed
before endorsing stronger versions. This discussion, in the end, attempts to address such
alleged difficulties— which brings up one final point in response to 0.2.
Finally, another reason for adopting DM , at least provisionally, is that it’s the
definition used by the main opponents of this projects— namely, zombiephiles. This
makes sense. Zombiephiles, who will be discussed in the next chapter, want to
undermine materialism of any stripe. Thus, they attempt to undermine the most minimal
sort of materialism, which is given by Dm. At any rate, since, as above, my aim is to
show that zombiephiles fail I adopt their definition of materialism, which provides the
final reason for adopting DM .
With 0.1 and 0.2 answered, turn now to a discussion of alleged defeaters of
materialism and, in particular, the mind.
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1.2 The Mind Versus Materialism
In the previous subchapter, materialism — or minimal materialism— was
introduced. Materialism, like most philosophical views, has faced many challenges. In
this subchapter I present, among a few other topics, one of the, probably the, greatest
challenge to materialism: qualia. In turn, I narrow the focus of this discussion
considerably, setting out the main line of debate, namely, materialism versus
zombiephiles.
1.2.1 Mind: Intentional and Phenomenal
For centuries, the main challenge to materialism has been the mind
.
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Other things
- trees, rocks, ants and anything else without minds— pose no great threat to
materialism. All such non-mental things seem to supervene on the physical without
much problem— and, so, pose no real threat to materialism’s entailment thesis, DM .
Alas, the mind is different.
The mind divides into (at least) two parts: the intentional side and the phenomenal
or qualitative side." The intentional side ot the mind comprises intentional states—
states individuated by ‘that’-clauses. Primary examples of intentional states are beliefs
Some might point to numbers as another perennial challenge. This is a worthwhile discussion, but I
ignore it. My reason for ignoring it is that, for the most part, numbers aren’t clearly part of “our world” at
all. Numbers, if abstract, may exist in Plato s or Godel s heaven— where heaven is likewise beyond our
world. If this works, as I think it does, then such other-worldly entities are beyond the scope of
materialism’s DM . (Of course, some materialists may want to adopt a stronger version of materialism
according to which all that exists is physical. These materialists would be committed to DM but go further
than Dm . I’m not such a materialist, and I’m not concerned with such materialism in this project— though
see section 1.3 of chapter 1 and late chapters for further discussion of DM and materialism.)
There are other parts of the mind, perhaps; among these may be emotional, volitional and other states. In
the end, the qualitative side is the main issue, though the intentional should at least be touched upon. The
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and thoughts- the belief that p or the thought that q. The phenomenal side of the mind
comprises qualitative states or raw feels- mental states that are not individuated by
that
-clauses. Primary examples of qualitative states are pains, itches, tickles, tastings
and so on.
The main difference between intentional and qualitative states is that the latter but
not the former have qualia (singular is ‘quale ’). 33 But what are these?
‘Qualia’ is not at all an ordinary or common term; however, it names a very
common feature of our world. Consider being in pain, having an itch, experiencing a
tickle or tasting Vegemite. There’s something it’s like to be in pain, to have an itch, to
experience a tickle, to taste Vegemite and so on. What it’s like to have an itch is different
from what it’s like to taste Vegemite; and what it’s like to experience a tickle is different
from what it’s like to be in pain. It’s these “what it’s like” features of such states that are
called ‘qualia’ or ‘phenomenal features’. The painfulness of pain, the itchiness of an itch,
the ticklishness of a tickle— these are the qualia associated with the given qualitative
states. It’s these features, the phenomenal features, that distinguish the phenomenal from
the intentional side of the mind . 34
plan, accordingly, is to briefly discuss the mtentional, go into the phenomenal (and stay on it) but omit
discussion of other parts altogether.
"Qualification: Some intentional states may be qualitative. Moody (1995) and others have argued that
beliefs about qualia may be qualitative. Still, these beliefs are individuated by ‘that’-clauses, and at this
stage, that’s sufficient for the distinction. But see footnote #35, below for further discussion.
Of course, some people say that there aren t any qualia. Furthermore, there are important issues having to
do with whether the content, if any, of qualia is the same as the content of intentional states. I address these
issues in the dissertation. For now, I assume that there are qualia— where qualia are nothing more than
the “what it’s like” features of various mental states— and that their content, if any, is not the same as
intentional states. For some relevant discussion, see Harman (1990), Dennett (1988, 1991) and Block
(1994). Also see Hannan (1994) for relevant discussion.
34
Alas, the two “sides” of the mind may blend a bit. As in footnote 33, above, some philosophers have
suggested that beliefs and perhaps desires are both intentional and phenomenal. For present purposes,
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The distinction between phenomenal and intentional states of the mind is very
important to the current discussion. To be sure, there may be borderline cases in which
the distinction becomes blurry. Nonetheless, it's important to see that there is a
distinction, and that the two sides of the mind are significantly different when it comes to
materialism’s entailment thesis.
As a rule of thumb, if some mental state simply couldn’t fail to have associated
qualm, then that state is phenomenal; and if it could fail to have qualia, the state is not
phenomenal- and most likely, intentional. So, for example, consider the belief that
Clinton is president. In this case, there’s nothing it’s like to have this belief in the sense
in which there’s something it’s like to be in pain. There’s no qualitative “feel” associated
with the belief that Clinton is president. This belief may give rise to phenomenal states
— pain or pleasure, for example; but the belief, itself, doesn’t have any associated qualia.
Given the principle according to which what is the case could be the case, the belief that
Clinton is president could thereby fail to have associated qualia. Thus, by the rule of
thumb, the belief that Clinton is president is not a phenomenal state.
Likewise, it seems, with virtually any belief, thought or desire. Granted, desires
may at times seem to involve qualia— as in “I want ice-cream so badly I can taste it!”
Whether such a desire actually involves qualia is a difficult matter; but what’s fairly clear
is that such a desire needn’t involve qualia. After all, it seems perfectly possible that one
could have, say, a desire for ice-cream while nonetheless failing to have any associated
however, this issue can be put aside. The main reason that this issue can be put aside is that the main
opponents in this debate— namely, zombiephiles, who will be introduced in the next chapter— admit that
it’s doubtful that there are intentional states that are essentially phenomenal or qualitative; but this, as will
become clearer in due course, is what is relevant. Thus, for now the issue is better left to the side. But see
“Objections & Replies” in this subchapter, as well as Chapter 2, for further discussion.
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qualia. Imagine, for example, that you believe ice-cream is nutntious. Suppose, further,
that you desire to consume nutntious things. In this case, you may well desire ice-cream
but have no qualia associated with your desire. Similar, perhaps even better, stories can
be told with respect to most intentional states. They may at times seem to involve
associated qualia, but it’s likely that they don’t and even more likely that they needn’t
.
35
Genuinely phenomenal or qualitative states are different. Despite some claims to
the contrary
,
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something just wouldn’t be a pain if it weren’t painful; something
wouldn t be an itch if not itchy; and something wouldn’t be a tasting (as it were) if not for
tastiness. Suppose that Kezza says to her mother, “Mother, I’m in great pain.” The
mother replies, Where does it hurt, Kezza?” Kezza answers, “Oh, it doesn’t hurt
anywhere; there’s no painfulness involved at all; I’m simply in pain.” To this the mother,
along with the rest of us, would question Kezza’s competence with respect to the term
‘pain’. After all, if there isn’t any painfulness, then there isn’t any pain. Likewise for
any other phenomenal state.
Phenomenal states essentially involve qualia— or some “what it’s like” feature, in
the relevant sense. Intentional states don’t.
With this distinction in mind, it’s important to see the difference between these
states with respect to the challenge they pose to materialism. In short, intentional states,
though problematic in various ways, pose no great threat to materialism. Qualitative
35 The alert reader is right to suspect that I’m rushing here. The question of whether some intentional states
involve essentially involve qualia is more difficult than I’ve indicated. However, as will become clear, the
main issue of this discussion cuts through this matter in a variety of ways, each of which allowing us to
omit an in-depth discussion. See section 1.2.4, below.
36
See Lewis (1994), for example; and Gil Harman, in conversation, frequently echoes Lewis’ view.
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states, on the other hand, do. The next two sections are offered as a bnef explanation of
this claim. Intent,onal states are discussed first, and then phenomenal states are taken up.
1.2.2 Materialism and The Intentional Mind
At the outset, the mind was mentioned as a great challenge to materialism. And it
is. But as above, the mind comes in two different parts. In this section, the intentional
part is discussed with respect to materialism. The big question is: How does materialism
deal with the intentional side of the mind? How, in other words, do beliefs, thoughts,
desires and the rest of the intentional states fit into the materialist’s view of our world?
In the end, this question is less pressing to the current discussion than its correlate
concerning the phenomenal side of the mind. Still, it’s worthwhile to briefly discuss the
question before turning to the mam issue— namely, qualia and materialism.
How do intentional states find a place in the materialist’s picture? The main task
for the materialist, here, is to give a plausible story according to which intentional states
are— either necessarily or contingently— physical states. This task reduces to the task
of making plausible the claim that beliefs, thoughts, desires and so on at least globally
supervene on the physical. So how is this done?
As it turns out, there are a variety of ways of meeting this challenge. One popular
way attempts to analyze intentional states in terms of so-called functional states.
Functional states are defined strictly in terms of their causal or functional roles, without
any appeal to the “thing” that actually performs the given roles. Consider, for example, a
mousetrap. Taking the term ‘state’ broadly, the state (or property) of being a mousetrap
28
IS a functional state. Something is a mousetrap just in case it performs various causal
roles- catching mice, for a notable example! It doesn’t matter whether a mousetrap is
made of plastic, wood or recycled Coke cans. What matters is that, regardless of what
it s made of, the thing catches mice! If it does, it’s a mousetrap; if it doesn’t, it’s not . 37
What matters with respect to functional states is what the thing does— period.
Functionalism offers an approach to the task at hand, the task of showing that
intentional states are physical— as understood, again, in terms ofDpp . In one version of
functionalism, the materialist claims that intentional (mental) states are necessarily
functional states and contingently physical. The idea is that intentional states are
necessarily functional states that happen to be “realized” or instantiated by physical states
- usually, states of the brain. Thus, on this approach, intentional states find a spot in the
materialist’s view of our world. Other approaches are likewise available, each offering a
way to meet the task at hand.
Of course, like any philosophical view, functionalism, on any version, is plagued
by a variety of objections. Here, though, the objections needn’t be discussed.
Functionalism is but one approach to the challenge at hand. In the end, the fall of
functionalism, if one at all, is not necessarily the fall of materialism. Regardless of
functionalism’s fate, the view that intentional states find a suitable place in the
materialist’s picture remains plausible.
37
Strictly speaking, of course, a mousetrap may be a mousetrap despite catching no mice at all. Likewise
for any functional state or property. What matters, really, is that the thing is defined functionally; what
matters is that it’s disposed to take various input and yield various output. In this discussion, we’re not
particularly concerned with functionalism. I give it, here, as a mere indication of one way that materialism
might meet the so-called intentional challenge.
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One reason that the materialist view of intentional states— the view that such
states at least globally supervene on the physical - rematns plausible can be seen from
conceivabihty considerations. Putting Cartesian dualism as.de
,
39
it’s more than plausible
that you and any of your (minimal) physical duplicates would have precisely the same
intentional states. Star Trek offers a popular example, here. The captain says to Scottie,
Beam me up, Scottie!” Scottie obliges, and the captain is disassembled
— particle by
particle- and “beamed” through spacetime; and then the captain's particles are
reassembled. The result is the same captain with the same beliefs, thoughts and other
intentional states— or so the story has it.
Likewise with you and your duplicate. It seems that your duplicate would have
precisely the same intentional states as you- provided your twin is in a minimal
physical duplicate of your world! A common objection to this sort of scenario is that our
environment frequently plays a key role in determining what we believe. If your minimal
physical duplicate were in a world with something very similar to water but not exactly
water, it s plausible that s/he wouldn’t share any of your beliefs about water
.
40
So, your
physical duplicate may lack certain intentional states if s/he is in a different environment.
However, keeping the environment, throughout all of spacetime, constant it’s difficult to
For a classic overview of these problems, see Block (1978). For further discussion, see Stich & Warfield
(1994). For the early appearance of the version of functionalism briefly discussed above, see Armstrong
(1968). Lewis (1994) gives a nice recapitulation of the view.
Recall that, as in 1 . 1 , Cartesian dualism is left to the side virtually throughout this discussion. The
rationale, here, is that the mam opponents in this debate put Cartesian dualism to one side. The rationale
for this, as will be clearer in chapter 2, is that the main opponents of this debate maintain the causal closure
of the physical— which runs havoc with Cartesian dualism given other plausible assumptions about
overdetermination. These issues will become clearer and receive further discussion in Chapter 2.
For discussion of these “twin earth” issues, see Pessin (1995).
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accept that your physical duplicate could differ with respect to any intentional states 41
More specifically, provided that your duplicate is in a minimal physical duplicate of your
world, it’s difficult to see how your duplicate could differ from you with respect to
intentional states. How could your twin differ with respect to a belief, thought or desire?
In the end, a difference seems simply impossible
.
42
One objection, here, might be this. Suppose your twin is in world a,, while you’re
in the actual world, a0 . You and your twin, the objector grants, behave exactly alike—
both externally and with respect to your physical internal workings. However, suppose
that ai is a world in which your twin has precisely the same beliefs as you except that
s/he has an extra belief, a magically inserted extra one— call it ‘B’. (And suppose, to
make things simple, that B is consistent with the rest of the belief-set.) Then you and
your twin are minimal physical duplicates but, given B, your twin differs with respect to
at least one intentional state. There’s nothing at all incoherent about this; and, so, there’s
nothing incoherent in denying that one’s minimal physical duplicate could have different
intentional states.
The reply to this objection is straightforward. Agreed: There’s nothing at all
incoherent in the notion of a world so described— with magic and so forth. Likewise, a
41
Alas, things get tricky! Depending on one’s analysis of ‘actual’ in (say) ‘actual world’, and dependmg
on how we treat propositions or the content of one’s intentional states, your physical duplicate may of
course differ with respect to the belief that this is the actual world! The general problem, here, stems from
intentional content described by ‘that’-clauses involving indexicals. This is a tricky matter, but not
somethmg that the main discussion hmges on. By my own lights, the problems involved, here, meet the
beginnings of a solution in some of Kaplan’s work. See, especially, his “Demonstratives” in Almog, Perry
& Wettstein (1989).
4
~ The alert reader will ask “But what if some intentional states essentially involve qualia, and what if, as is
pnma facie plausible, qualia are not physical?” As above, I think it’s unlikely that there are any intentional
states that are essentially phenomenal. Nonetheless, the question deserves some attention, and will receive
some in Chapter II. But this must wait until Chapter II.
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minimal physical duplicate of yours could very well be in a world such as a, in which
your twin magically gets the extra belief, B. However, your twin could not be in a
minimal physical duplicate world. Consider, briefly, the following.
Let p be a minimal physical duplicate of our world. Let T-you be your twin in p.
Could T-you have an extra belief? No. Suppose, for reductio, that T-you could have an
extra belief. Let b be the extra belief. Now, either b is physical or not. If physical, then
P isn t a physical duplicate of our world— since it has an extra physical component,
namely b. If, on the other hand, b is nonphysical, then p doesn’t contain b— since p is a
minimal physical duplicate, which, by Dmpd , implies that p contains no nonphysical stuff.
Thus, in either case, T-you can’t have an extra beliefprovided that T-you is in a minimal
physical duplicate world. As in section 1.1.3, the materialist’s entailment thesis is
concerned only with minimal physical duplicates of our world, not physical duplicates of
any stripe. So the objection, here, doesn’t work.
Thus, whether functionalism or some other view stands up in the end, there’s fairly
strong reason to maintain that intentional states at least globally supervene on the
physical. Provided this much is granted, then materialism is safe from the challenge
posed by the intentional side of the mind.
Notice, though, before turning to the phenomenal side of the mind, that granting the
global supervenience of intentional states on physical states doesn’t at all answer the
question: Exactly what sort of physical states are intentional states? In other words,
granting the given supervenience claim leaves many important questions unanswered.
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This is another instance of a general objection to global supervemence claims, namely
that they just don’t tell us enough.
As in subchapter 1.1.4, 1 grant the above objection. Nonetheless, the current
discussion is concerned with the truth or falsity of materialism- minimal materialism, at
that. As above, the mind is often used as a chief objection to materialism, even in its
minimal form. Thus, provided that the intentional side of the mind does in fact globally
supervene on the physical, the intentional side of the mind thereby fails to undermine
minimal materialism— though it may well undermine more “macho” forms, of course. 43
In this discussion, the main focus is on minimal materialism. This is important to
keep in mind. I’ve suggested, above, that the intentional side of the mind doesn’t appear
to pose a terribly great threat to materialism, so construed. Of course, much more could
be said with respect to materialism and the intentional mind. In this discussion, however,
the main focus of debate rests not on the intentional but the phenomenal mind. It’s this
side of the mind to which we now turn.
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For further discussion of the materialist approaches to intentional states, see “objections & replies” in this
subchapter. As will be clear, the main debate in this discussion side-steps this issue by taking a fairly
straightforward assumption— namely, that intentional states do in fact at least globally supervene on the
physical.
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1.2.3 Materialism and The Phenomenal Mind
As in section 1.2.2, above, it’s plausible that the intentional side of the mind
globally supervenes on the physical bits of our world. The big challenge comes with the
phenomenal side of the mind. It’s this side of the mind— the qualitative side— which
poses the greatest challenge to materialism.
Why the greatest challenge to materialism?44 Qualia pose the greatest challenge to
materialism in this sense. There are philosophers who deny that materialism can account
for qualia but affirm that materialism can account for intentional states. 45 Moreover,
there are other philosophers who say that materialism can account for neither intentional
states nor qualia— i.e., that every aspect of the mind poses trouble for materialism’s
entailment thesis.46 Yet, despite all this controversy, there are no philosophers who say
that materialism can account for qualia but not intentional states. The idea is that if
anything will defeat materialism’s entailment thesis, it’s qualia— or the phenomenal
mind. That much is common ground. It’s in this sense that qualia pose the greatest
challenge to materialism.
44 As in footnote #31, some might say that numbers or “abstract entities” in general cause at least an equally
difficult problem for materialism. In this discussion, I’m not concerned with this issue. However, I should
point out that abstract entities, strictly speaking, are a problem only for “macho” versions of materialism, or
at any rate versions stronger than that of minimal materialism (or DM). Abstract entities are necessary
entities. Thus, they trivially supervene (in any sense of ‘supervene’) on the physical. This, at any rate, is
one response to the claim that abstract entities are a great challenge to materialism. Another response is
given in footnote #1 above. (Of course, I'm not pretending that the nature of numbers isn’t a difficult
matter. I think it is. I also fmd it to be quite fascinating. The point, here, is that it’s not an issue relevant to
the current discussion.)
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These philosophers are important to the main issue, here. These philosophers are the zombiephiles, to be
introduced in Chapter 2. (A list of names and references will be given in Chapter 2.)
46
This group is a smaller group, but Swinburne (1986) may be among them.
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But why? Why are qualm so troubling? This question is one of the mam questions
of Chapter 2, and so a fuller answer will be given there. For now, however, a few
comments will be given by way of indicating the troublesome nature of qualia.
There are many objections to materialism based on qualm. The most fundamental
and, recently, most discussed objection is based on a conceivability argument. This
objection will be the focus of Chapter 2, and in many ways the focus of this overall
project. For now, a few of the other long-standing and popular objections will be
discussed.47 I should make it clear, though, that despite their interesting features, the
following objections are not the mam focus of this project. I will attempt to briefly brush
the sort of reply that might be given to the following objections, but I won’t— and don’t
pretend to cover them in depth. 48 The main aim of this section is to set aside the
objections dealt with here in an effort to clear the way for the main focus to come— the
zombie objection.
Three Popular Objections to Materialism Based on Qualia 49
The Ownership Objection: Suppose that accidentally you put your hand on an
extremely hot stove. You soon begin to feel terrible pain. Now, the ownership objection
divides into two parts— each part accentuating a different but relevant sense of
‘privately owned’.
4/ Some of the following arguments likewise hinge on certain conceivability claims. However, they’re not
quite as explicit about the conceivability premises as the argument in Chapter 2 is. Here, I glide over the
conceivability elements as much as possible, since those elements will be duly addressed in Chapter 2.
‘ The only exception to these qualifications concerns the last of the given objections— the so-called
explanatory gap objection. In this section, this problem is dealt with briefly. However, the problem
receives further discussion near the end of the overall discussion. The other two listed objections do not
receive much further treatment than that given in this section.
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The first part of the objection is notes that the pain you feel in response to the hot
stove is “private” to you in the following sense. While someone else could perhaps
experience a pain that feels exactly like yours, nobody else could experience the exact
same pain that you experience. (Putting this in terms of “types” and “tokens,” someone
else could perhaps experience a token of the same type of pain but not the exact same
token.) In this way, your pain is privately owned— nobody else could possibly have it.
Now the objection is this. In short, physical objects are not such that exactly one
person, if any, could have them. Physical objects can be owned by anyone— or could
be, anyway. (You own, or have, your stove; but I could have it.) Since pains and any
other qualitative state can be had by exactly one person if any, pains aren’t physical.
The second part of the Ownership Objection emphasizes that the relevant notion of
ownership runs even deeper than what’s indicated in the first part of the objection. In
short, pains or any qualitative state— are always someone s; that is, they’re always
owned by someone or other. In other words, if there’s some pain, if pain is instantiated,
then it s always someone s pain never something standing alone, never without a
subject of the given painful state. Thus, pains or other phenomenal states cannot fail to
belong to some sentient creature or other. But, runs the second part of the objection,
physical objects (or properties) aren’t like this. Physical things needn’t belong to anyone
at all, and in many cases don’t belong to anyone at all. Since pains and other phenomenal
states must belong to someone or other, pain and other phenomenal states aren’t physical.
49
For a nice discussion of these and other objections, see Tye (1995). My presentation of the given three
objections follows Tye’s own— fairly closely. Note, however, that Tye, himself, doesn't respond to the
objections in the way I suggest.
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qualitative states exist, materialism is undermined - since materialism
says that anything that exists is physical.
What should the matenalist say in response to the Ownership Objection? I think
there are a couple of plausible responses the materialist can make. Here, I’ll concentrate
on one.
In short, it s not at all clear that the objector’s sense of ‘physical’ is the relevant
one, at least for purposes of this discussion. For purposes of this discussion, physical
properties (facts, etc.) are to be understood in terms ofDpp , as spelled out in subchapter
1.1. So the response that a materialist might make— or, at any rate, a response a
minimal materialist might make— is to question the relevant sense of ‘physical’. In
particular, it’s not at all clear that no physical states are “privately owned” in the
objector’s sense.
Consider, for example, intentional mental states. According to the Private
Ownership objection, qualitative states can’t be physical since tokens of them can’t be
“had” by more than one individual, and also that necessarily they’re always “had” by
some agent or other.
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But this seems to be true of intentional states as well. Granted,
you and I can both have the same belief— for example, the belief that grass is green.
50
Again, some might object that Dpp specifies a far too weak sense of ‘physical’. As in subchapter 1.1,
however, this is not an issue that need concern us here. In the end, D
pp specifies the sense of ‘physical’
germane to the main debate of project. (This will be clearer in Chapter 2.) Besides, most stronger senses
of ‘physical’ have fairly decisive objections— as, again, mdicated in subchapter 1.1.
The scare quotes are important here. Another reply one might give to the Private Ownership objection is
to question the relevant sense of ‘ownership’ or ‘possession’. I don’t do this here, mostly for reasons of
space. (Recall that, as above, my replies in this sections are intended merely to brush, in broad strokes, the
direction of replies a materialist might make.)
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Here, though, we share a belief type. It's not at all clear that we could share the same
belief token. If, as is plausible, belief tokens are located in spacetime, it’s likely that two
different agents couldn’t share the same belief token. Furthermore, it’s fairly clear that
belief tokens are always “had” by some agent or other— though this isn’t true of belief
types. Similarly for any other intentional state: they seem to be “privately owned” in the
same sense that qualitative states are privately owned. As in subchapter 1.1, however,
intentional states are very likely physical states insofar as it’s likely that they at least
globally supervene on the physical.
Notice, too, that this reply might work even if belief tokens aren’t genuine concrete
parts of spacetime at all, as some philosophers might hold." 2 Consider, for example, the
property of being Bev’s belief that grass is green. Presumably, this is something that, if
instantiated, is always instantiated by some sentient creature. Moreover, it’s something
that, if instantiated, it’s instantiated by exactly one subject. You could of course have the
belief that grass is green; but it seems nonsensical to say that you could have Bev’s belief
that grass is green. If the claim sounds like it makes sense, then it’s likely being read as
You could have a token of the same belief type that Bev has’. But the claim at issue is
that you could have the very belief token that Bev has. This, it seems, is nonsensical,
even if belief tokens aren’t concrete entities in spacetime.
If all this is right, then the Private Ownership objection implies that intentional
states aren t physical. But this is implausible. Of course, more could be said with respect
to the Private Ownership objection and materialism. Here, however, the point is to give
38
only the hint of a reply, as these objections aren't the main focus of discussion. Tum.
then, to the second long-standing objection to materialism based on qualia
.
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The Perspectival Objection
: Consider again your experience of touching the
extremely hot stove. Consider, that is, the terrible pain you experienced. Presumably,
knowing all there is to know about the state you were in- the given state of pain-
involves knowing what it is like to be in that state. Presumably, one who knows an
impressive lot about your given state of pain but nonetheless doesn’t know what it’s like
to experience that pain thereby fails to know something important about your given
mental state. But how could a person know what it’s like to touch a very hot stove unless
one has undergone a very similar experience? It seems that one simply couldn't know
and this, in the end, is the problem.
52 "
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Baker ' s view
’
her practical realism, seems to fall into this category. See Baker (1996). Instrumentalist
views would likewise fall into this category. See, for example, Dennett (1987) for a selection of relevant
articles.
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Another, though perhaps more controversial, reply might appeal to so-called world-indexed properties.
Let the actual world be named ‘a0 \ It’s contmgently true that Baker is a famous philosopher (at least in
Australasia, I’m told!). There are some worlds in which Baker is neither famous nor a philosopher, which
is why the claim is merely contingently true. But consider the property of being a famous philosopher at
a
°;
There’s no world m which Baker fails to have this property, and so ‘Baker is a famous philosopher at
cto’ is necessarily true.
Now, suppose we accept these world-indexed properties. Then this gives us a quick reply to the
Private Ownership objection. In short, let ‘b rigidly designate Clinton's nose. Consider the property:
bemg b at cc 0 . This is a property such that necessarily, if it’s instantiated at all, it’s instantiated by exactly
one sentient creature— assuming that Clmton is actually sentient (or sentient at a0 )! Surely, though, b is a
physical object. But, as indicated, being b at a0 is “privately owned” in the given sense. Thus, the Private
Ownership objections fails provided that world-mdexed properties are granted. (If one is worried about an
haecceity being involved in being b at a0 , then simply use the property: being Clinton’s nose at a0—
where ‘Clinton’ rigidly designates Clinton.)
I should note that I’m not endorsing world-indexed properties, though I do think that they’re quite
interesting. I also believe that, should world-indexed properties stand up in the end, this response to the
Private Ownership objection is worth developing. As above, though, the Private Ownership objection isn’t
a main concern of this project; so, I won’t pursue it further, here. (For the beginnings of world-indexed
properties, see Plantinga (1974). For a discussion of potential problems with world-indexed properties, see
Beall (in progress).)
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Pains and other phenomenal states are perspective in that a full comprehension of
those states requires taking on a certain “perspective”- in particular, a certain
experiential perspective, as it were. Suppose that Mark has never experienced pain. How
could you communicate to him exactly, or even roughly, what it’s like to be in pain?
You could of course tell Mark an impressive lot about pain— that it does this and that,
that it s typically caused by such and so. It seems, however, that you couldn’t possibly
tell Mark about the qualia associated with pain— what it’s like to be in pain. The only
way Mark could come to understand the lull nature of pain, including the phenomenal
feel of pain, is to take on a certain perspective— namely, an experiential perspective that
affords acquaintance with the painfiilness of pain.
Physical states are not like this at all. In order to fully comprehend some physical
property, one needn’t take on some special perspective. Indeed, in principle, one need
only read a book or two— in order to fully comprehend the full physical story of our
world. (Of course, the given books are still forthcoming or at least in progress!) No
special perspective is required. Since qualitative states are significantly different in this
respect, qualitative states are not physical.
The Perspectival Objection is this: Qualitative states are perspectival; that
is, full knowledge of such states requires some special “experiential
perspective.” Physical states (properties, facts, et cetera) are not
perspectival. Thus, qualitative states are not physical. Hence, given that
qualitative states exist, materialism is undermined — since materialism
claims that all existent things are physical.
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What should a materialist say in response to the Perspectival Objection? Again,
there are vanous responses that a materialist might make, here. I’ll concentrate on one
.
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The mam response is that being perspectival doesn’t necessarily conflict with being
physical. According to the Perspectival Objection, physical states are (essentially) such
that they don’t require any special perspective— any “experiential perspective.” But
even if it s granted that we cannot fully comprehend qualitative states without a certain
“experiential perspective”- and, so, even if it’s granted that qualitative states are
perspectival" in the given sense (a sense which isn’t clear !)
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— it hardly follows that
qualitative states aren t physical.Consider the following.
Being perspectival, as the objection “defines” it, is relative to a certain cognitive
capacity. The idea is that if a certain special perspective— and “experiential
perspective”— is required for full understanding of F, then F is perspectival. The
objection claims that no physical properties are like this. But this isn’t clearly true. If
this objection is correct, then, given Dpp , it ought to be incoherent to speak of a property
that at least globally supervenes on microphysics and is such that full comprehension of
that property requires a special experiential perspective.” But, at least on the surface,
this doesn’t seem to be incoherent at all.
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The idea for this response stems from McGinn’s proposed “solution” to the mind-body problem. See
McGinn (1991). The core of the reply is the notion of cognitive closure, the beginnings of which may go
back to Locke’s Essay. For recent developments, see McGinn (1991), Chomsky (1975) and Fodor (1983).
Though I don’t think this sort of approach works as a genuine solution to the mind-body problem, I do
think it offers at least the beginnings of a reply to the Perspectival Objection.
The unclarity of ‘perspectival’, as it’s used in the Perspectival Objection, should give further pause as to
the effectiveness of the objection. 1 don’t spend time, here, spelling out possible interpretations of
‘perspectival’ due to space limitations. Instead, I trust that at least a rough sense of the term is in hand.
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Indeed, as I’ll argue later on- especially in Chapter 5 - qualia do at least
globally supervene on the mierophysics (or, at any rate, microphys.es and everyth,ng
that, at least by common assumptions, globally supervene on microphysics). If, as I’ll
argue, the relevant arguments of this project are sound, then there’s no incoherence at all
in the notion of a perspectival physical property— granting, as per the current objection,
that qualia are indeed perspectival.
Of course, in the end, this particular exchange may come down to a difference in
views on the nature ofphysical properties. For current purposes, physical properties are
to be understood in terms of global supervenience, completed mierophysics, et cetera —
in short, Dpp . Perhaps the proponent of the Perspectival Objection will insist on a
different account of physical properties. 56 If so, this becomes a separate issue. For now,
however, it’s important to recall that Dpp is the relevant account ofphysical properties.
And there s no reason given to think that perspectival properties cannot be physical in
this sense. (See, too, the discussion in 1.1.4 for criticism of other prominent proposals of
the nature ofphysical properties
.)
My response to the Perspectival Objection, then, is simply this: Either it’s account
ofphysical properties is irrelevant to the current debate or, if it is relevant, the objection
gives no reason to think that physical properties cannot be perspectival. In addition, if
the Perspectival Objection requires a different account of ‘physical property’, then the
suggestions in section 1.1.4 against prominent alternative accounts becomes relevant.
56 Whether this is so isn’t clear. Tye (1996) contains a very good discussion of the Perspectival Objection.
But in his discussion, it remains unclear whether physical properties are to be understood in terms of D
pp
or
otherwise. For present purposes, though, Dpp is the official account of physical properties— as this is the
account of those who endorse the main arguments of this project (the Zombie Argument and the
Knowledge Argument, to be introduced in later chapters).
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(See section 1.1.4 for discussion.) Besides, it seems, at least to me. that it’s a bad idea to
define ‘physical property’ in terms of our cognitive capacities- as the Perspective
Objection does. One brief consideration should make this clear.
Take some physical property, F. Suppose that, as things stand, full understanding
of F by us requires a certain “experiential perspective.” Well, this is just how things
stand— how, given our current cognitive capacities, things contingently happen to be.
But suppose that our cognitive capacities were altered in some way. Suppose, in
particular, that we were given faculties that could fully comprehend F without any such
experiential perspective. Then F would no longer be perspectival. It seems, though, that
if F is physical, it ought to be physical regardless of our cognitive capacities. For this
reason, it seems like a bad idea to define ‘physical property’ relative to our cognitive
capacities.
Furthermore, consider the so-called theory of everything. This theory has been
pursued by a great number of brilliant physicists. Yet, despite enormous amounts of
effort (and money!), the discovery of the theory continues to elude human grasp. 57 It
may well be that the relevant properties required by the theory are simply beyond the
cognitive capacities of humans. Of course, maybe they’re not beyond human capacities.
But if they are, this seems like a bad reason to say that the relevant properties are
nonphysical. This is another reason at least for caution against defining ‘physical
57
For an interesting discussion of this project and its current status, see Hawking (1993).
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properties’ relative to our cognitive capacities. As above, however, this is what the
Perspectival Objection seems to do . 58
As with the Ownership Objection, there’s more that could be said with respect to
the Perspectival Objection and materialism. The hope, however, is that enough has been
said to at least suggest a plausible reply on behalfof the materialist. As above, the
current objections are long-standing and important; but they’re nonetheless not the main
focus of this project. For now, turn to the final of the three objections considered in this
subchapter.
The Explanatory Gap Objection : T. H. Huxley famously exclaimed: “How it is
that anything so remarkable as a state of consciousness comes about as a result of
irritating nervous tissue, is just as unaccountable as the appearance of Djin when Aladdin
rubbed his lamp. Others have rightly echoed the cry— begging for some explanation
of how, exactly, the lump of soft, mushy gray and white matter in our heads gives rise to
“technicolor phenomenology.”60 If materialism is true, then this explanation must be in
terms of purely physical properties. The trouble is, nobody has a clue as to how such an
explanation would run; and, worse, it’s likely that no such explanation could run— at
least not in physical terms.
The situation, here, is a common one with respect to so-called higher-level and
lower-level properties or facts. The distinction is also sometimes put in terms of macro-
58
For further discussion of this sort of reply against the Perspectival Objection, see McGinn (1991).
McGinn, incidentally, is forced to argue against this sort of objection given that on his view, qualitative
states are both physical but beyond our cognitive grasp. See Chomsky (1975) and Fodor (1983) for related
concerns agamst taking 'the physical’ to be defined relative to our cognitive capacities.
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T.H. Huxley (1866), quoted in Tye (1995) (and on my computer screen-saver!).
<>0 McGinn (1991) is responsible for the dramatic “technicolor phenomenology” expression.
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level and micro-level properties or facts. Consider, for example, the property of liquidity.
One might well wonder how it is that tiny molecules can account for the properties
involved in liquids. The puzzle, here, is to understand how the micro-level facts about
molecules “give rise” to the macro-level facts about liquidity. The solution, here, comes
with an analysis of ‘liquidity’. Once one recognizes that liquidity is a dispositional
property— the property of being able to be poured smoothly, as it were61 — and that
certain molecules (in certain states) realize this disposition, then the puzzle is solved.
H20 molecules, for example, are such that in certain conditions they’re disposed to move
freely by one another— they can be poured smoothly. With this analysis of ‘liquidity’ in
hand, then, the puzzle is solved. (A parallel analysis works for ‘brittle’, ‘hard’, and so
The trouble with qualitative states is that it seems next to impossible to find an
analysis of such states that will afford an appropriate explanation. Indeed, runs the
objection, it seems simply unimaginable that qualia can be analyzed or otherwise
explained in terms of physical properties. 62 In the end, then, it seems that physical
properties cannot account for the “what it’s like” features of our minds. We simply
cannot understand or explain qualia in terms of the physical.
The Explanatory Gap Objection , then, is this: If materialism is true, then
the phenomenal side of the mind is explicable in terms of physical
properties. But to explain qualia in terms of physical properties requires
an analysis of ‘qualia’ or some explanation of qualia in physical terms.
This, however, is seemingly impossible.
61
I’m not pretending that this is the right analysis, of course; it’s used only for illustration of the objection.
6
~ Popular support for this sort of claim comes from Jackson’s knowledge argument, which will be
discussed at length in Chapter IV. Jackson’s argument is one of the two main targets of this project, though
his argument is postponed until Chapter IV.
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What should the materialist say in response to the Explanatory Gap objection?
Once again, there are a variety of responses available. In this case, however, there’s one
fairly straightforward reply that should be made at the outset.
In short, the objection maintains the conditional: If materialism is true, then the
phenomenal side of the mind is explicable in terms of physical properties. But is this
true?
The trouble, here, revolves around the term ‘explicable’. For convenience, say that
property (or fact) F is explicablen) in terms of property (or fact) G only if F and G are of
the same kind. (‘Kind’, here, picks out classes such as physical properties, mental
properties, etc.. Nothing metaphysically controversial is intended by the term.) In turn,
say that property F is explicable^) in terms of property G only if F can be understood (by
us!) in terms of property G. With this distinction in mind, an important problem with the
Explanatory Gap objection is easily seen.
Consider, again, the objection’s main premise: If materialism is true, then the
phenomenal side of the mind is explicable in terms of physical properties. Is this premise
true? The answer is ‘yes’ if the term is understood in the sense of ‘explicable(1) ’ but not
‘explicable^)’. After all, if materialism is true, then phenomenal properties are included
in physical properties— as understood in terms ofDpp . In this case, phenomenal
properties are explicable^
)
in terms of physical properties.
On the other hand, if the main premise of the Explanatory Gap objection implies
the sense of ‘explicable^)’, then the premise is false. The issue is similar to that in the
Perspectival Objection. In short, whether we can understand the J’-facts of our world in
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terms of the (7-facts has little to do with whether the two sets of facts are physical— or
of some other kind. A failure to understand some set of facts in terms of another is just
that: a failure to understand. Nothing ontologically significant follows from such a
failure. Consider my cat. Beetle. Beetle’s failure to understand, say, transfinite cardinal
arithmetic has no bearing on what sorts of property are involved in that domain.
Likewise with us and the physical world.
Thus, the trouble with the Explanatory Gap objection arises with its use of
‘explains’. The objection is plausible only if ‘explicable,,)’ but not ‘explicable,2) ' is being
used. But in that case, an analysis of ‘qualia' isn’t required for an explanation— an
explanation i), as it were.
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Though this, I think, is a sufficient reply to the Explanatory Gap objection, the
objection still raises an important issue. Huxley had a point. The phenomenal mind is
indeed an oddity, especially from the materialist’s view of the world. It would certainly
be nice to have an analysis of qualia in physical terms, especially if materialism is true!
For that matter, it would be nice to have some idea of the kind of physical property qualia
are— if indeed they are physical. What we want, in short, is an understanding of qualia
and there place in the materialist’s picture. This is an issue that the Explanatory Gap
objection accentuates. This is also an issue to which we’ll return in late stages of this
discussion.
For now, there remains a fundamental and recently popular objection to
materialism based on qualia. If the objection is successful, then any hope of
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understanding the place of qualia in the materialist’s p.cture is a futile hope. For if the
objection is successful, materialism’s picture is simply wrong— shattered, as it were.
The objection m question is the objection from zombie worlds. It’s this objection to
which the present discussion is mainly addressed. And it’s to this objection that we now
turn.
1.3 Review of Chapter 1
In this chapter the basic ideas for the current project were introduced. Physical
properties are properties that at least globally supervene on the microphysical properties
of our world. A set of properties or facts J globally supervenes on a set of properties or
facts Q just in case no two J-duplicates differ with respect to g-facts (or instantiations
of (^-properties).
The relevant sort of materialism being defended in this project is minimal
materialism the view according to which any two minimal physical duplicates of our
world are duplicates simpliciter. The intentional side of the mind is likely to raise few
problems for minimal materialism; and, at any rate, the current discussion assumes that
the intentional side of the mind is physical— as will become clear in Chapter 2.
The real problem for materialism is the qualitative side of the mind. In this chapter,
three long-standing objections to materialism based on qualia have been dealt with.
Whether they’ve been adequately avoided is an issue left to the reader. What’s important
63
I’m grateful to Lynne Baker’s criticisms of an earlier draft of this response. I’m also grateful to David
Braddon-Mitchell and Dave Chalmers for helpful correspondence on the issues involved.
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to the current project is an objection to come— the zombie objection. It's to this
objection that we now turn.
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CHAPTER 2
THE ZOMBIE ARGUMENT
In Chapter 1, materialism was introduced. The way to defeat materialism, or
mimmal materialism, is to describe a minimal physical duplicate of our world that fails to
be a duplicate simpliciter. The focus of this chapter, and much of the overall project, is
one such alleged defeater of materialism— zombie worlds. In the first subchapter,
zombie worlds, as understood in this discussion, and the corresponding Zombie
Argument will be introduced. In the second subchapter, common objections to the
Zombie Argument will be examined. The final subchapter will offer a brief review. For
now, turn to zombies, zombie worlds, and the Zombie Argument.
2.1 Zombies, Zombie Worlds, and The Zombie Argument
In this subchapter, I will present the main argument to which this project is
addressed— the Zombie Argument. Before the argument can be presented, zombies
themselves must be presented. After zombies are presented, zombie worlds can be
presented. So this subchapter presents zombies, zombie worlds and the Zombie
Argument— in that order. Along the way this subchapter, as well as subchapter 2.2, is
intended to narrow the focus of this discussion considerably by making the relevant
opponents of the discussion clearer.
2.1.1 Zombies
Materialism claims that our world is physical through and through, as spelled out in
Chapter 1 . This includes the mental part of our world, which in turn includes the
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phenomenal mental part. It’s this part, the phenomenal part, that’s most challenging to
materialism. And it’s this part to which zombies are addressed.
Zombies are supposed to be minimal physical duplicates of us that nonetheless lack
qualia
.
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In other words, zombies are supposed to be physically indiscernible from us in
every respect but they lack qualia.
Consider, for example, my zombie twin. My twin is a physical duplicate ofme in
every respect. Thus, as I type this sentence, my zombie twin types this sentence. As I
read the previous sentence and type this sentence, my zombie twin does the same. Every
instance ofmy behavior is duplicated in the behavior ofmy zombie twin. Thus, when I
say “How interesting it is to think about zombies!”, my zombie twin says the same.
The important (and only) difference between me and my zombie twin is that there’s
something it’s like for me to, say, perceive red, whereas there’s nothing it’s like for my
zombie twin to do the same. Likewise with pains, tickles, itches and so on. Physically,
my twin and I are exactly the same; but whereas I experience the painfulness of pain, “all
is dark inside for my twin. My zombie twin behaves as ifhe were in pain, or as if
being tickled, or et cetera
;
in the end, though, this is merely “as if.” My zombie twin has
all the physical resources to duplicate me physically, including the physical components,
Zombies were introduced by Kirk (1974) but made popular— wildly popular, as a glimpse at the world
wide web (philosophy links) will easily testify— by Chalmers (1995, 1996). Other related stories,
including the Tik-Tok story found in Matthews (1977), contain the seeds of zombies. Other well-known
zombie-ish stories include Jackson (1986)— whose Mary story will be discussed at length in Chapter III
— and, also, Nagel (1974, 1986). See also Campbell (1970), and the dramatic recent surge of attacks based
on zombies in Tye (1996), Flanagan (1992), Kirk (1974a), Hamad (1994), Bringsjord (1995), Mills (1995),
Giizeldere (1995) and Sutherland (1995).
65
The ‘all is dark’ is from Chalmers (1996).
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if any, of qualitative states. What he lacks, however, are qualia— the essential
ingredient for a bona fide phenomenal life.
At this point, it’s important to recall that qualm are to be understood in terms of the
what it s like features” of paradigmatic qualitative states— states like pain, tickles,
itches, seeing red, and so on. Moreover, as in Chapter 1, qualitative states essentially
involve qualia. 66 None of this is to say that states other than the paradigm cases aren’t
qualitative; there may well be some. For example, it seems that there’s something it’s
like to have anxiety, or to be very excited, or er cetera
.
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But whether these states are
qualitative depends on whether the given “what it’s like features” are both essential to the
states and, also, sufficiently like the what it’s like features of the paradigm cases. The
point, in the end, is that ‘what it is like’ may apply to many states, but this isn’t enough to
make those states qualitative or, for that matter, to make the relevant “what it’s like
features qualia. Qualia are those “what it’s like features” of our world that are
sufficiently like the what it’s like features of paradigm qualitative states. And it’s these
features, the qualia, that zombies lack.
Zombies, then, are (minimal) physical duplicates of us that lack qualia and only
qualia. Except for the absence of qualia, zombies are complete duplicates of us. If,
beyond the paradigm qualitative states, there are other states that require the instantiation
of qualia, then zombies lack these states too. But this is an issue that will be addressed
more fully in subchapter 2.2. At this stage, it’s best to keep in mind that zombies are
b6 As in Chapter I, this definition of ‘qualitative states’ is a concession to the main opponents of this
project. But it’s a very easy concession to make, at least on my part. It seems to me that pain, itches and
the like do indeed essentially involve qualia. But, again, this is a concession to zombiephiles - to be
introduced below.
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exactly like us in every respect- with respect to every property, state, or « cetera -
except that zombies lack qualia.
Some readers may already have objections to the notion of zombies. Many of these
objections may be addressed in subchapter 2.2. For now, it’s best to w.thhold objections
until the notion ofzombie worlds is introduced. For in the end, zombie worlds, not
zombies, are what matter to materialism’s main entailment thesis. Accordingly, turn to
the notion of zombie worlds.
2.1.2 Zombie Worlds
Are zombies logically possible? Maybe. Notice, however, that even if zombies are
possible, they make little difference to the truth or falsity of materialism’s entailment
thesis. What is needed, in the end, is a zombie world. Recall that materialism—
minimal materialism— is a global supervenience thesis. Thus, noting the possibility of
ghosts, goblins or, especially, zombies doesn’t address the claim in question. As in
Chapter 1, what is needed is a world of zombies (and no qualia).
The point, here, should be clear. Materialism claims that any minimal physical
duplicate of our world is a duplicate simpliciter. Suppose that someone objects to
materialism by noting the possibility that there could be a minimal physical duplicate of
you that isn’t a duplicate simpliciter. Consider, for example, the possibility of your
minimal physical duplicate differing with respect to some belief. While you believe that
water is H20, your minimal physical duplicate believes that twater is H20. (Your twin’s
67
Lynne Baker raised this issue in correspondence. See Jackson & Braddon-Mitchell (1996), as well as
Tye (1996) for further discussion of where to place the non-paradigm cases.
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belief would be false, on the standard story. 68) Is this a good objection to (minimal)
materialism? The answer is “no ” The reason is that the object,on duplicates only a
proper part of our physical world while failing to duplicate the entire physical world,
leaving H20 out of it. Though these stories are interesting and indeed might be damaging
to “macho” verstons of materialism, they don’t at all damage minimal materialism -
which, again, is the only relevant materialism in this discussion.
For this reason, zombies alone won’t do. What we need are zombie worlds. Given
the discussion in Chapter 1
,
these are easily enough described.
Dzw a is a zombie world iff a is a minimal physical duplicate of the
actual world; and a is devoid of qualia.
Note that devoid of qualia’ is to be understood to mean ‘there is no instance (or token) of
qualm at all’. Someone might say that the property of being quale Q necessarily exists
insofar as properties in general necessarily exist; and insofar as the property is there, the
given world isn t devoid of qualia. Maybe so. Whether properties are really like this
isn’t important. The important point, with respect to the current discussion, is that
nothing in any zombie world ever instantiates qualia. In short, for any individual in any
zombie world, it’s false that that individual has qualia— in the sense of ‘has’ in which
we have qualia.
For convenience, those who endorse the existence of zombie worlds are called
zombiephiles
. But, at least in this discussion, zombiephiles, as the term is used here,
68
See Pessin (1995) for an excellent summary of twin-earth and related stories.
6
The expression comes from Thomas ( 1 996).
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meet one more condition. In particular, zombiephiles agree that our world is mostly
physical. In fact, zombiephiles agree with materialists on every issue except with respect
to qualm. According to zombiephiles, the materialist’s main entailment thesis would be
true were it not for qualm; and qualia, according to zombiephiles, are the only defeater of
materialism’s entailment thesis.
Thus, the opponents of materialism in this discussion are zombiephiles in the above
sense: those who maintain the truth of materialism with respect to everything but qualia.
According to zombiephiles, qualia are the only defeaters of materialism, but they’re
significant and decisive defeaters for all that. 70
2.1.3 The Zombie Argument Against Materialism
Given the nature of zombie worlds, the corresponding Zombie Argument against
materialism is fairly obvious. Still, the argument deserves to be laid out, and so it is.
The Zombie Argument— ‘(ZA)’ for short:
(ZA. 1) If zombie worlds exist, then materialism is
false.
(ZA.2) Zombie worlds exist.
(ZA.3) Therefore, materialism is false.
70
Mills (1995) is the only published philosopher I’m aware of who uses the zombie argument to defeat
materialism, but also thinks that materialism fails in other respects beyond qualia. It’s important to keep in
mind that this debate focuses only on those who endorse materialism all the way up to but not including
qualia. These are the only relevant zombiephiles in this discussion.
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Everyone agrees with the first premise of (ZA). More accurately, everyone who
agrees that our world has qualia also agrees that (ZA.l) is true. After all, suppose that
our world has qualia and that, as in (ZA.l), zombie worlds exist. Then, by Dzw , there’s a
minimal physical duplicate of our world that lacks qualia— call it ‘az\ But since our
world has qualia, az and our world are minimally physically indiscernible but not
indiscernible simpliciter. In short, az is a minimal physical duplicate of our world but not
a duplicate in every respect. This contradicts DM ; thus, materialism is false. Hence,
(ZA.l) is true.
As said, nobody who affirms the existence of qualia denies (ZA. 1 ). And for
purposes of this discussion, the existence of qualia is a given. 71 The question, then,
centers upon (ZA.2). It’s this statement, in the end, to which this discussion is addressed.
I will argue that (ZA.2) is false. My main argument for this thesis is called the
epiphenomenalp argument. This argument will be presented and defended in Chapter 3.
For now, I will discuss some common and interesting objections leveled against (ZA.2).
71 > i
The assumption that our world has qualia— that normal human beings aren’t themselves zombies! — is
an assumption of this discussion. Zombiephiles, of course, strongly agree that our world has qualia. Some
materialists, on the other hand, sometimes appear to deny this. Dennett ( 1 99 1 , 1996) is perhaps the closest
to denying the existence of qualia— commg close to so-called eliminativism about qualia. But a denial of
qualia is so difficult to believe that one often reads Dennett as either misunderstanding the discussion or,
instead, as merely exploring (without “really” endorsing) the view that qualia don’t exist. In any event,
qualia are taken as a given in this debate.
I should note, along this line, that sometimes when a philosopher seems to be denying the existence
of qualia, she is frequently denying some detailed theory of qualia, rather than the sheer existence of “what
it’s like” features in our world. See Jackson & Braddon-Mitchell (1996) for a good discussion of this
confusion. See, too, Harman (1990). [Harman, in conversation, has told me that when he denies the
existence of qualia, he’s not attempting to deny the existence of “what it’s like” features of certain mental
states; instead, he’s denying particular theories of these features. He thinks that this is what’s going on
with Dennett, as well. But notice that, at least in this discussion— and also the discussion within zombie
literature (as it were)— no particular theory is being endorsed. The only thing being endorsed, here, is that
there are phenomenal, “what it’s like” features of our world.]
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Before turning to common objections to (ZA.2), it’s important to see the
significance of the Zombie Argument. In Chapter 1,1 said that this argument is the most
fundamental and, recently, most popular objection against minimal materialism. The
popularity of the argument is reflected by the rather dramat.c increase of recent articles
and books— as well as virtual (online) discussion groups— focusing on (ZA). 72 But in
what sense is it the most “fundamental?”
The Zombie Argument is arguably the most fundamental argument against
materialism— at least out of those arguments based on qualm— in the following sense.
Aside from the long-standing arguments discussed in Chapter 1, there is one other
argument from qualia that has been recognized to be very challenging to materialism.
This is the “Knowledge Argument,” details of which will be given in later chapters. As I
shall show in Chapter 4, the Knowledge Argument presupposes the existence of zombie
worlds; and in that sense, the Zombie Argument is the more fundamental of the two.
Moreover, it s arguable that even the Explanatory Gap argument against materialism
presupposes zombie worlds— though this is less clear. 73
So, despite its brevity, (ZA) is important. The question of this project is whether
it’s sound. The main thesis of this project is that it isn’t. But before discussing my
argument for this thesis, turn first to some common objections to the Zombie Argument.
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For a list of these, see the bibliography; and see, in particular, the many recent articles and books with
‘Zombie’ in the title. [Most of the listed books published between 1994 and the present (1997) with
'Consciousness’ in the title treat the zombie argument in way or another.] For electronic discussion lists,
see Dave Chalmers’ “Zombie Page” on the web: http://hng.ucsc.edu/~chalmers (This site contains links
to the various discussion groups centered on the Zombie Argument.) See, too, the magazme New Scientist
at: http://www.nsplus.com/nsplus/insight/big3/conscious/conscions.hlml
. Finally, for other relevant links
to the popularity of the zombie argument, see also my own zombie page, accessed through: http://www-
unix.oit.umass.edu/~jcbeall
.
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2.2 Some Common Objections to the Zombie Argument- and Replies
There are a variety of interesting objections to the Zombie Argument, and in
particular to premise (ZA.2). For current purposes, the various objections can be reduced
to four— The Question-Begging Objection, the Conceivability Objection, and the
Quahtative Beliefs Objeetion. Though all of these objections are interesting, each of
them arguably fails. 74 My aim in discussing these objections is two-fold: first, to set the
objections aside, and second, to further clarify the relevant position of zombiephiles. In
this subchapter, I will present each objection and, then, give a reply on behalf of the
zombiephile.
2.2.1 The Question-Begging Objection
Perhaps the most common response to the Zombie Argument is that it simply begs
the question against materialism. 75 The objection is frequently put as follows.
As mentioned m Chapter 1, the Explanatory Gap argument will be discussed near the end of this project.
For now, I mention it only to give a sense of the importance of the Zombie Argument.
Note that if some of the following objections, contrary to what I’ll suggest, succeed in undermining the
Zombie Argument, this supports rather than hinders the current project. The ultimate aim of this project is
a defense of materialism against the Zombie Argument. If the objections of this subchapter in fact succeed,
the current project is best seen as offering another argument agamst zombie worlds, and additionally
applications to another well-known attack on materialism based on qualia— specifically the knowledge
argument. (See Chapter 4 for details.) In any event, I do believe that the objections in this subchapter fail,
as I argue below.
Fred Feldman, in conversation, endorsed this objection. Others have likewise endorsed the objection,
including Erik Wielenberg and, in the JCS online discussion list, Sue Pockett (1997). I will present the
objection mostly in the terms in which Pockett does. [Unfortunately, Pockett’
s piece, with replies by both
me and David Chalmers, were published in the JCS-online discussion list. The unfortunate thing about this
is that JCS-online doesn’t have an archival network for retrieving these published listings. However, as
indicated in the bibliography, the given documents are available in hard-copy on request. (I have copies.)] .
Thanks to Dave Chalmers and David Braddon-Mitchell for discussion of this objection.
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The materialist maintains that our world is physical - through and through, as it
were. Thus, the materialist maintains that qualia are physical. Hence, without the prior
assumption that qualia are not physical, it’s inconceivable that zombie worlds exist.
Alternatively, the matenalist maintains that nothing in our world is nonphysical.
Thus, the materialist will deny that a minima] physical duplicate of our world could lack
qualia. This, by the materialist’s lights, is incoherent.
The trouble is that the zombiephile simply asserts, on the basis of conceivability,
that zombie worlds exist. As above, however, no such conceivability claim will work in
this case. At best, it begs the question against the materialist.
The Question-Begging Objection
,
then, is: Zombie worlds are
conceivable only given the prior assumption that qualia are nonphysical.
Since materialists won’t assume this, the Zombie Argument begs the
question against the materialist. But a question-begging argument is no
argument at all.
What should the zombiephile say in response to the Question-Begging objection?
Well, I should first say that, at least by my lights, charges of question-begging are
generally very difficult to adjudicate, especially in the area of metaphysics. Despite this,
there seem to be a number of responses the zombiephile might make in response to the
given charge. Here, I’ll concentrate on what may be the strongest reply
.
77
In short, the Zombie Argument doesn’t beg the question. Consider the following
claim:
76
Again, this argument most closely reflects Pockett’s (1997) version, though Feldman’s and Wielenberg’s
version are quite similar.
77
This follows the response I gave in the JCS-online discussion list. See Beall (1997).
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1
. Zombie worlds are logically possible only if qualia are nonphysical.
Nobody will deny (1). The question, of course, is whether its antecedent is true. But
how does one establish the truth of a (broadly logical) possibtlity claim? How, in
particular, does one establish the truth of (l)’s antecedent? The answer is:
Conceivability-without-incoherence.
If zombie worlds are conceivable without internal inconsistency or incoherence
then ( 1 ) s antecedent is true. This much, the objector agrees with. She continues by
saying that zombie worlds are not coherently conceivable. But why does she say this?
It s here where the zombiephile’s innocence seems to emerge.
Some materialists, of course, will point to an analysis of ‘qualia’ as a way of
showing that zombie worlds are incoherent. One might, for example, analyze ‘qualia’ in
terms of “know-how,” and ‘know-how’, in turn, in terms of physical “abilities.”78 With
this analysis in hand, the materialist generates a contradiction in the description of
zombie worlds. And with an analysis, the materialist will understandably wait for the
zombiephile to undermine the analysis before acknowledging the conceivability of
zombie worlds. In this case, if the zombiephile fails to undermine the analysis but
nonetheless proceeds to assert the conceivability of zombie worlds, then the charge of
question-begging may be warranted.
This is the approach of Lewis (1990) and Nemirow (1990). Other approaches frequently appeal to
different versions of functionalism. See Hannan (1990) for discussion.
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Note, however, that the Question-Begging objection is rarely,
.fever, accompan.ed
by a viable (or any) analysis of ‘qualia’.™ Instead, the objection proceeds as above-
going from the materialist’s “all is physical” to the question-begging charge.
As above, I do think that charges of question-begging are frequently difficult to
adjudicate. In this case, however, it seems that the zombiephile remains innocent.
Obviously, the matenalist claims that everything in our world is physical. What the
zombiephile does, however, is to argue that materialism is false given the (apparent)
conceivability of zombie worlds. What the matenalist needs to do is to attack this
argument directly— in particular, by showing that there’s an inconsistency in the notion
of zombie worlds. In the end, though, the Question-Begging objection does little more
than appeal to faith in materialism: “Materialism must be true; so, zombie worlds must
be inconceivable.” But this won’t do. What is needed is some inconsistency in the
descnption of zombie worlds. This can be shown either by giving a true analysis of
qualia in physical terms if any there be ! 80— or by showing that the zombiephile’s
assumptions jointly generate a contradiction. Unfortunately, the Question-Begging
objector does neither of these. For this reason, it seems that the zombiephile remains
innocent before the charge of question-begging.
This isn t to say that there’s nothing objectionable to the Zombie Argument. After
all, many will immediately complain that the argument rests on nothing more than
Again, none of those who put forth the Question-Begging objection do so in addition to an analysis of
‘qualia’. Other philosophers who, online, have endorsed Pockett’s (1997) charge do so only by rephrasing
her charge; they don t do so by adding an analysis or etc.. (David Chalmers, in correspondence, has told
me that he frequently hears the Question-Begging charge but, as I said, it’s never accompanied by more
than what’s given above— no analysis to defend, etc..)
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“mtuition" or “conceivab.lity”- which is true. This, though, is an issue separate from
that of question-begging. As for quest,on-begging, the zombiephile is innocent- or, a,
the very least, not at all clearly guilty.
But what about the cries against “conceivability,” etc.? This, too, is a common
objection. Turn to the next objection.
2.2.2 The Conceivability Objection
Another common response to the Zombie Argument appeals to the unreliability of
conceivability as a guide to logical possibility. The objection, in short, runs as follows.
No doubt, it appeared to be perfectly coherently conceivable to some that there
should be a minimal physical duplicate of our world that nonetheless lacked life itself. 81
Consider, for example, the vitalists who espoused a view according to which some
nonphysical element was required for the existence (or instantiation) of life— a so-called
vital spirit. To these thinkers, it would’ve appeared coherently conceivable that there is a
world minimally physically indiscernible from ours but being such that life is entirely
absent. As we know, though, this isn’t really coherent; and, in fact, no such world exists.
For example, call a minimal physical duplicate of our world that lacks life an
Inanimate World . The reason that an inanimate world is impossible is that animation
Some have plausibly argued, there may well be no analyses of any terms— at least none in the
Chisholmian sense of ‘analysis’. This issue arises again in Chapter V. See Harman (1994a) for doubts
about analyses in general.
81
Dennett (1996) uses this sort of objection against Chalmers’ (1995) use of the Zombie Argument.
Dennett isn't alone. Other philosophers recently using the conceivability objection against the Zombie
Argument include P.M. Churchland (1996), P.S. Churchland ( 1996), Clark (1995) and, among others,
Hardcastle (1996). See also Hill (1997), who gives a particularly clear version of the Conceivability
Objection.
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- life- is guaranteed by functional proper!,es. In the end, once you have the ability to
reproduce
,
to adapt, to metabolize, and perhaps a few other functional properties, you
thereby have life itself
.
82
There just isn’t anything else to add. Given that functional
properties are physical properties, no Inanimate World exists- pace appearances of
coherent conceivability to the contrary.
Furthermore, consider the ease with which some might seem to conceive of a
minimal physical duplicate of our world which nonetheless lacks heat. The world has
molecular motion, et cetera
;
but, by all appearances, the world is coherently conceived to
lack heat. Again, though, such appearances are misleading— as we now know, given a
posteriori discoveries in science. Thus, once again, conceivability offers little by way of
guiding us to genuine logical possibility.
In the end, conceivability is constrained by what we know. Should science
discover new truths in some area, such discoveries may and often will demand the
revision of what we take to be coherently conceivable. Given this, however, any
argument based on conceivability alone is an argument on shaky grounds. Conceivability
just isn’t a good guide to logical possibility.
The Conceivability Objection , then, is: Coherent conceivability — or
conceivability without internal inconsistencies — is a reliable indication
of logical possibility. Unfortunately, what appears to be coherently
conceivable isn t always, and many times is not, really coherently
conceivable. Thus, the Zombie Argument, since it rests solely on the
appearance of coherent conceivability, rests on shaky grounds.
82
See Chalmers (1996) for further discussion. Also see Matthews (1977). For alleged troubles with any
analysis of life, see Feldman (1992).
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What should the zombiephile say in response to the Conceivability Objection
against the Zombie Argument? This is a very difficult objection
.
83
Nonetheless, there
are a few things the zombiephile might say.
To begin, grant that what appears to be coherently conceivable is indeed often
constrained by what we know. Thus, not knowing that heat is molecular motion, it may
(inaccurately) appear to be coherently conceivable to have a minimal physical duplicate
of our world which nonetheless lacks heat. This much the zombiephile should grant.
Next, however, the zombiephile should point out that granting this much isn’t to
grant that conceivability arguments aren’t important or otherwise useful— or, indeed,
indispensable. What is granted, instead, is that a conceivability claim is defeasible. In
the light of future evidence, perhaps a given conceivability claim, contrary to prior
appearances, will be seen to be incoherent. But this is true of many claims, especially
given the fallibility of the human mind. By itself, then, the defeasible nature of
conceivability claims isn’t itself a death-blow to conceivability arguments.
Beyond this, there’s also the general but important point that, without
conceivability, it’s not clear that we have any access to logical possibility. Granted,
assuming that actuality implies possibility, the empirical world itself is a guide to logical
possibility. In other words, ifwe know that there ’s a tree in the quad, then we know that
trees (and quads, and trees in quads) are logically possible— given, again, the principle
from actuality to possibility . 84 But this principle, alone, is insufficient to settle a great
For a very good treatment of some of the difficulties involved, see Yablo (1993).
Issues of actualism versus possibilism are of course highly relevant, here. In the end, though, these
issues appear to rest very much on conceivability claims, and so these issues shouldn’t arise in support of
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deal of important matters concerning possibility. Indeed, for any counterfactual claim,
it's obvious that the principle affords no help; it’s silent. (How could it speak? In
counterfactual claims, you’re considering what isn V actual, as it were; thus, the principle
says nothing.) But clearly counterfactual reasoning is integral to many inquiries, notably
science; and this need for such reasoning gives nse to the need for conceivability.
Without conceivability, we'd likely have nothing with which to decide counterfactual
claims
.
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These considerations offer support to the zombiephile. Indeed, they offer a sort of
indispensability argument for conceivability arguments. In the end, those who endorse
the Conceivability Objection incur a particularly difficult burden. The burden is to
specify some alternative criterion by which to adjudicate claims of logical possibility
.
86
As above, the principle from actuality to possibility works in some cases but leaves
many, many cases undecided.
In response to this, one might argue that such cases should simply be left
undecided, and leave the matter at that. But this sort of response is inadequate. As
above, the importance of counterfactual reasoning in science, history and other inquiries
is enough to reject this response.
the Conceivability Objection at hand. For useful discussion of actualism versus possibilism, see Loux
(1979) and Lewis (1986). See also Plantinga (1974).
' Note that Lewis ( 1 986) argues that principles of recombination rather than conceivability considerations
offer the best guide to logical possibility. The trouble with Lewis’ view, however, is that it’s very difficult
to see what grounds his principles of recombination. For example, one famous (Humean) principle says
that lor any two distinct existents, there’s a world in which they coexist and worlds in which they don’t—
they exist together in some world, and each exists alone in other worlds. With this principle in hand, many
issues of logical possibility can indeed be settled. The trouble, however, is the principle itself. In the end, it
seems that this very principle is grounded, if at all, in conceivability considerations. The end result is that
conceivability appears to be indispensable to reasoning about logical possibility. (Lewis’ own argument, I
should note, leaves this issue open. Again, see Lewis (1986).)
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See the above footnote for issues germane to this claim.
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Notice, too, that the principle from actuality to possibility, itself, is likely grounded
in a conceivability argument. After all, it’s certainly not an empirical principle- an a
POSteri°ri PnnClplG
’
as 11 Were- that actuality implies possibility. Instead, such a
principle is grounded in conceivability considerations. In short, it’s inconceivable that
something actually the case should fail to be possibly the case. How could this be? It
couldn’t. Why? In the end, a priori, conceivability considerations come into play. The
same applies to other principles of modal reasoning- including those under the name of
recombination’. Ultimately, what grounds these principles is conceivability
.
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One might object, here, that the principle from actuality to possibility or
principles concerning recombination- are grounded not so much in conceivability
claims as they are in semantics. In short, the meaning of ‘possible’ is such that anything
actual is possible; and that’s that. No appeal to conceivability is required.
At this point, the issue certainly gets tricky. However, it seems at the very least
plausible that reasoning about the “meanings” of terms involves at least some
conceivability considerations. How, for example, do you come to know that the meaning
of ‘identity’ excludes the possibility of the predicate ‘x and y are identical but different in
some respects truly applying to any x and y? It seems that conceivability considerations
are at the forefront of reasoning about this issue. You learn, first, that ‘x=y’ means such
and so. Then, given this meaning, you attempt to conceive of situations in which x and y
87
Another push for conceivability considerations comes with the justification of logical axioms—
including those in modal logic. Insofar as there’s one correct alethic modal logic, for example, arguments
for the correctness of one system over another— arguments for which axioms reflect the truth about alethic
modality— will ultimately rest on conceivability. What else could they rest on? (Obviously not on the
system in question, itself!) Despite all this, I should note that these issues are difficult. Though I think that
the zombiephile has a solid response to the Conceivability Objection, the issues remain complex. For
particularly nice discussions of some of these issues, see both Haack (1978) and Engel (1991).
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may be different. Given a failure to so conceive, you conclude that tile meaning of
‘identity- excludes the possibility above. This, at any rate, is a plausible account of
what’s going on in such reasoning.
In the end, then, I suggest that the zombiephile should grant the defeasible nature of
conceivably claims- in particular, (ZA.2)- but also argue that such claims are in
many cases indispensable. Of course, indispensability
?
arguments, in turn, are also
controversial. 88 But if conceivability claims really are indispensable, then this is a burden
all of us must carry. It’s simply another facet of living a fallible life.
The one thing left to do is to establish that, at least as things now stand,
conceivability is indeed indispensable for claims about qualia. In particular,
conceivability is indispensable for adjudicating the claim that qualia are physical— or
nonphysical, as the case may be. This task, however, is not too difficult.
Recall that something is physical just in case it at least globally supervenes on the
microphysical facts of our world— including, of course, distribution of microphysical
properties, et cetera. As an assumption, macrophysics, along with all the natural
sciences, are considered to be physical in this sense. As things currently stand (in Fall
1 997), nobody can point to some physical part of the world and say “Alas, that is a
quale!” Thus, this sort of approach— empirical discovery, as it were— is at least
currently unavailable as a way of figuring out whether qualia are physical. 89
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For a detailed discussion of indispensability arguments, see Putnam (1971).
89
The issue, here, is trickier than I indicate. At this point, though, it’s better to move along. As will be
clear near the end of the chapter, and especially near the end of the entire project, my own argument against
zombie worlds affords room for empirical work on qualia. At the same time, this room is afforded only at
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But, now, what other approach is left? What has to be done is to show that qualia
at least globally supervene on the physical (as understood above). But how is this done?
In the end, the only (currently) available way seems to involve conceivability. After all,
any claim of supervenience- whether global or otherwise- will involve conceivability
considerations somewhere or other along the line. 90 Thus, conceivability would indeed
seem to be indispensable to the issue of whether qualia are physical— at least as things
currently stand. And with this, the zombtephile has a response to the Conceivability
Objection.
Again, the issue of conceivability and possibility is a difficult one. But enough has
been said, I hope, to show that the Zombie Argument shouldn’t be dismissed merely in
the face of the Conceivability Objection. Conceivability claims, like most claims, may
well be defeasible; but conceivability claims, at least with respect to (ZA.2), and at least
nght now (Fall 1997), are apparently indispensable to further inquiry. Thus, we must
either give up the inquiry or set the Conceivability Objection aside. I suggest that the
latter option be followed.
Turn, then, to another interesting objection against the Zombie Argument.
the price of other arguments, many of which involve conceivability. For now, I simply want to indicate
that “empirical discovery” isn’t as crude as I may have indicated in this section.
90
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Agam, some might argue that other principles governing modal reasoning would suffice, and that these
principles don’t involve conceivability considerations. I should emphasize that I do think that this is a very
difficult issue. But, as above (see two footnotes above), I also think that such principles do in fact involve
conceivability considerations somewhere or other along the line. Again, it’s simply very difficult to see
how else they could be grounded.
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2.2.3 The “If you believe it, then you got it” Objection
The
“Ifyou believe it, then you got it ” Objection can be put very easily. The
objection runs as follows.
If zombie worlds exist, then so do zombies
.
91
This is uncontroversial. Now,
zombies sometimes believe that they experience qualia. (Indeed, as will be discussed at
length in the next section, zombies believe everything we believe— or nearly everything.
But this will be discussed at length below.) In particular, a zombie will believe that she
experiences pain; and she’ll say as much. If she didn’t say as much, then this would be a
physical difference notably, a difference in behavior, which again is impossible given
Dzw- So, zombies at least sometimes believe they experience pain. But this is
troublesome.
The trouble, runs the current objection, is simply this. Zombies, by all accounts,
never experience qualia. Thus, zombies never experience pain— given that pain is a
qualitative state. Thus, every time a zombie believes that she experiences pain, she’s
wrong. But this can’t be! Nobody can believe that she experiences pain but be wrong!
This hardly makes sense! When you believe that you’re experiencing pain, you are.
That’s just the way beliefs about pain— and any other qualitative state— work.
Thus, if zombies believe that they experience pain, then they do. But they don’t
experience pain, and so they don’t believe that they do. But, as above— and, again, as
91 Of course, by ‘zombies exist’, in this context, all that’s meant is that there are possible (zombie) worlds
in which (possible) zombies exist. Nothing about the actual world is being claimed, here— except,
obviously, that the actual is such that the given conditional about zombie worlds and zombies holds, et
cetera.
92
See Chapter I for the current account of qualitative states.
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Will be discussed a, length in the next section- zomb.es do believe that they expenence
pain. Thus, zombies believe they expenence pain, but it’s not the case that they believe
they expenence pain. This is a contradiction. Given that zombie worlds imply the
existence of zombies (at least in those worlds), it follows that zombie worlds imply a
contradiction. But, then, zombie worlds don’t exist.
P16 - ,fvou ^
W l™'1 ’* m 'll Qhimim then, is this:Sometimes zombies believe that they experience pain. In each casehowever, they’re wrong. But nobody can believe that she experiences
pain but be wrong. Thus, zombies don’t exist. Hence, since zombie
worlds imply zombies, zombie worlds don’t exist
What should the zombiephile say in response to this objection? I think it’s a very
interesting objection, but I also think that, ultimately, it doesn’t succeed.
A natural response to the “If you believe it, you’ve got it” Objection might be to
deny that zombies ever believe that they experience pain. However, for reasons given
below in section 2.2.4, this response won’t work. This will be discussed at length below
So what response should be given?
I think the response ought to be this: Deny the main premise. In short, the
zombiephile ought to deny that if S believes that S experiences pain, then S experiences
pain. The way to show that this claim is false is to describe a situation in which it fails
a plausible situation, that is. This can be done, I think, as follows.
Imagine walking into the kitchen and seeing a big pot of boiling water on the stove.
Suppose there’s nothing else on the stove when you see it. Now imagine that, for
whatever reason, you’re blindfolded and told that, for whatever reason (perhaps an
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initiation ntual into some club), you must put your hand into the boiling water. After
you’re blindfolded, someone leads you up to the stove. Your guide takes your hand, and
moves it in the direction of (what was) the boiling water. Then, suddenly, your hand is
shoved into the pot. You scream “Ouch!” As it turns out, however, you weren’t
experiencing pain at all. Instead, your hand was in a fairly cold- but not painfully so-
pot of icy water. In this situation, you certainly believed that you were experiencing pain.
In fact, however, you weren’t.
This sort of situation is rather common— especially, say, in dental offices. Indeed,
quite frequently, someone will expect a dental procedure to be horribly painful, and
they’ll proceed to say “Ouch!” when the procedure first begins
.
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As it turns out,
however, the patient experienced no pain at all — and will say as much after coming to
realize it. In these cases, one believes that one is experiencing pain but one is wrong.
Given these cases, the main premise of the “If you believe it, you’ve got it”
Objection fails. Granted, generally, these sorts of cases arise given the expectation of
pain— or pleasure, or other sorts of qualitative states. But, of course, expectations of
pain or other qualitative states— are frequently wrong; and there’s no trouble with
zombies expecting pain or other qualitative states
.
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Thus, the zombiephile should deny
the main premise of the going objection.
Of course, one might object, here, as follows : 95 It’s one thing to believe that you
are experiencing pain on a given occasion when you are not; it’s another thing to believe
93 My father, incidentally, is a dentist. He tells me that this sort of thing happens all the time.
I should note that this will be qualified in the next section.
43
I’m grateful to Lynne Baker for suggesting the objection (which I take from an email letter from her).
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that you are experiencing pain if you have never experienced pain. If, the latter that the
zombiephile needs to make plausible. The foregoing response, however, goes nowhere
near meeting this task.
In response, I think there’s something right and something wrong in this objection.
What’s wrong is this: The foregoing response- to whtch the above objection is directed
— is a response to the “If you believe it, you’ve got it” objection. That objection, I
believe, is met by the foregoing response and its examples of the fallibility of the relevant
beliefs. In this respect, then, the above objection misses the mark.
At the same time, the above objection raises a very good, and very challenging,
issue. The issue is the very possibility of having certain beliefs about qualia without ever
expenencing qualia. This, as the above objection emphasizes, needs to be made plausible
- or, in one way or another, needs to be dealt with. The next section takes up this task.
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2.2.4 Two Objections Against “Intentional Duplicates”
There are two more common objections against zombie worlds. Both objections
are closely related in that each concentrates on the same theme. Recall that, as above,
zombiephiles are material, sts with respect to everyth,ng except qualia.% Thus, at least on
the surface, zombiephiles are materialists with respect to intentional states— beliefs,
desires, and other states individuated by ‘that’-clauses. Accordingly, intentional states
are taken to be physical; they at least globally supervene on microphysics (as per
Chapter 1).
The view that intentional states are physical has independent support. In short, it’s
simply very difficult to imagine how there could be a difference with respect to (say)
beliefs once the rest of the physical nature of our world is fixed. Q/ Exactly what
intentional states are be they functional states, brain states, states of the whole person,
or et cetera is a difficult issue. Yet, regardless of their exact nature, it seems that any
world physically indiscernible from ours will be intentionally indiscernible as well. At
the very least, this view is primafacie plausible. 98
See section 2.1.2 for brief discussion. For statements of this “almost materialism” feature of the
zombiephile view, see Brmgsjord (1995, forthcoming), Chalmers (1996), Flanagan (1992), Flanagan &
Polger (1995), Garfield (1996), Guzeldere (1995), Kirk (1974a), Lanier (1995), Midgley (1995), Moody
(1994, 1995), Shear (1996, 1997), Sutherland (1995), Tart (1995), and Tye (1996).
Cases of “wide beliefs,” of course, aren’t relevant given that those cases aren’t cases in which the
physical nature of our world is perfectly duplicated. For discussion of “wide beliefs,” see Devitt &
Sterelny (1987) and, especially, Pessin (1995). Wide beliefs are beliefs with so-called wide content or
broad content. The idea is that these beliefs depend, in some essential way, upon environmental and/or
historical factors. As above, provided that these environmental and/or historical factors themselves at least
globally supervene on microphysics— which, as in Chapter I, is a given in this debate— then such wide
beliefs don’t raise problem for (minimal) materialism. (Of course, stronger versions of materialism may
well suffer in the face of wide beliefs. But I don’t pursue this here.)
98
This view is at prima facie plausible given the other assumptions of this discussion— for example, that
all non-mental items of our world at least globally supervene on microphysics. (See section 1.1.3 for
discussion.) For excellent general discussions of the view that intentional states at least globally supervene
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In any event, zombie worlds, both here and in the literature, are taken to be
intentional duplicates of our world - at least initially. The trouble, according to the
objections of this section, is that zombie worlds cannot be intentional duplicates. There
are two (alleged) reasons for this, each ofwhich makes up one of the common objections
discussed below. Turn to the first such objection.
2.2.4.1 The Qualitative Belief Objection
The Qualitative BeliefObjection is straightforward. By common assumption,
zombie worlds are duplicate worlds with respect to intentional states. This is so given the
common assumption shared by both zombiephiles and materialists— that intentional
states are physical states
.
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Thus, if zombie worlds aren’t indiscernible from our world
with respect to intentional states, then the Zombie Argument fails. According to the
Qualitative Belief Objection, zombie worlds aren’t indiscernible from our world with
respect to intentional states. Why?
In short, some beliefs are qualitative! In other words, some beliefs are such that
there s something it s like to have them. For example, the belief that sugared milk tastes
like the taste of vanilla ice-cream is an example of a qualitative belief. There seems to
be something it s like to have this belief. Or consider the belief that Q feels a certain way
— where ‘Q’ is the name given to some quale. When one has this belief, there’s
something it’s like to have it.
on the physical, see Jackson & Braddon-Mitchell (1996) and, especially, Kim (1996). See, too, Papineau
(1995).
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The consequences of this for the Zombie Argument are clear: Zombie worlds are
supposed to be intentional duplicates of our world- since zombte worlds are physical
duplicates and intentional states, by common assumption, are physical states. But given
the existence of qualitative beliefs— beliefs that are genuine phenomenal states, in
addition to being intentional states- zombie worlds are not intentional duplicates. This
is so given that zombie worlds are devoid of qualia . 101
The Qual}tative Belief Objection
,
then, is: If zombie worlds exist, then
they’re intentional duplicates of our world. If they’re intentional
duplicates of our world, then zombie worlds contain qualitative beliefs (in
the sense above). But if zombie worlds contain qualitative beliefs, then
zombie worlds contain qualia. By definition, however, zombie worlds
don’t contain qualia. Hence, zombie worlds don’t exist; and the Zombie
Argument therefore fails.
What should the zombiephile say in response to the Qualitative Belief Objection? I
think there are at least two adequate responses that the zombiephile can make. In this
subsection. I’ll briefly discuss one of the responses; in the next subsection, I’ll discuss
another .
102
The response, in short, is to deny that there are any qualitative beliefs (or
intentional states) at all. Contrary to what the objector claims, it seems implausible that
99 nSee especially Chalmers (1996), Flanagan & Polger (1995), Garfield (1996), Moody (1996), Sutherland
(1995) and Tye (1996) for discussion of this point. I’m grateful to David Chalmers and Jay Garfield for
helpful correspondence on this issue, in addition to this entire section.
100
See discussion above..
101 The Qualitative Belief Objection is discussed briefly in Chalmers (1997), as well as Moody (1994).
Apparently, Lee Bowie, of the Propositional Attitudes Task Force (Pioneer Valley, MA), strongly endorses
the Qualitative Belief Objection. The examples used above are from unpublished notes from Bowie. For
discussion of Bowie’s view and the Qualitative Belief Objection in general, see Garfield (1996). Jackson
& Braddon-Mitchell (1996), in addition to Tye (1996), discuss the Qualitative Belief Objection. My
response, on behalf of the zombiephile, follows Jackson & Braddon-Mitchell (1996) most closely, but the
response, in abbreviated form, is also in Garfield (1996).
,0
" The other response, as will be clear, applies equally well to both objections of this section.
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there’s something it’s like to have certain beliefs. Take, for example, the belief that
sugared milk tastes like the taste of vanilla ice-cream. No doubt, the content of this belief
involves qualia— the tastefulness of tastings, as it were. And indeed, there’s certainly
something it’s like to taste sugared milk or et cetera. But the belief, itself, remains
qualia-free
.
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Perhaps the confusion, here, can be explained as follows. When we consider an
alleged example of a qualitative belief, we may well concentrate on part of the content of
the belief rather than the belief “as a whole,” as it were. When considering, as in the
above example, the belief that Qfeels a certain way, what probably happens is that we
concentrate on Q itself; in turn, we say “Yes, there’s something it’s like to have that”
The trouble, though, is that Q isn’t in question. Instead, the beliefthat Q feels a certain
way is the state in question. What happens, perhaps, is that one concentrates on Q and
then mistakenly attributes phenomenal features to the belief as a whole. Ultimately,
though, it seems more plausible to say that the given belief carries no qualia at all—
except, of course, in its content.
Here, one might be tempted to object that if a belief, B, is individuated by its
content, then B essentially has its content. In turn, one might argue that if B's content
involves qualia— B is about qualia— then B is at least partially qualitative or
phenomenal in nature. This, though, is simply a mistake. Beliefs do have their contents
103
At this point, some may say “But having Q is necessary for having some sorts of beliefs about Q!” This
is a very important point, and the next objection is devoted to it. At the moment, though, it’s important to
note that this is a different objection. The current objection, the Qualitative Belief Objection, turns only on
the premise that some beliefs are qualitative states. The “But having Q is necessary for having various
beliefs" is consistent with the denial that beliefs are qualitative. At the moment, only the Qualitative
Beliefs Objection is at issue. (I’m grateful to Lynne Baker for emphasizing this objection.)
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essentially. This isn’t the problem. The problem is that the property of a beliefs
content don’t automatically transfer to the properties of the entire belief, itself.
Consider the belief that magic is mysterious. Simply because the content of this
belief “involves" magic and mystery as “parts," it doesn’t at all follow that the belief
itself is magical or mysterious. The same applies to examples of qualitative beliefs. Just
because the content of the beliefthatpudding is tasty involves tastiness, it doesn’t follow
that the belief, itself, is tasty.
So, zombiephiles should deny that there are any qualitative beliefs. An explanation
along the foregoing lines, I think, should go a long way toward supporting such a denial.
On the other hand, suppose that the case for qualitative beliefs becomes very
strong. (I think this is unlikely, but consider it anyway.) In this case, the Qualitative
Belief Objection remains correspondingly very strong. What can the zombiephile say?
As it turns out, what the zombiephile should say in this case is precisely what she
should say in response to the next of this section’s objections— namely, the “But qualia
are necessary for some beliefs” Objection. This response will be given in the next
subsection.
Before turning to the next objection, however, a related one should be put aside.
One might be tempted to object as follows. If a belief, B, has its content essentially, then,
obviously, there’s no world in which its content is absent. But if there’s no world in
which B's content is absent, then where B is a belief about qualia, qualia can’t be absent.
Thus, there can’t be zombie worlds— on pain of qualia existing in zombie worlds.
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zombies couldn’t have the content involving qualm. But since, for reasons above,
zombies have the same beliefs that we have, there can’t be zombie worlds.
The trouble with this objection is fairly clear. Granted, beliefs have their contents
essentially. This, as per the objection, implies that there’s no world in which some given
belief lacks its content. At this stage, however, the objection goes wrong. In short, one
can’t infer
S exists at (world) a
from the fact that
At (world) a, Charlie believes that S is F.
To see the relevant fallacy, here, simply substitute ‘Santa Claus’ for ‘S’ in each of the
above sentences. Many of us have beliefs about Santa, but this doesn’t imply that Santa
exists. The trouble with the current objection is that it makes just this sort of inference.
The objection supposes that zombies have beliefs about qualia, and then infers, from this
fact alone, that qualia must exist at zombie worlds— and thereby a contradiction is
supposed to emerge. As said, however, this is a fallacy. For this reason, the objection
fails.
On the other hand, some might argue that there are other reasons for thinking that
some beliefs about qualia imply that qualia exist— reasons that avoid the fallacy above.
Indeed, such reasons are provided in the next objection.
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2.2.4.2 The “Qualia Are Necessary For Some Beliefs” Objection
The “Qualm Are Necessary For Some Beliefs” Objection is a very strong one
.
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In this section, I present the objection and, then, give what I take to be the best sort of
reply available to the zombiephile. As above, the reply given applies equally well to the
Qualitative Beliefs Objection, should another response to that objection be required.
The objection runs as follows. By definition, zombie worlds are minimal physical
duplicates of our world that nonetheless lack qualia. Thus, the inhabitants of zombie
worlds are minimal physical duplicates of us. These inhabitants are supposed to be
indiscernible from us in every physical respect, but they lack qualia.
Now, the zombiephile maintains that intentional states are physical. They may be
functional states of one kind or another, or they be something else. But regardless of
what exactly they are, zombiephiles maintain, with materialists, that intentional states at
least globally supervene on the physical. Thus, zombie worlds, if any there be, are
indiscernible with respect to intentional states
.
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But this is problematic.
The problem is that if there are no qualia at all in a world, then no inhabitant of that
world could form a belief about qualia. How could they? Indeed, as in the Perspectival
Objection, it seems impossible to communicate to someone the idea of qualia unless she
has already experienced qualia. For example, how could you communicate to someone
104
1 am particularly indebted to Lynne Baker for emphasizing the importance of this objection. I am also
very grateful to David Braddon-Mitchell and, especially, David Chalmers for (email) discussion concerning
the response I offer to this objection. The response I offer is the response that Chalmers, himself, now
takes to be his own standard response. (We each came up with the response independently, though my own
formulation owes a lot to discussion with Chalmers.)
105 As above, see especially Chalmers (1995, 1996), Campbell (1970), Jackson (1986, 1994a, 1994b),
Bringsjord (1995), Giizeldere (1995) and others for discussion of zombiephiles and intentional states.
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what it’s like to feel the painfulness of pain unless that person has already experienced
pain? Perhaps you could tell her that painfulness feels much the way some other quale.
Q, feels; but unless she has already experienced Q, this explanation won’t do. The
trouble with zombies— the inhabitants of zombie worlds- is that they’ve experienced
no qualia at all! Thus, there’s no quale, Q, on the basis ofwhich a zombie can be taught
the nature of other qualia— or any at all.
In short, there seem to be two ways for someone to acquire a belief— or other
intentional state— about some quale, Q: She experiences Q directly, or she learns about
Q by analogical reasoning on the basis of some other quale, Q'. In either case, though.
experience of Q seems to be necessary. Thus, there simply is no other way to form a
belief about qualia
.
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Given that an experience of qualia is necessary for a belief— or any other
intentional state about qualia, and given that, by definition, zombies experience no
qualia at all, it follows that zombies are not intentional duplicates of us. Since, by
common assumption, intentional states are physical states, zombie worlds are thereby not
physical duplicates of our world. But, then, zombie worlds (by definition) are physical
duplicates of our world and, by the foregoing reasoning, are not. This is a contradiction.
Hence, there are no zombie worlds.
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Alas, there’s a technical qualification, here. One might come to know what it’s like to be in pain, for
example, by means of an artificially implanted “memory” of the painfulness of pain. In this case, some
might argue, experience of the relevant quale— the given painfulness— isn’t necessary to learn about the
given quale. I think that this is probably true. Nonetheless, the current objection can be easily extended to
cover this qualification. I skip the extension for the sake of space, but note it here for the sake of
completeness. See Jackson & Braddon-Mitchell (1996) for discussion of this point.
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ntentional states, by common assumption, are physical states (of one sort
or another). Thus, zombie worlds are indiscernible with respect tointentional states. But, given that beliefs about qualia require experience
of quaha, and given that zombie worlds are devoid of qualia-expenences
it follows that zombie worlds are not indiscernible with respect tointentional states. Thus, there are no zombie worlds.
What should the zombiephile say in response to the “Qualia Are Necessary for
Some Beliefs” Objection to the Zombie Argument? Alas, this one is difficult! Still,
there’s room, I think, for the zombiephile to avoid the foregoing argument. 107
To begin, it s clear that at least some, indeed, many beliefs about qualia don’t
require experience of qualia.
Suppose that you’ve never experienced qualia at all. Suppose that, with
justification, you take me to be an authority on any subject on which I speak. Now,
suppose that I walk up to you and begin talking about qualia non-stop, as it were:
“Qualia are wonderful features of our world,” I say. “Qualia are the bane of
materialism,” I continue. “Qualia are such and so,” and “Qualia are so and such” I
proceed, beginning to bore you, until you finally depart.
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1 should note that I’m particularly sympathetic to this argument. I came up with the argument, myself,
prior to discovering it in both Garfield (1996) and Moody (1994) and, also, prior to discovering a similar
argument proposed by Chalmers himself in Chalmers (1996). My own defense, on behalf of the
zombiephile, follows brief remarks by Chalmers (1996), and is especially indebted to correspondence with
Chalmers. Whether the defense succeeds is something I leave to the reader to decide. The main reason for
not pursuing this argument further than I do is two-fold: First, space considerations play a part. Beyond
this, though, even if the Different Beliefs Objection does succeed— and, so, even ifmy suggested defense
fails— this provides only additional ammunition for the current project. As above, the main aim of this
project is to present a defense of materialism against zombie worlds— and, especially, one with immediate
application to other popular attacks on materialism (notably Jackson’s). The Different Beliefs Objection
does not afford immediate application to other arguments. This, in the end, is a virtue of the main
argument of this project.
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The question is, have you formed any beliefs about qualia at all? It seems that the
answer is clearly "yes.” Indeed, this sort of belief-formation process occurs quite
frequently. (Incidentally, have you ever heard of Bundaberg, Queensland? It’s a little
town on the eastern coast of Australia. Question: Any beliefs about Bundaberg yet?!))
Of course, in the case of qualia, you might not— probably would not— come to
know what it’s like to experience qualia simply in virtue ofmy prolonged speech. But
you would certainly believe quite a bit about qualia. You could come to believe (truly)
that qualia are features of our world. You could come to believe (truly) that qualia
allegedly undermine materialism. You could come to believe (truly) that qualia are
features of our world that are very difficult to describe! You could come to believe
(truly) that you’ve heard of qualia. And so forth.
It seems, then, that you could indeed come to have beliefs about qualia without any
experience of qualia at all. The one thing you might not come to know, as above, is what
it’s like to experience qualia. At this point, however, the zombiephile should emphasize
that zombies could nevertheless come to believe that they know what it’s like to
experience qualia. Consider the following.
There’s an age-old and interesting problem called ‘the problem of other minds ’. 108
The problem, itself, isn’t as important for present purposes as the situation it presupposes.
The question is. How do you know that other people, beyond yourself, experience qualia
— that they experience pain, for example? 109 This question, notice, is the same question
108
For an interesting discussion of the problem of other minds, see Aune (1986).
This is one version of the problem— the version Aune (in conversation) has called ‘the problem of
other-person experiences’.
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as: How do you know that other people, beyond yourself, are not zombies? (Here,
though, we’re talking about actual zombies, rather than “merely possible,” as it were.)
The question seems to make sense. And indeed, it does seem at least epidemically
possible that other people could be zombies. If, as it seems, the other minds question
does indeed make sense, then it would seem at least logically possible that someone
could come to believe that they know what it’s like to expenence qualia without ever
actually experiencing qualia. After all, when you’re thinking about the problem of other
(phenomenal) minds, you’re thinking about the possibility that others, despite their
prolonged speeches about qualia
,
might in fact be zombies. Moreover, in thinking about
the problem, you’re imagining that others believe that they experience qualia, and believe
that they truly know what qualia are like— despite the fact that they’ve never
experienced qualia.
The point, here, is that this does indeed seem to be a possibility. Whether, in the
end, it s the relevant sort of possibility— namely, one within the bounds of minimal
physical duplicate worlds is a good question. 1 10 Nonetheless, the exercise seems to
suggest that even if others never really experience qualia, they might well have a large
host of beliefs about qualia— including the belief that they’ve experienced qualia.
This sort of response, I think, will go a long way toward meeting the current
objection. Unfortunately, it won’t go far enough. For there do seem to be at least some
beliefs about qualia that do seem to require experience of qualia. Consider, for example,
1 10 Of course, notice, too, that granting the possibility of zombies is not at all equivalent to granting the
existence of zombie worlds. One might grant that zombies are possible, but that no zombie world, as
understood above, is possible.
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the belief that rotten eggs smell like this."' More generally, beliefs of the form the belief
that quale Q feels tike this seem to require experience of the relevant Q. And it’s on the
basis of these sorts of beliefs that the “Qualm Are Necessary for Some Beliefs” Objection
gains great intuitive strength.
To meet the objection, the zombiephile must either explain away the intuitive force
of the view that beliefs of the given sort require qualia, or she must do something else.
By my lights, the former route is likely to meet with failure. The intuition is simply too
strong. ~ Thus, another response must be given.
The best response, I think, is two-fold: First, make a concession; second, make a
distinction. I 11 treat each “fold” of this response in reverse order.
The distinction. The relevant distinction is perhaps best illustrated via the
Qualitative Beliefs Objection. Suppose that there’s a qualitative side to some beliefs (or
other intentional states). Suppose, in other words, that some beliefs have a phenomenal
feel they’re phenomenal states that are likewise intentional. In this situation, the
zombiephile should distinguish between the physical/functional side and the phenomenal
side of such beliefs. 1 1
3
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Thanks to Lynne Baker for this example, and especially for pushing me to address this objection.
Incidentally, the other main target of this project— the Knowledge Argument— in many ways gains
great intuitive appeal from the very intuition at issue here. Chapter 4 is devoted exclusively to the
Knowledge Argument, so I won’t go mto the matter any further here.
I'm indebted to correspondence with David Chalmers for this response. Chalmers (1996), Moody
(1994) and, in some respects, Flanagan (1992), Flanagan & Polger (1995), and Levine (1995) make this
sort of response to both the Qualitative Belief Objection and, especially, the “Qualia Are Necessary for
Some Beliefs Objection. Note that the distinction between functional and phenomenal sides of
“qualitative beliefs’’ isn’t intended to be controversial. Functionalism is fairly well understood, and despite
many objections seemingly still fairly popular. I explain the distinction in terms offunctional properties
mainly because this is the way it’s put in the foregoing references. In the end, though, nothing of great
significance hangs on this so long as some physical side of beliefs is recognized.
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Consider, again, the belief that quale Q feels a certain way. Gather up all the
physical/functional features of this state, and call the result a belief*. (The superscnpt
‘(Z)’ stands for ‘zombie’, the rationale for which will be clear below.) Now, if the belief
thauz really is phenomenal, then the belief*
2
' that is not the same as the belief ,h a , „_
obviously." 4 The belief* 21 that/r isn’t phenomenal at all; it’s simply a functional or
otherwise physical state. The idea, then, is to stnp the belief that p of its phenomenal
features and leave only a belief*21 that p
What is a belief>1 For present purposes, one has the beliefZ) that/, if one tends to
respond affirmatively when questioned about/?; if, given one’s other beliefs/beliefs(Z)
,
desires/desires* }
,
etc., one tends to behave in the appropriate belief that p way; and so
forth.
115
The idea is that there’s a 1-1 correspondence between the belief that p and the
belief } that p for any p. In some, perhaps many, cases, the belief that w and the
belief* 1 that p will be the same belief. (This may be the case, for example, with the belief
that chairs exist, or that there’s a tiger approaching, or whatever.) 1 16 But if the “Qualia
Are Necessary for Some Beliefs” Objection or the Qualitative Beliefs Objection are
correct, then for some belief that/?, the corresponding belief* 21 that p will be a different
belief. But what’s the difference?
I should note that Chalmers, in correspondence, claims to now (Fall ’97) think that zombie worlds
should be understood with this distmction in mind. Though he lightly touches on the distinction in his
(1996), he now thinks that’s it’s very important to emphasize the distmction. As above, I’m indebted to
David Chalmers for discussion of this issue.
Underlining, here, is used only to offer ease of reading. There’s no special convention being employed,
here.
115
See Chalmers (1997).
116 Moody (1995) and Chalmers (1997)— and, though in a different context, Jackson (1994a, 1994b)—
maintain that for most beliefs, the relevant z-belief (as it were) is precisely the same belief. For present
purposes, this particular issue isn’t important. What matters, here, is the distinction. It doesn’t matter, for
present purposes, whether most beliefs and their corresponding z-beliefs are precisely the same belief.
What matters, with respect to the Zombie Argument, is that the distinction saves the argument from the
relevant objection.
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Where there is a difference, the difference between the belief that n and its
corresponding belief^ that;? is in the content. In short, the content of the non-z-belief
(as it were) is richer. Consider, again, the belief that quale O fools like this The
corresponding belief*
2
* that O feels like this will be poorer with respect to its content.
What will be lacking is the full nature of the denotation of ‘this’ — presumably, some
what it s like” feature, some quale. To the extent that the content of a belief comprises
“concepts,” the mam difference between the two given beliefs is a difference either in the
concepts involved or in the degree to which the concept is realized. For now, though, it’s
perhaps best to leave the tricky notion of concepts aside.
With respect to relations between beliefs and beliefs(Z)
,
perhaps the most important
one is this: S has the belief that p only if S has the belief*2 * that p As above, the belief*2 *
that£ is simply the physical/functional component of the belief that p So if you believe
that p, then you beheve
(Z)
that/?. The converse, however, doesn’t hold. In particular, if
the belief that/? (for some p) really does entail qualia, then having the belief*2 * that/?
wouldn’t imply having the belief that p. Beliefs imply beliefs(Z)
,
but not vice versa. 117
Thus, in the end, the going response has it that zombies have every belief*2 * that we
have, though they may not have every corresponding “full” belief. The picture is similar
to that presupposed by the problem of other minds— with everyone behaving in every
' 1
7
The same distinction might be done with qualitative states themselves, if need be. That is, we might
distinguish between pain and pain<Z) . The trouble with this, though, is that pains essentially have qualia—
they’re qualitative states, as spelled out in Chapter 1. (This, at any rate, is a given in the current debate.)
So the pain(Z) would ultimately be incoherent, given this assumption.
Nonetheless, it may be useful to say that zombies believe<Z) that pain(Z) exists (or whatever). The
point, here, might be to emphasize that some zombie-beliefs do lack the full nature of the relevant contents
— namely, any qualia-entailing features of the content. At the same time, superscripting each term in the
‘that’-clause of belief-ascriptions becomes, beyond cumbersome, unnecessary. The whole point of
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way as ifthey have (say) qualia-entailing beliefs, though in the end they don’t. They
have merely beliefs®, which of course entail no qualia at all. A similar, and in some
ways more vivid picture, is given by Star Trek 's Mr. Data. 1 1
8
Mr. Data believes that he
experiences qualia, and, together with his other intentional states, behaves in every way
as if he really does experience qualia. As it turns out, however, Mr. Data has no qualia at
all. All that he has are beliefs' 2
1
about qualia.
So much for the distinction. The question is: Does it save zombie worlds from the
main objections at hand— especially the “Qualia Are Necessary for Some Beliefs”
Objection?
Does the distinction save zombie worlds? Well, yes and no. This is the point at
which the concession part of the current response comes in. The relevant concession
involved in this response has already been indicated. In short, zombie worlds, strictly
speaking, are not intentional duplicates— assuming that either there are qualitative
beliefs or that qualia are necessary for some beliefs.
1 19
Alternatively, if there are some
intentional states that, for whatever reason, entail qualia, then zombie worlds, strictly
speaking, are not intentional duplicates. This is the concession. With the concession and
introducing (say) z-beliefs, as it were, is to emphasize that the given content lacks any qualia-entailing
features.
Thanks, very much, to Dave Chalmers for helpful discussion, here.
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Alas, this picture is vivid only for those “Trek” fans, I suppose!
1 19
Perhaps I should emphasize that this really is a bit of a concession. As indicated above, zombie worlds
are always introduced in the literature as intentional duplicates. The pressure of the current objection,
however, has forced at least some zombiephiles to recast zombie worlds in accord with the going
distinction. See Moody (1995), for one; and David Chalmers, in correspondence, claims that he now (late
1997) introduces zombie worlds in terms of this distinction. (Apparently, any of his forthcoming work will
make this clearer.) Again, I’m grateful to Dave Chalmers for very helpful discussion.
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the foregoing d.stinction comes another d.stinction- namely, that between zombie
worlds and zombie worlds(Z)
,
as it were
.
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Zombie worlds are minimal physical duplicates of our world. But, as above, a
common, and plausible, assumption is that intentional states are physical. The
consequence of this is that zombie worlds are intentional duplicates of our world. The
trouble is that if one finds the objections of this section plausible, then zombie worlds, on
this conception, will be correspondingly implausible
.
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Since many readers probably
will find the given objections plausible, the notion ofzombie worlds must be modified.
The modification is this. Zombie worlds are still to be understood as per Dzw .
Moreover, all the assumptions of this discussion— for example, the “almost
materialism assumption— remain intact, except for the intentional duplicates
assumption. Instead, zombie worlds are to be understood to be, at the very least,
intentional duplicates®, as it were. In other words, the inhabitants of zombie worlds are
duplicates at least with respect to our beliefs®, but not necessarily our beliefs— our
full beliefs. Strictly speaking, then, the focus of this debate concerns what might be
called zombie worlds®’ — zombie worlds as understood in this paragraph.
Nonetheless, for convenience the superscript ‘(Z )’ will be dropped unless context
requires it. From now on, zombie worlds are zombie worlds®, but without the
superscript !
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For reasons to be given below, the superscript ‘(Z)’ will be dropped from zombie worlds,Z)
.
Again, I’m grateful to Lynne Baker for emphasizing this point. Thanks, too, to Dave Chalmers for
enormously useful discussion.
Note, of course, that zombie worlds* 2 ' may well turn out to be the original sort of zombie worlds — that
is, the intentional duplicate sort. This depends on whether further argument can show that qualia are not
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Return to the question: Does the distinction between beliefs and beliefs® save
zombie worlds from the “Qualia Are Necessary for Some Beliefs” Objection? Yes-
provided that zombie worlds are understood in the z-sense, as it were. For in this case,
the main premise of the objection is false: namely, that zombie worlds are intentional
duplicates. 123 Thus, provided that the relevant distinction is plausible, which 1 grant, then
zombie worlds avoid this otherwise very strong objection. 124
There remains at least one more concern, here: namely, does the distinction, even
if granted, significantly affect the Zombie Argument? Not really. Clearly, the revised
argument is now in terms of zombie worlds(Z)— our new zombie worlds. But the
existence of these worlds is just as damaging to materialism as the old ones.
In short, zombie worlds, in either sense, are still minimal physical duplicates of our
world that lack qualia— and anything entailed thereby. The difference is that, if the
Qualia Are Necessary for Some Beliefs” Objection is granted, then zombie worlds will
likewise lack some beliefs. The end result, though, is that qualia fail to at least globally
supervene on the physical (as understood in Chapter 1). But, then, qualia fail to be
physical, and thus materialism’s main entailment thesis is false. So the change of zombie
necessary for any intentional states, etc.. But I leave this issue aside, otherwise granting, for the most part,
that qualia are indeed necessary for some beliefs.
"
’
I should make it clear that, strictly speaking, zombie worlds, as presented m the cited literature
throughout, are undermined by the going objection. For, as said, zombie worlds are consistently said to be
intentional duplicates. So the going distinction saves “zombie worlds” by saving something different than
what’s normally said to be a zombie world. At any rate, zombie worlds'2 ' are just as important— as I’ll
briefly discuss below.
124
Note: For reasons that will be abundantly clear in Chapter 3, 1 grant the plausibility of the going
distinction only for the sake of argument. I do think that the distinction is plausible, at least on the surface;
but for forthcoming reasons— in Chapter 3 — the distinction may ultimately fail. (The reason is that the
main argument of Chapter 3 will apply equally well to the going distinction. But I leave this to Chapter 3.)
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worlds doesn’t significantly impact the consequences of the Zombie Argument
.
125
Turn
now, to a brief review.
2.3 Review of Chapter 2
In this chapter, zombie worlds, Zombie Argument, and the relevant opponents
(zombiephiles) were introduced. The Zombie Argument, for reasons discussed above, is
the most fundamental argument against materialism based on qualia. Given that, by
many lights, qualia are the most fundamental problem for materialism in general, the
Zombie Argument is a very important argument with respect to the fate of materialism
.
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After introducing the Zombie Argument, various common objections against the
argument were considered. In almost every case, I argued that the objections fail for
strong reasons. In the final case, the case of the “Qualia Are Necessary for Some
Beliefs” Objection, I suggested that, granting the objection, zombiephiles must modify
the normal sense of zombie worlds’. The main result of this modification is that zombie
worlds are to be understood as being intentional duplicates with respect to beliefs(Z) at
least. With this distinction in hand, the Zombie Argument avoids the otherwise very
strong “Qualia Are Necessary for Some Beliefs” Objection.
Notice, incidentally, that with the current distinction in hand, the “If you believe it, you’ve got it”
Objection receives a new reply. I don’t think that the main premise of that objection is true, but grant it for
the moment. The mam premise says that if you believe you experience pain, then you experience pain.
One might mamtain that this is true but, then, say that smce zombies merely believe*21 that they experience
pain— mdeed, pain(Z)
,
as it were— then the given objection doesn’t apply. But, again, I don’t think that
the main premise of the given objection is true to begin with.
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This opinion is held by prominent philosophers such as Lewis (1993), Tye (1996), McGinn (1993), Kim
(1996), Jackson & Braddon-Mitchell (1996), Chalmers (1995) and others. Some of these philosophers,
such as Lewis, take Jackson’s Knowledge Argument— to be discussed at length in Chapter 4— to be the
best argument against materialism based on qualia. However, as I’ll argue, Jackson’s argument
presupposes the Zombie Argument and, so, in that sense is less fundamental.
90
The mam project at hand is to formulate a simple but, 1 think, powerful defense
against the Zombie Argument. In turn, this defense will have applicat.ons to the other
well-known “qualia attack” on materialism— notably, the so-called knowledge
argument, to be introduced in Chapter 4. It’s to this task that we now turn.
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CHAPTER 3
the main defense against the zombie argument
This chapter comprises the heart of the current discussion. In Chapter 1,
materialism was introduced. Chapter 2, in turn, introduced the most fundamental and one
of the most popular (alleged) defeaters of materialism— namely, the Zombie Argument.
As in Chapter 2, the Zombie Argument is one of the two main targets of this project. 127
The current chapter consists of the main objection to the Zombie Argument.
In the first subchapter, I argue that the existence of zombie worlds implies that
qualia are epiphenomenal
p— a species of epiphenomenal properties to be explained
below. That this implication holds is strong reason to reject zombie worlds— especially
given, as 1 argue in the second subchapter, the absence of strong arguments for the view
that qualia are epiphenomenalp. The third subchapter provides a brief review of the
arguments, and also a brief preview of what’s to come. For now, turn to the
Epiphenomenalp Objection.
'~ 7
The other target, Jackson’s Knowledge Argument, is treated in Chapter 4.
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3.1 The Epiphenomenalp Objection
One of the strongest reasons to reject zombie worlds, and thus the Zombie
Argument, is that zombie worlds imply epiphenomenal qualia— or, more accurately,
epiphenomenalp qualia. ‘Epiphenomenalp’ means epiphenomenal with respect to the
physical domain of our world. 1 " 8 Thus, if F is an epiphenomenalp property, F is causally
impotent with respect to the physical domain— has no effects in the physical domain.
What I argue in this subchapter is that qualia are epiphenomenalp if zombie worlds exist.
Given the discussion in the next subchapter, this provides strong reason, or at least
reasonable grounds, to reject the Zombie Argument.
In section A, the relevant argument is presented. Section B, in turn, takes up
relevant objections, and provides replies. Section C offers a brief review, and also points
the way to subchapter 3.2.
3.1.1 The Epiphenomenalp Argument
Zombie worlds, by definition, lack qualia and are minimal physical duplicates of
our world. " The issue at hand is whether zombie worlds imply the causal impotency of
qualia - at least with respect to our world’s physical domain. The relevant claim is
E. Zombie worlds exist only if qualia are epiphenomenalp.
128
Note that ‘epiphenomenal’ is sometimes used to imply that if c is epiphenomenal then c is caused by the
physical but has no physical effects. As I use the term, c is epiphenomenal with respect to domain J if c
has no J'-effects. (Where domain J is our world at large, then c is epiphenomenal simpliciter if c has no
J'-effects.) Thus, I leave it open as to whether c may be caused by the ^"-domain.
129
For more on the notion of minimal physical duplicates see Chapter 1.
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If something is epiphenomena]
p then it doesn’t cause any physical events. Thus. (E) is
equivalent to the claim that if zombie worlds exist, qualia cause no physical events
.
130
My argument for (E) is straightforward. Before giving it, however, a brief
preliminary discussion of causes is in order. In the following, I am not offering an
analysis of ‘cause’, but instead appealing to the bare minimal requirement on causes. I
expect the given bare minimal requirement to be uncontroversial.
A cause, whatever else it is, is something that makes a difference in the world; it
has effects in the world. If something has no effects at all in the world, then that
something isn’t a cause. This is the bare minimum required of a cause.
Of course, as Samuel Alexander noted
,
131
having effects and “being real” are
intimately related - at least with respect to contingent entities in our world. Thus, if
something contingent has no effects at all in the world, then that something probably isn’t
real. ^ In what follows, only contingent entities are at issue.
Consider part of our world. In particular, consider the physical domain. Suppose
that c makes no difference in the physical domain; it has no effects whatsoever in the
physical domain. If, per materialism, the physical domain exhausts our world - if the
physical part of our world is an improper part of our world - then probably c isn’t real.
™ Note that whether qualia cause nonphysical events is an open issue. It’s left open here.
See Alexander (1920). Kim (1996) talks about Alexander’s dictum — according to which something
exists in our world only if it’s causal in some fashion or another. I endorse this view, but I don’t make
essential use of it here.
' Numbers and so-called abstract entities are a general problem. If, as I think, such entities have no causal
trucking with the world, then Alexander’s dictum - i.e., “to be is to have effects” - doesn’t apply. Yet if, as
I think, Alexander’s dictum is true, then some sort of distinction must be made so as to allow for numbers,
etc.. One way is a standard way: Alexander’s dictum is true for all contingent entities. Thus, numbers
and, if she’s necessary, God, are beyond the scope of Alexander’s dictum. For now, though, this issue can
be put aside.
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Suppose, though, that materialism isn’t true - that there’s more to our world than the
physical
.
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Then c may well be a genuine part of our world but c has no effect on the
physical part of our world. In this case, c is epiphenomenal
p .
I trust that the view, here, is a common one. If you were to take away all the F,
from our world, then if the Fi make a difference - do some sort of causal work - then that
difference would be reflected in the world. Likewise, if you were to take away all the F,
from some (proper) domain of our world, then if the F, make a difference in that domain
- do some sort of causal work - then that difference would be reflected in the domain. In
particular, once you take away the F, there should be some sort of noticeable change in
the domain - beyond, of course, the mere absence of the F
,,
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If the absence of the F,
doesn’t make a difference to the given domain, then the F, hardly deserve the title
‘causes’, at least with respect to the given domain. This, I take it, is simply part of the
nature of causes - regardless of whatever else they may be. And this, as above, is what
may be called the bare minimal constraint on causes: c is an actual cause only if c has
some sort of effect in makes some sort of difference to— (g (where (g is a domain of
our world).
In effect, this means that there are some entities — properties or etc. — that fail to globally supervene on
the microphysical bits of our world. See Chapter I for discussion of physical and global supervenience.
This applies, of course, even if the F, are mere “partial causes” of (7-events. In this case, the F, are
necessary for some (7-events but sufficient for none of them. Thus, taking away the F, would leave a very
noticeable difference in the (7 -domain - it wouldn’t be there any more!! This issue is discussed further in
Objections & Replies below. (Thanks very much to Lynne Baker for raising this issue in response to an
earlier draft.)
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As it turns out, the case of qualia and the physical domain of our world is exactly
the same- if zombte worlds exist. In other words, (E) is true. My argument is as
follows. 135
The Epiphenomenalp Argument (‘EA’ for short):
EA 1
. If zombie worlds exist, then there’s a (minimal) physical duplicate
of our world without any qualia.
EA2. If there’s a (minimal) physical duplicate of our world without any
quaha, then the physical domain of our world isn’t affected by the
complete absence of qualia.
EA3. If the physical domain of our world isn’t affected by the complete
absence of qualia, then qualia have no effect on — make no
difference to— the physical domain of our world.
EA4. If qualia have no effect on - make no difference to - the physical
domain of our world, then qualia don’t cause any physical events.
EA5. If qualia don’t cause any physical events, then qualia are
epiphenomenalp.
EA6. Thus, if zombie worlds exist, qualia are epiphenomenalp.
The rationales behind EA’s premises are as follows. 136
EAiL. Why think that (EA. 1 ) is true? (EA.l) is obviously true; it follows by
definition of zombie worlds’ — namely, Dzw (See Chapter 2 for relevant definition.)
135
Note that, after formulating this argument, I discovered that other philosophers have put forward this
style of argument before. See, especially, Horgan (1987) and Seager (1991). (I’m grateful to Dave
Chalmers who pointed these references out to me during correspondence on my argument.)
Note that objections concemmg causal overdetermination, partial overdetermination and related matters
are discussed in Objections & Replies.’ These, I believe, will be the most obvious and most serious
objections. First, though, rationales are given.
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M2, Why think that (EA.2) is true? (EA.2), unlike (EA.l), isn’t trivially true.
Like (EA.l), however, the truth of (EA.2) is fairly clear. After all, suppose you were to
stnp the world of all its F, Suppose that in doing so you leave the world’s g-domain
precisely as it was - except, of course, for the mere absence of the F, m Then this is a
situation in which the g-domam isn’t affected by the complete absence of the F,- again,
beyond now being such that the F, aren’t around.
This situation is precisely the situation with respect to zombie worlds and qualia.
Given a zombie world, there’s a world physically indiscernible from ours but lacking
qualia. But, then, stripping our world of qualia leaves the physical world unaffected -
beyond, once again, the mere absence of qualia. Thus, if there is a physical duplicate of
our world without any qualia, then the physical domain of our world is unaffected by the
complete absence of qualia. Thus, (EA.2) is true.
EA3. Why think that (EA.3) is true? The truth of (EA.3), like that of its
predecessors, can be easily shown. Suppose that the (^-domain of our world is unaffected
by the complete absence of our world’s F Then our world’s F, have no effect on its §-
domain. If the F, had some effect on the ^-domain, then such effects would be
noticeable; but they’re not.
The situation is the same with zombie worlds and qualia. Given that our world’s
physical domain is unaffected by the complete absence of qualia, qualia thereby have no
effect on the world s physical domain. If qualia had some effect on the physical domain,
137 Of course, for some (7-domains, stripping the world of all its F, won’t leave a duplicate (7-domain. This
is obviously true in the case where the F, - by necessity or otherwise - are themselves part of the (7-
domain. If zombie worlds exist, however, then qualia aren’t part of the physical domain. This much is
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such effects would be noticeable; but, given zontbie worlds, they're not. Hence, if the
Phystcal domain of our world is unaffected by the complete absence of qualia, then qualia
have no effect on - make no difference to - the physical domain of our world. (Again -
qualtf,cation concerning the mere absence of qualia remains in effect.) Thus, (EA.3) is
true.
EAA Why think that (EA.4) is true? (EA.4) is virtually trivially true. Given the
bare minimal constraint on a cause, then anything failing to have some effect on some
domain of our world thereby fails to be a cause (an actual cause). Thus, if qualia fail to
have any effect on the physical domain, then qualia don’t cause any physical events.
Thus, (EA.4) is true. 138
EA.5. Why think that (EA.5) is true? (EA.5), like (EA.l) and others, is obviously
true; it follows from the definition of ‘epiphenomenal
p
’, above. Hence, (EA.5) is true.
(EA.l) through (EA.5) provide the rationales for argument EA. If the rationales are
nght, then zombie worlds imply that qualia are epiphenomenalp. Zombie worlds, by
definition, are physical duplicates of our world. But, by definition, zombie worlds also
lack any trace of qualia. Thus, if qualia had any effect on the physical domain of our
world, then such effects would be noticeable in zombie worlds; but, by hypothesis,
they’re not. Accordingly, qualia are epiphenomenalp if zombie worlds exist.
common ground. (It also follows from the working sense of ‘physical’ according to which F is physical iff
F at least globally supervenes on the microphysical bits of our world - including laws, etc..)
138
Note, again, that objections concerning overdetermination issues will be addressed below.
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So much for the argument and rationales. The argument is intended to be simple,
straightforward and sound. Trouble is, there will no doubt be objections. Turn, now. to a
few of the most important objections to EA.
3.1.2 Objections and Replies
There are various related objections one might advance against EA. Here, I
consider the four most important ones. Turn to the first of the four objections.
3. 1.2.1 The Causal Overdetermination Objection (0.1)
One obvious objection to this argument concerns the idea of causal
overdetermination. Roughly, an event e is causally overdetermined by two entities cn
and cm if each of cn and cm occur, each is sufficient for e and each would’ve brought
about e had only one of and cm occurred. The objection is that if there is causal
overdetermination, then the above argument fails.
Suppose, for example, that at least some of the F, — in the above abstract scenarios
- are involved in causal overdetermination of ^-events. Let e
g be a ^-event; and let F0
and G0 be distinct events from the J- and ^-domains, respectively. Suppose that F0 and
G0 each cause eg (at some time, t). Now suppose, as above, that there’s a world, WG ,
that’s an exact ^-duplicate of our world but lacks any trace of the F, - and, thus, lacks F0 .
Is there an inconsistency here?
139
This objection is discussed in a variety of places. Jackson & Braddon-Mitchell (1996) contains an
excellent review of this, and related, objections based on overdetermination. Kim (1996) contains a good
but swift discussion of overdetermination. For discussion of issues related to overdetermination and causal
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According to the going objection, the answer is “no.” F0 causes eg and so does G0 .
But given that each causes eg , there’s no need for a noticeable difference in WG . In short,
so long as you have at least one of the causes you’ll also have the effect - namely, eg .
Thus, same effects doesn’t imply same causes; in which case, the above reasoning is
fallacious. In particular, so long as qualia sometimes causally overdetermine the
physical, then qualia needn’t be epiphenomenal
p given zombie worlds.
RJ.. My response to (0.1) is two-fold. First, it’s not at all clear that there’s any
causal overdetermination to begin with. Most alleged cases of causal overdetermination
tend to rest on a fairly coarse-grained view of events. But whether events need to be - or,
for that matter, should be - individuated coarsely is far from clear. At any rate, such a
view requires argument before the objection can get off the ground. 140
The second, perhaps more important, part ofmy response is this. Suppose, for the
sake of argument, that there is causal overdetermination in our world. Suppose, further,
that at least some of this causal overdetermination involves qualia. The important point
to notice is that if overdetermination is to save zombie worlds from epiphenomenalp
explanation, see Kim (1993). There are a number of useful papers discussing related issues in Heil & Mele
(1993).
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Take a classic example. Mark and Kathy both have pistols, and each fires a bullet at the local water
tower. Call Mark s bullet b| and Kathy’s, ‘b2 ’. As the story goes, bi and b2 penetrate the water tower at
the same time, t. The result is a leaky tower. Hence, there are (allegedly) two distinct causes of the leak.
Hence, there is causal overdetermination.
The trouble, as above, is that ‘the leak’ is too broad a specification— or so one may plausibly
argue. Let ‘p,’ and ‘p2 ’ name the places on the tower struck by bi and b2 , respectively. Then as it turns
out, there are really two different effects each with precisely one cause. There is the leak at p, and there is
the leak at p2 . No causal overdetermination is involved; the confusion rested on an overly course-grained
specification of the relevant events. This, at any rate, is a view one might take. For a good discussion of
overdetermination in general, see Jackson & Braddon-Mitchell (1996).
In any event, as will be clear below, I grant, at least for the sake of argument, that some causal
overdetermination exists in our world. As I argue, however, the only sort of overdetermination that can
avoid EA is “hyperoverdetermination”— a species of overdetermination which, in the end, fails to be
causal at all. But this is discussed below.
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qualia. then the overdetermination must be all out (as it were). In particular, every case
of qual.a causing physical events must be overdetermmed if qualia cause physical events
at all.
That this is so is easily seen. The physical domain of our world is causally
closed . 141 This implies that every physical event has a complete - as opposed to merely
partial
- physical cause. Suppose, then, that some quale, q, causes physical event pe . By
the relevant closure, pc is also caused by some physical event pe '. But, then, pe is causally
overdetermined by pe ' and q .
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Thus, if qualia cause physical events at all, then qualia always overdetermine such
events. This, though, paints a poor picture of the causal potency of qualia. If qualia
always causally overdetermine the physical, then it seems that qualia don’t genuinely
cause the physical at all. After all, taking them away from the world leaves the physical
world entirely intact and, except for the mere absence of qualia, precisely the same. It’s
one thing, of course, if— pace the causal closure principle - even a few qualia “acted
alone” in causing physical events while the host of other qualia engaged in
overdetermination. In this case, qualia are at least at times making a genuine difference
with respect to the physical. But if in every case the qualia can be stripped away without
any noticeable change in the physical domain, it seems odd (at best) to call qualia
‘causes’ with respect to physical events . 143
141
Support for this assumption is given below.
' This is so, at any rate, given the zombiephile’s view that qualia are nonphysical.
Kim (1993, 1996) makes a similar point with respect to causal explanation and, in particular, his
“explanatory exclusion” principle. For various reasons, I’m attempting to avoid discussion of causal
explanation; it would take the discussion too far afield. (For the record, though, I’m very sympathetic to
Kim’s views voiced in the “explanatory exclusion” principle.)
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The point, here, is the simple one emphasized above. In short, a cause - whatever
else it might be - had better make a noticeable difference in the world or some domain
thereof. Otherwise, our world is filled with causes that don’t do anything. But this, at the
veiy- least, seems paradoxical; at worst, contradictory. This, though, is precisely the case
if (say) the F, always engage in causal overdeteimination - relative to some domain -
whenever the F, engage in causation at all. Hence, this is the case with quaha: If zombie
worlds exist, then quaha cause no physical events at all or in every case of such causation
they overdetermine such events. In either case, though, qualia don’t deserve the title
‘cause’. Hence, qualia are epiphenomenal
p if zombie worlds exist.
But, now, another objection emerges. Turn to the Causal closure and question-
begging objection.
3.1.2.2 Causal closure and question-begging objection (0.2)
Given the crucial role it plays in (R.l), one might object to the relevant causal
closure principle. Call the causal closure principle ‘CCP’, which asserts that every
physical event (in our world) has a complete physical cause. The objection is that using
CCP in a proof against zombiephiles— those who assert the existence of zombie worlds
— begs the question against the zombiephile.
R2. My response is this. If zombiephiles reject CCP, then the issue of begging
questions is serious. As it turns out, however, zombiephiles don’t reject CCP. For
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example, two of the main contenders in this dispute firmly endorse CCP
,
144
while all
others either firmly endorse it or grant it in the context of arguing against materialism
.
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Of course, some zombiephiles might eventually choose to drop CCP. Still, as one
prominent zombiephile says, “the causal closure of the physical is not to be denied
lightly. But why? There seem to be two reasons, the second of which is more
relevant to the current issue.
In short, the first reason not to drop CCP is simply its strong plausibility. Though
the physical sciences currently cannot trace the etiology of every physical event to some
physical cause or another, the many etiologies thus far traced make CCP overwhelmingly
plausible— at least in principle.
The second, more relevant, reason for maintaining CCP, at least in the context of a
debate against materialists, is that materialists almost universally maintain CCP. The
idea that the physical domain of our world is causally closed is ubiquitous in materialist
literature
.
147
The point, as zombiephiles seem to recognize, is that a denial of CCP, at
least in the context of a debate against materialists, requires independent argument
144
The two relevant contenders are Chalmers and Jackson— see references in the next footnote.
145
See Chalmers (1996, 1997) and Jackson (1994b, 1995c) and Jackson & Braddon-Mitchell (1996).
These are not isolated cases. See Campbell (1970), Tye (1996), Flanagan (1992) and Kirk (1974a) for
noteworthy examples. But see also Bringsjord (1995), Mills (1995), Guzeldere (1995) and Sutherland
(1995).
146 Chalmers (1997).
147
See Kim (1996) for an excellent discussion of materialism and the causal closure principle— and
especially with respect to its ubiquitous presence in materialist literature. See Kim (1996), too, for
independent reasons for accepting the causal closure principle— independent of the current debate, that is.
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against CCP. This, though, zombiephiles haven’t provided— a fact perhaps partly
explained by the first reason for maintaining CCP. 148
Thus, for the foregoing reasons, my reply to the question-begging objection against
CCP is a plea of innocence. Though I haven’t argued for CCP, I likewise haven’t begged
the question.
3. 1.2.3 The Partial Causation Objection (0.3)
Another objection involves the notion ofpartial causation. Sometimes, ‘partial
causation’ is used to mean no more than ‘causal overdetermination’ in the sense
discussed above. In this case, cn and cm are each partial causes of event e if both cn and
cm occur, each is sufficient for e and had only one of cn and cm occurred e still would’ve
occurred. This case, however, is no different than the case discussed in (R. 1 ) above.
Another sense of ‘partial causation’ has it that cn and cm are each necessary
>
for
event e but neither is individually sufficient for e. A common example involves Jones’
heart failure at t. According to the story, Jones is in bad shape. Her aerobic condition is
very poor, so much so that were she to run a marathon she’d have heart failure. As things
go, Jones does run a marathon and has a heart attack at t. The idea is that, though neither
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Lynne Baker, on behalf of anti-materialists, suggested (in correspondence) the following objection here.
“All that the materialist is entitled to claim is that materialism is true only if CCP is true. But
antimaterialists agree with that. However, the only reason to believe that CCP is true requires an
antecedent commitment to materialism.” I'm not convinced that the only reason to believe CCP requires a
prior commitment to materialism. Indeed, as said, most zombiephiles firmly endorse CCP despite denying
materialism. CCP has independent plausibility, I think. In any event, this sort of objection, even if true, is
an issue for another (large!) project. With respect to the current debate between materialists and
zombiephiles, CCP is a given.
Lynne Baker has also consistently insisted to me that zombiephiles shouldn't endorse CCP. I
suspect that her view, here, might be a common response. Note, though, that CCP, alone, is consistent with
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the marathon venture nor the poor aerobic condition were individually sufficient for
Jones’ heart failure at t, each was necessary. In this case, both the marathon venture and
the aerobic condition are each called ‘partial causes’ of Jones’ heart failure at t.
Now, the objection is that qualia may be partial causes of physical events - in the
sense given by Jones’ heart failure case. In this case, runs the objection, it’s not so clear
that qualia would have no effect at all on the physical domain.
— ' My resP°nse to the partial causes objection is straightforward. Partial causes,
at least in the sense of being necessary conditions, clearly won’t help with respect to
qualia and zombie worlds. In short, qualia can’t be partial causes of physical events lest
zombie worlds be incoherent! For suppose this isn’t so. Then some quale, q, partially
causes physical event pe . Then q is necessary, though individually insufficient, for pe .
Given that pe is a physical event in our world, pe is thereby in every zombie world —
otherwise a zombie world, contrary to Dzw, wouldn’t be a physical duplicate of our
world. But since q is necessary for pe , q is also in every zombie world. This, though, is
incoherent. Zombie worlds, by definition, contain no qualia and thus don’t contain q.
Hence, qualia can t be partial causes of physical events if zombie worlds are coherent.
Notice, too, that appealing to the first sense of ‘partial causes’ - namely, the sense
in which they’re individually sufficient but not necessary - won’t help. As said, this is
the case discussed above in (R.l). The main trouble, here, is that if qualia are sufficient
causes of physical events, they always overdetermine such events. But this, as above,
zombie worlds. What doesn’t work is CCP, the minimal constraint on causes (as discussed above) and
non-epiphenomenalp qualia - provided that my argument in this section is sound.
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pamts a poor picture of qualm as causal entities. Overdetermination in every case simply
isn’t causation.
This raises one final, closely related objection.
3.1.2.4 The Overdetermination Objection - Again (0.4)
Some might object that the reasoning in the foregoing replies is fallacious.
Consider, in particular, the claim that if qualia in every case overdetermine physical
events, then qualia don’t cause physical events at all. This is absurd! Suppose that qualia
always causally overdetermine physical events. If qualia causally overdetermine physical
events at all, then, by definition of ‘causally overdetermine’, qualia cause physical
events! To wind up saying that qualia don’t cause physical events if they always causally
overdetermine them is absurd. Thus, the reasoning throughout the replies is fallacious.
RA My reply to (0.4) appeals to hyper-overdetermination
,
and runs as follows.
(0.4) is a fair objection, but I don’t think it works. I grant, at least for the sake of
argument, that some events are causally overdetermined. I grant, further, that in such
(limited) cases, causation is actually occurring. That is, I grant that if cn and cm causally
overdetermine e at t, then each of cn and cm cause e at t. All this I grant — again, at least
for the sake of argument.
What I don’t grant is what might be called ‘hyper-overdetermination’. Hvper-
overdetermination involves overdetermination in every case - with respect to some
domain. The F, hyper-overdetermine the 67-domain iff the F, overdetermine the (g
-
domain in all cases of J-Xo-(g causation.
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I deny that there’s hyper-overdetemiination; and I deny that such a denial is absurd.
It s one thing to say that there are a limited number of cases of Jf-to-g
overdetermination. And when the overdetermination is limited, there’s no problem
acknowledging two distinct (complete) causes— or so I grant for the sake of argument,
anyway. It’s a very different situation, however, when the overdetermination is supposed
to be hyper-overdetetmination— especially in the case of qualia and the physical
domain.
In short, the trouble with hyper-overdetermination is that it leaves us with “causes”
that don’t do anything with respect to some domain. Suppose that the F, always causally
overdetermine the ^-domain. Then, as above, stripping the world of all F, would leave
the (^-domain exactly as it was. The minimal requirement on causes, however, is that
they make at least some sort of difference to their respective domains. But if the F, can
be stripped away without any difference to the ^-domain, then the F, don’t make a
difference to the ^-domain. In this case, they shouldn’t be called ‘causes’.
My response to (0.4), then, is simply this. If, as seems eminently plausible, any
cause must make a difference, then hyper-overdetermination doesn’t exist. If it did exist,
then there d be causes that don’t make a difference. But this, again, seems impossible —
given one of the basic requirements on causes.
Turn, now, to a summary of the current subchapter.
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3.1.3 Review of SubChapter 3.1
I’ve argued that zombie worlds exist only if qualia are epiphenomenal
p . My
argument relies on the minimal requirement on causes; namely, that they make some sort
of difference that they have some sort of effect— in a given domain of the world.
Once this minimal requirement is recognized, then it’s clear that zombie worlds imply
epiphenomenalp qualia.
The most serious objection to the given argument concerns overdetermination
.
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As I argued above, however, qualia aren’t helped by this objection. Given CCP qualia
engage in “hyper-overdetermination” if they engage in causing the physical at all. But, as
I also argued, the minimal requirement on causes makes hyper-overdetermination no
'
4<)
David Chalmers offers another response to my EA. In Chalmers ( 1 996, 1997) he offers what's called
‘the Russellian Reply’ to epiphenomenalism, and in the given works he suggests that this is the best
response that zombiephiles can make. The response, in short, says that the physical sciences can never
appeal to “intrinsic properties”, but instead can appeal only to extrinisic, functional and/or structural
properties. When it comes down to it, argues Chalmers (in the given works), physical properties are at most
dispositional properties. And, as with any dispositional property, one should ask “What, exactly, is the
thing doing the causal work or carrying the disposition, as it were?” He says that the physical sciences
leave this question unanswered, and thus there’s room to say that qualia themselves are the “things” doing
the causal work described by scientific theories. (Thus, science says that a muon has such and such
functional properties. On the view in question, it might well be qualia performing the functional role of
muons!) The response, in the end, then, is that zombie worlds do not entail epiphenomenalp qualia. The
reason is that it’s consistent with physical theory that qualia play the causal role of the physical items
functionally, structurally or dispositionally described by science! This view was motivated by Russell
(1927, 1959), developed a bit by Maxwell, and recently endorsed by Lockwood (1989).
If Chalmers, one of the premier zombiephiles, has suggested this as a good response to my EA, then
why relegate the response to a footnote? Good question!
The answer is this. In the first place, the view is very strange, very complicated, and requires a great
deal of space to explain adequately. This, alone, is no reason to relegate it to a footnote. (After all, for all
its strangeness, it’s quite interesting!) However, in correspondence, Chalmers has conceded that my
objection to this response is successful. The objection is that any zombiephile who endorses this response
must thereby give up CCP, and also must offer strong independent support for the dubious claim that
physical theory cannot appeal to “intrinsic properties.” (Indeed, Chalmers has also acknowledged in
correspondence that physical theory may well appeal to intrinsic properties — for example, mass.) But, as
Chalmers acknowledges, once the zombiephile gives up CCP, she is no longer a zombiephile as understood
in this particular debate. Thus, despite its interesting features. I’ve decided against spending a great many
pages on the Russellian objection only to say, in the end, that it’s not relevant to the current debate. As
said, Chalmers (and Jackson) in correspondence concede that my assessment here is correct. [1 should note
that, in the future, I hope to develop this particular issue in a short paper. For now, however, it’s left aside
— thus leaving overdetermination as the most serious objection to EA.)
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overdetermination at all - since overdetermination (allegedly) involves causes
,
but hyper-
overdetermination involves no such things.
I conclude, then, that zombie worlds imply epiphenomenal
p qualia. The question
remains as to whether qualia really are epiphenomenalp. This is the main issue of the
next subchapter.
3.2 Epiphenomenalp qualia?
So far, we have it that zombie worlds imply epiphenomenalp qualia. In this section,
I argue that there s no reason to believe that qualia are epiphenomenalp, and indeed that
there s reason to deny it. More specifically, I argue that, at the very least, there’s
reasonable grounds upon which to deny the epiphenomenalp view.
A note on terminology. The only issue immediately at hand is whether qualia
cause physical events, whether qualia are not epiphenomenalp. Accordingly, I will
sometimes use causal qualia or ‘causally potent qualia’ or ‘causally efficacious qualia’
and the like as short for ‘non-epiphenomenal
p qualia’. Likewise, I will sometimes say
that qualia aren’t causally potent or et cetera if qualia are epiphenomenalp. This is merely
for convenience . 150 In no way is this to suggest that qualia cause things— be they
physical or not— only if qualia cause physical things. This may in fact be true but it’s
not here assumed . 1 ^ 1 The task, then, is to argue that qualia are indeed causally potent.
150
Writing ‘qualia are not epiphenomenalp' or ‘qualia are causally impotent with respect to the physical
domain’ or et cetera becomes cumbersome!
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Notice that, strictly speaking, since zombiephiles maintain a materialist view with respect to everything
except qualia, the assumption turns out to be harmless. Nonetheless, since (E) speaks only of
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The plan is this. I will first argue from commonsense. In particular, I will argue
that commonsense weighs heavily in favor of non-epiphenomenal
p qualia. This argument
is very brief; but this argument, alone, bolsters a strong case for causal qualia unless
there’s strong independent evidence to the contrary. The question, then, is whether there
is a strong case to the contrary— a strong case for epiphenomenal
p qualia. This question
forms the second stage of the argument. After examining the most popular case for
epiphenomenalp qualia— namely, the argument from complete science— I argue that
the question should be answered negatively
.
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For now, turn briefly to the case from commonsense.
3.2.1 The Case From Commonsense
Commonsense weighs heavily in favor of causal qualia. Indeed, upon reflection,
the view that qualia are epiphenomenalp seems to be simply not believable. Consider the
following.
Suppose that qualia are epiphenomenalp. Then the tasteftilness of Big Macs has nothing
whatsoever to do with your recurring “Big Mac attacks” (as they’re called). “What are
you doing?” asks your friend. “I’m walking to McDonalds to get a Big Mac,” you reply.
epiphenomenalp qualia, the assumption might be misleading. (Thanks to David Chalmers for discussion,
here.)
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1 should note that there are quite a few arguments against epiphenomenalp qualia. The argument from
commonsense is among the standard ones; but others include an argument from (causal) knowledge, an
argument from (causal) reference, and an argument from evolution. Originally, I had planned to discuss
these arguments here. I’ve decided not to do so mostly for considerations of space, but also because all of
them are fairly well-known. My own contribution in this particular section is tying the commonsense
objection together with an origmal response to the main argument for epiphenomenalp qualia— namely,
the argument from complete science. For a handy (but brief) discussion of the standard attacks against
epiphenomenalp qualia, see Garfield (1996), Chalmers (1996), and Jackson & Braddon-Mitchell (1996).
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Why? asks your friend, “Don’t you know that they’re bad for your health?!” “Yes, I
know,” you reply, “but I eat them for the taste- not because I seek nutritional value.”
This sort of exchange is common enough. On an epiphenomenal
p view, however,
your explanation of your behavior isn’t true. On the epiphenomenalp view, your desire
- a physical state! — cannot be causally influenced by the tastiness of Big Macs. The
tastiness of a Big Mac— that is, the phenomenal features of tasting a Big Mac have
no causal beanng on your behavior according to the epiphenomenalp view. But this
seems to be not only false, but also not believable. If qualm are epiphenomenalp, then it’s
false to say that the taste of your favorite food in any way causes you to seek more of it.
But, again, this seems to be not believable.
Consider another, perhaps stronger, case. Consider the painfulness of your
migraine. If qualia are epiphenomenalp, then the painfulness of your migraine has
nothing whatsoever to do with your groaning, with your calls to the doctor for
prescription drugs, or, generally, with your desire to avoid migraines. In fact, on the
epiphenomenalp view, if everything else were kept constant but the painfulness were
stripped away, you’d still be groaning, calling the doctor, or, generally, trying to avoid
the (painless!) migraine! As above, this seems to be simply not believable— and very
close to incoherent.
The trouble is, it seems that it’s simply part of what ‘painfulness’ or ‘tastiness’
mean that they tend to cause particular sorts of behavior. Something is tasty only if, in
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For anyone who, like me, has suffered from migraines, this will be a very’ persuasive case indeed! For
those who haven’t suffered from migraines (and good for you if you haven’t!), consider your worst case of
pam instead of the migraine case.
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the right conditions, it bnngs about such and such behav.or. (This isn't at all to say that
this is all there is to tastiness, of course.) Ukewise, something is painful only ,f. in the
condhions, it brings about such and such behavior. This connection between qualia and
behavior seems to be very, vety intimate. So it seems, anyway- and strongly so. On
the epiphenomenalp view, however, these seemings are misguided.
Given this strong sense that producing behavior— or bringing about some physical
effect is part of the very concept ofpainfulness, we need an argument for why the
above “seemings” are allegedly misguided. The next section examines just such an
argument.
For now, however, it s important to see where commonsense leaves us. As above,
it leaves us with the belief that qualia are indeed causally potent— that qualia aren’t
epiphenomenalp. In the end, though, what we’re really left with is the phenomenon
captured by “One philosopher’s modus ponens is another’s modus tollens .” 154 In
particular, we’re left with:
Q. If qualia are epiphenomenalp then the pamfulness of pain has nothing
whatsoever to do with our pain-behavior. (Likewise for any name of qualia
substituted for ‘painfulness’, etc..)
Everybody agrees with the conditional. It’s just that some take the conditional and
make a modus ponens, while others, including myself, take it and make a modus tollens.
As above, commonsense weighs heavily toward making a modus tollens out of (Q).
Barring strong argument to the contrary, it’s reasonable to go with commonsense. The
154
1 get this very appropriate phrase from Lynne Baker’s various works.
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question is whether there is strong argument to the contrary. The question is: Is there
any good reason for making a modus ponens rather than a modus tollens out of (Q)? I
will argue that the answer is “no.” This argument is in the next section.
3.2.2 The Argument from Complete Science
As above, we begin our reflections with the view that qualia have effects on our
behavior. “Why are you scratching?” the mother asks. “Because I’m itchy,” the child
replies. “Why do you eat so much ice cream?” the father asks. “Because it tastes good,”
the child replies. And the child is right. The taste of the ice cream, the itchiness of an
itch - these are the properties that influence our behavior. This, at any rate, is how things
seem. Should we give up this commonsense view? We should only if there’s good
reason to. But are there any good arguments for epiphenomenal
p qualia?
The most popular argument against the causal efficacy of qualia— the argument
from complete science— appeals to the apparent explanatory irrelevance of qualia in an
imagined complete scientific explanation of human behavior. 15 ^ The argument arises as
follows.
Why would anyone hold to epiphenomenalism
p about qualia, especially in the face
of its radical break from commonsense? The motivation, here, stems from reflection on
the practice of science. Suppose that you’re attempting to explain the causal origins of
Sally’s ice-cream-eating behavior. You’d point to motor nerves connected to activity in
the cortex of the cerebrum; you’d point to various inputs into various parts of the brain;
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you'd point to this bit of brain and that bit of brain; and, eventually, you'd point to some
bit of brain that yields outputs described, in ordinary terms, as ice-cream-eating behavior.
But in any of this bit-o’-brain talk, would you appeal to "what it’s like” to taste ice-
cream? It seems unlikely.
Your neuroscientific explanation would seem to involve no reference at all to the
what it s like aspects of Sally’s experience. You’d certainly appeal to a wonderfully
complex physical system, but it seems unlikely that any of your explanation would appeal
to qualia. Suppose you were to tell Mary the complete scientific story of Sally’s behavior
(and anything else required for the full scientific story). It seems that, on first glance, you
could tell Mary all you want about physics, neuroscience and the bit-o’-brain story; still,
you won’t tell her about qualia— the intuition goes. Moreover, it seems that a complete
scientific explanation of Sally s behavior would be complete. Nothing, it seems, would
be left out of a scientific explanation of Sally ’s behavior. This, at any rate, is the main
intuition upon which the argument from complete science rests.
But an obvious question arises: What about qualia? How can the explanation be
complete if it fails to involve qualia? This is the question posed by commonsense. The
answer, according to the going argument, is that the explanation is an explanation of
Sally’s behavior— the causal origins of her behavior. The answer, more specifically, is
that qualia are epiphenomenal
p : They’re really there, but they have nothing to do with
causing behavior - or, for that matter, causing any other physical events.
I5?
There are many philosophers who cite this argument as the main reason for epiphenomenalp qualia.
Among these philosophers are Jackson (1982), P.M.Churchland (1988), Dennett (1993), Chalmers (1996),
Campbell (1970), Tye (1996) and almost all other zombiephiles.
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Thus, the motivation for thinking that qualia are epiphenomenal
p is based on the
idea that a complete scientific story- perhaps neuroscience, among other sciences-
would fail to appeal to qualia. Knowing that qualia exist, the only reasonable conclusion
is that qualia are causally impotent. This, at any rate, is the main reasoning behind the
argument from complete science, and the main reasoning behind the view that qualia are
epiphenomenalp.
Is it good reasoning? I don’t think so. Turn, now, to the reasons for this view.
3.2.3 Why the argument from complete science fails
Ask yourself whether the complete scientific story has really given you a good
reason to doubt what you’ve always believed— namely, that were it not for qualia, we
wouldn’t do all that we do. Have you been given good reason to doubt? Have you really
been given reason to think that qualia don’t cause any physical events?
I don’t think so. The argument from complete science seems to go something like
this - where ‘CS’ abbreviates ‘the argument from complete science’.
CS
CS. 1 Complete science cites all causes of behavior.
CS.2 Complete science doesn’t cite qualia.
CS.3 Therefore, qualia don’t cause behavior.
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The trouble with CS is that it neglects the important notion of implicit reference or
implicit citing
,
as it were. The result of this neglect is an ambiguity in (CS.l) and (CS.2)
Let me explain.
Suppose that I say “Mark is a male sibling of Kathy” and that’s all that I say. Does
it follow that Mark isn’t a brother of Kathy? Of course not. Yet, I didn’t cite the fact that
Mark is a brother of Kathy - at least not explicitly.
Consider a better case. Suppose that Beth wants to sell her property, property
consisting of exactly 4 acres of land: acres A, B, C and D. Beth tells a potential buyer
“I’m selling nothing more than A, B, C and D.” Is Beth lying? After all, she’s certainly
also selling her property, which she didn’t cite! This, of course, is crazy. Beth did cite
her property - though not explicitly. Instead, she cited it implicitly.
Implicit reference is all around us. Thus, if I tell you, in these words, that I have 1
cat, 1 mat and 1 hat, I’ve explicitly told you just that: namely, that I have 1 cat, 1 mat
and 1 hat. But I ve also told you more. I’ve implicitly told you that I have an animal and
two artifacts; I have at least 3 things; I have something that is normally worn on one’s
head; and so on. I didn’t explicitly tell you any of this. Implicitly, however, I told you
all of it - and much, much more, of course.
In general, an expression implicitly refers to some fact, property or entity when the
fact, property or entity is entailed by whatever is explicitly referred to by the
expression.
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Thus, as in the above examples, if I were to say “There’s a triangle on the
156 As in Chapter I, a property F entails property G iff there’s no world in which F is instantiated but not G.
(The same can be said for entities and facts.)
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board” I’d thereby make implicit reference to the fact that there’s a three-angled object on
the board the sum of whose angles equal 180 degrees.
Ignoring implicit reference is a serious mistake. Consider, for example, the
following argument— the argument from complete membership records (or ‘CMR’ for
short):
CMR
CMR1. List L cites all members of the APA.
CMR2. List L doesn’t cite Dr. Jet.
CMR3. Therefore, Dr. Jet isn’t a member of the APA.
‘Dr. Jet’, as a matter of fact, doesn’t appear on list L. Nonetheless, the conclusion
doesn’t follow. As it turns out, ‘Dr. Jet’ is another name for Dr. Gettier - whether Gettier
or most of the APA knows it or not! 1 7 Thus, it turns out that Dr. Jet’s membership is
entailed by what is explicitly cited on list L. List L explicitly cites Gettier and thereby
implicitly cites Dr. Jet. Alternatively, Dr. Jet’s membership is entailed by Gettier’
s
membership. The problem with CMR is that it neglects implicit reference.
The same sort of caution, I suggest, ought to be taken with respect to CS — the
argument from completed science. Is CS sound? The question is: Are qualia in fact
implicitly referred to in the complete scientific story?
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This is true, by the way. I’m not sure whether the name comes from the Umass faculty members
(perhaps Sleigh?), but students sometimes refer to Gettier by ‘Dr. Jet’ or, at tunes, ‘The Jet’. (Of course,
the trouble with the example is that Gettier probably isn’t a member of the APA. Alas, perfect examples
are hard to find!)
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The answer, of course, is that qualia are so cited only if they’re entailed by the
complete scientific story. In turn, they’re so emailed if they at least globally supervene
on the relevant story. But do they so supervene?
The answer is that qualia at least globally supervene on the relevant story the
complete scientific story, including microphysics— provided that they cause physical
events. This, in effect, is the result of (E). As per (E), zombie worlds exist only if qualia
are epiphenomenal
p only if, that is, qualia don’t cause physical events. By the
contrapositive of (E), zombie worlds don’t exist if qualia do cause physical events. But,
then, if there aren’t any zombie worlds, then qualia at least globally supervene on the
physical — as there’s then no (minimal) physical duplicate of our world that isn’t a
duplicate with respect to qualia.
Thus, the question, once again, is: Are qualia implicitly referred to by the complete
scientific story? The answer, once again, is that they are provided that qualia cause
physical events. (Again, this is the main import of (E).) But do qualia cause physical
events?
The important point, here, is that the argumentfrom complete science leaves us
without an answer ! That argument is sound only if the complete scientific story doesn’t
implicitly cite qualia. Unfortunately, the story motivating the argument from complete
science leaves this question unanswered. Indeed, the story is plausible insofar as it’s read
in terms of explicit reference only. After all, science is unlikely to use the term ‘qualia’
or ‘what it is like’ in its complete story. At the same time, the story becomes implausible
if, in addition to its claims of explicit reference, it says that qualia won’t even be
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implicitly referred to. For how could it say this without first establishing that qualia fail
to at least globally supetwene on the microphysical? The answer is: It couldn’t— at
least not without begging questions against the materialist
.
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Given that CS doesn’t tell us whether qualia are implicitly cited in the complete
scientific story, CS accordingly fails to give reason against the view that qualia are
causally efficacious. In this way, CS is neutral with respect to the causal powers of
qualia. And this, in the end, is the main failure of the argument from complete science.
Given, then, that there’s no good reason to accept the view that qualia are
epiphenomenalp, there s likewise no good reason to reject the commonsense view to the
contrary. Qualia appear to be causally efficacious, and there’s no good argument to think
otherwise. Thus, the view that qualia are not epiphenomenalp, at the very least, is well-
warranted.
Given (E), the rejection of epiphenomenalp amounts to the rejection of zombie
worlds. Without zombie worlds, the Zombie Argument is unsound. For these reasons,
the Zombie Argument should be rejected . 159
1 58
Note that the “explanatory gap problem is relevant, here. This problem is taken up in the final chapter,
Chapter V.
159 One might still be tempted to argue for epiphenomenalp qualia on the basis of so-called blindsight.
Experiments have been done that seem to indicate that in rare cases people with damaged brains react to
“color” in the same way that nondamaged persons react, but that the damaged-brain persons seem to
experience no qualia at all (at least with respect to color). The objection, then, may be that this is empirical
evidence for epiphenomenalp qualia. In other words, color-qualia can disappear without affecting the
behavior of individuals. (I’m very grateful to Gary Matthews for raising this objection in conversation.)
There are a couple of responses, here. First, it’s not true that behavior in these cases is the same. In
particular, in no case of blindsight has someone spontaneously issued a report about the contents of then-
perceptions. Instead, patients, in every case, must be forced to choose between various possibilities before
they can issue a report— like “That’s red” or etc.. Second, and more importantly, the objection isn’t a
very strong one for this reason: The argument against epiphenomenalp qualia, above, doesn’t say that if
qualia were removed then behavior has to change. Indeed, it’s quite open to interpret cases of blindsight as
119
3.3 Review of Chapter 3
I ve argued that the existence of zombie worlds implies that qualia are
epiphenomenalp— causally impotent with respect to the physical domain of our world.
This argument appeals to the bare minimal requirement on causes
,
namely that they have
some effects in some domain of our world. Once this requirement is in hand, it’s fairly
clear that zombie worlds imply epiphenomenalp qualia. The only relevant option for the
zombiephile is to appeal to hyper-overdetermination; but this, as I’ve argued, won’t help
— as it hardly casts causal powers on qualia.
In turn, I ve argued that, at the very least, there’s reasonable grounds upon which to
deny that qualia are epiphenomenalp. These grounds consist of commonsense and the
lack of any strong argument opposing commonsense— opposing the view that qualia are
causally efficacious. Hence, with reasonable grounds, there’s a straightforward argument
against zombie worlds, and thereby a very strong objection to the Zombie Argument.
The argument, in short, is this: (E), and qualia are not epiphenomenalp; Therefore,
zombie worlds don t exist. Hence, (ZA.2) is false, and the Zombie Argument collapses.
With these considerations in hand, minimal materialism, we can all reasonably
conclude, is not threatened by qualia. 160 At the same time, there are other important
issues left over. Notice that throughout the discussion, no attempt has been made to say
suggesting that if qualia are removed, then some other property “clicks in” to take over the causal work of
qualia. So, despite the extremely interesting issues that blmdsight raises, I don’t think it affords a very
good objection to the argument against epiphenomenalp qualia— and likewise, I don’t think it offers a
good argumentfor epiphenomenalp qualia.
For discussion of blindsight, see Heil (1983), Dennett (1991), and McGinn ( 1991).
160
These claims will be backed up in Chapter V— a chapter devoted to the very question of whether my
arguments have really established that qualia are physical. I’ll argue that they have, but I reserve this for
Chapter V.
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precisely “where” qualia are in the physical world- be they properties of the brain.
propert.es of the whole sentient body, or perhaps even properties of the world as a whole!
Moreover, there’s still the question as to whether, given the success of the foregoing
arguments, it follows that qualia are physical. Furthermore, as in Chapter 1, there remain
general concerns about the significance of minimal materialism, itself whether it’s
really worth defending, et cetera. These, and other concerns, are important; but as yet,
none of them have been adequately addressed (though hints of responses have been given
in Chapter 1).
The only thing that has been established is that zombie worlds don’t exist
provided, again, that we have good reason to think that qualia are not epiphenomenal
p ,
and I’ve argued that we do. Though this conclusion is very important— especially given
the wide-ranging debate over materialism versus qualia— there seem to be many
important questions left over. For this reason, Chapter 5 is devoted to responding to such
questions in the context of a general response to other objections, concerns and
complaints that may well be leveled against the current project as a whole. For now,
however, the reader should note that the main thesis has been established: namely, that
zombie worlds don’t exist, or at any rate, that minimal materialism isn’t threatened by
qualia.
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Before moving on to Chapter 5, another important topic must be addressed— and
it will be in Chapter 4. Any discussion of “qualia attacks” on materialism would be
conspicuously incomplete without a discussion of the infamous “Knowledge Argument.”
161 Of course, all of this is said modulo the given parameters of the discussion! This, too, is an issue
addressed in Chapter 5.
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In many ways, this argument started the recent surge in qualia attacks on materialism, and
it’s to this argument that we now turn.
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CHAPTER 4
ZOMBIE WORLDS & THE KNOWLEDGE ARGUMENT
The overriding theme of this project is qualia-versus-matenalism. No discussion of
this theme would be complete without an examination of the infamous Knowledge
Argument. 162 The present chapter fills this role.
In Chapter 3, zombie worlds and the Zombie Argument collapsed on pain of
denying that our belief that qualia exist is reliable. In this chapter, this result will be used
to decisively undermine another widely discussed qualia attack on materialism—
namely, the Knowledge Argument. The main thesis of this chapter is that the Knowledge
Argument, if sound, entails the existence of zombie worlds. Given this result and the
results of the previous chapter, a decisive objection to the Knowledge Argument emerges.
The plan of this chapter is this. Subchapter 4.1 will introduce the story of Mary
and the Knowledge Argument. Subchapter 4.2 will discuss an array of interesting and
popular objections to the Knowledge Argument. In each case, I will argue that the
objections fail. As above, however, I will also present a new objection. In subchapter
4.3, 1 will argue that the Knowledge Argument, if sound, entails the existence of zombie
worlds— and, hence, a clear and strong objection arises. Subchapter 4.4, finally, will
16
~ Infamous — at least to materialists! As in the Preface, this entire project stems from my long-standing
interest in Jackson’s (1986) Knowledge Argument against materialism. In some ways, what’s most
rewarding about this project is that it provides a solid response to the Knowledge Argument— a response
based on the results of Chapter 3. For discussion of this chapter. I’m very grateful to David Chalmers,
Frank Jackson, and, especially, Jay Garfield and David Braddon-Mitchell.
For the record, Frank Jackson no longer endorses the Knowledge Argument. He explicitly says this
in Jackson (1997b). Unfortunately, he has yet to make explicit his reasons for rejecting the argument—
though. I’m happy to learn (in correspondence), his reasons apparently have much to do with the line I
develop in this chapter. In any event, I treat the Knowledge Argument throughout as something of interest
in itself, irrespective of Jackson’s own current views.
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briefly review the territory covered. For now, turn to Mary and the Knowledge
Argument.
The Story of Mary and The Knowledge Argument
In this subchapter, I present the Knowledge Argument against materialism. 163
First, however, the story of Mary must be told.
The plan is this. Part A will give the story of Mary, and part B will give the
Knowledge Argument. After that, subchapter 4.2 will examine common objections to the
Knowledge Argument. First, turn to the story of Mary.
4.1.1 The Story of Mary
The story of Mary is an imaginary story of a brilliant woman who is an expert in
neuroscience, physics, biology, cognitive psychology and, generally, all other natural
sciences.
164
Unfortunately, she is raised in very awkward circumstances. From birth,
Mary is confined to a black and white room. She is fed properly enough, but her food is
always in black in white. Likewise, her entire education is given in black and white.
Mary learns from black and white books, black and white videos, black and white
163
Frank Jackson (1982, 1986, 1995a)— especially Jackson (1986)— came up with the Knowledge
Argument. Nagel (1974), however, came up with virtually the same argument. For unknown reasons,
Jackson’s version has been the more popular of the two. Here, I concentrate exclusively on the Jackson
version— which, in the end, is the version officially called ‘the Knowledge Argument’.
164
Cognitive psychology, though perhaps not (yet) officially a natural science, is among Mary’s areas of
expertise. I should note, too, that the story of Mary is retold without explicitly mentioning her mastery of
physics, biology, etc.. (Jackson, himself, makes it clear.) Usually, Mary is said only to be a neuroscientist.
However, it’s clear that Mary is supposed to know all of the physical sciences, etc.. So, I’ve simply made
this explicit.
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internet connections, etc.. The same applies to her interpersonal interactions; they’re all
in black and white. Mary’s life, in short, is in black and white.
Now, Mary’s story takes place in the future. Indeed, Mary lives during the time of
completed science the time during which the complete physical story of our world is
known. As the story goes, despite her rather odd lifestyle, Mary comes to learn all there
is to know about the physical story of our world. For example, she knows all there is to
know about the physics of perception; she knows all there is to know about the
neuroscientific dynamics of perception; and, in general, she knows a whole lot— indeed,
as said, the entire physical story of our world! (Mary, needless to say, has a prodigious
mind, and she s able to easily make sense of tremendous information she carries.)
One sunny day a bright day for Mary but, allegedly, a gloomy day for
materialism— Mary is released from her black and white environment. She walks
outside for the first time in her life; and, for the first time, Mary sees a red rose. (She
had seen roses before, but only in black and white.) Upon seeing the red rose, Mary
learns something new— something new about people. She learns what it’s like to see a
red rose. This new knowledge wasn’t something she had before, and it wasn’t something
she could deduce from her knowledge of the complete physical story of our world. Thus,
the day Mary saw her rose is the day that materialism died. Or so the story goes.
How is it that Mary’s story end with the death of materialism? For this, turn to the
Knowledge Argument.
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4.1.2 The Knowledge Argument
It is important to recall that Mary knows the entire physical story of our world
or, at any rate, the knowable bits of the story. 165 It’s also important to recall that,
allegedly, Mary learns something new about our world when she sees the red rose.
Finally, it s important to recall that, according to materialism, our world is completely
physical. Thus, if Mary knows the complete physical story of our world, then Mary
knows the complete story of our world unless materialism is false. But, given that she
learns something not in— or entailed by— the complete physical story, materialism is
false. Hence, Mary’s new knowledge spells the death of materialism. This is the
Knowledge Argument.
The argument can be laid out clearly as follows: 166
The Knowledge Argument— KA
—
KA.l. Before her release, Mary knows everything physical there is to
know about people.
KA.2. After her release, Mary learns something new about people.
KA.3. If (KA.l) and (KA.2), then some knowable truths about people
aren’t physical.
KA.4. Therefore, some knowable truths about people aren’t physical.
165
Throughout, when I say that Mary knows the complete physical story of our world, I mean, of course,
that Mary knows the knowable parts of the story. This is clearly Jackson’s intention in the Mary story. In
some places, this point becomes relevant below.
166
This follows Jackson (1986). Jackson, himself, doesn’t stop to give rationales for the premises, but I do
so below. I also add a conditional premise to make the argument’s validity obvious.
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The rationales for KA run as follows.
KAJ. Why is (KA.l) true? This is true by stipulation (as it were). As in the Mary
story, it’s part of the Knowledge Argument that Mary, by stipulation, knows all the
(knowable) physical facts and, so, all the physical facts about people. So, by
assumption, (KA.2) is true.
KA2 Why is (KA.2) true? The reason that (KA.2) is supposed to be true is that,
as in the story, upon her release Mary learns what it’s like to see a red rose. This is a
fact, an important fact, about people— that there’s something it’s like for people to see a
red rose. (Of course, the story could equally well be told in terms of pain, or an itch, or
any other qualitative state.) Hence, given that she learns something new about people
after her release, she thereby doesn’t know everything (knowable) about people before
her release. So, (KA.2) is true— as the argument goes.
KA.3 (KA.3) follows from Leibniz’s Law. Here, I merely pause to indicate what
Leibniz’s Law is, and briefly indicate how it applies— or one clear way of applying it.
Leibniz’s Law— also frequently called ‘the indiscemibility of identicals’ — says that,
for any x andy, ifx and y are identical, then any property ofx is a property ofy, and vice
versa. In this case, it may be easiest to assign sets of truths to ‘x’ and ‘y’ in Leibniz’s
Law. In particular, assign the set of all (knowable) physical truths about people to ‘x’,
and the set of all (knowable) truths about people to ‘y’. In turn, let the relevant property
be being such that all of its elements are known by Mary. Since, on the given
assignment, x has this property buty doesn’t, it follows from Leibniz’s Law— and a
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dose Of cardinal arithmetic- that the knowable truths about people outrun the knowable
physical truths about people. Thus, given (KA.l) and (KA.2), the consequent of (KA.3)
is true.
So much, then, for KA’s rationales. The important point to notice is that, if sound,
the Knowledge Argument does indeed spell the end of materialism. For if sound, there
are some facts about our world that aren’t physical facts; but this contradicts
materialism.
The question, then, is whether the Knowledge Argument is sound. There have been
many interesting responses to the Knowledge Argument, and many of them are quite
plausible. Turn, now, to a discussion of the most interesting of these responses.
4.2 Common Objections to the Knowledge Argument
In this subchapter, I examine six of the most popular sorts of objection to the
Knowledge Argument. All of the objections are closely related, and each one is
interesting— and many, but not all, of them are plausible. I will argue, though, that in
nearly every case, each objection ultimately fails. I should emphasize, here, that I say
only as much as I think is required to give a sense of the relevant objections, and likewise
for replies. Much more could be said in each case, but here is not the place. 168 After
examining the objections, I offer a brief review of the territory covered. For now, turn to
the objections.
167
(this is not always immediately recognized by some writers on this issue, which is why I spell it out)
168
For excellent, up to date collections of relevant articles, see Davies & Humphreys (1993) and,
especially, Metzinger (1995).
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4.2.1 The Intensional Fallacy Objection
The Intentional Fallacy Objection involves so-called intentional terms , 169
Intensional terms create intensional contexts. An intensional context is a context in
which the following rule of substitutivity fails:
S. For any distinct singular terms, x and x', and any true sentence, a,
in which x occurs: If rx=x '1 is true then uniform substitution of x
for x' in a yields a true sentence.
(S) is in many ways obviously true. After all, if x and x' both refer to x, then how
can
r
x is F1 — for any predicate F— be true while rx' is F1 be false? Suppose, for
example, that ‘Jezza=The author of Rubbish' and ‘Jezza loves Kezza’ are both true.
Clearly, it follows that ‘The author of Rubbish loves Kezza’ is thereby true as well. And
this is the import of (S). Intensional contexts conflict with (S).
An intensional context is a (linguistic) context in which (S) fails. There are many
such contexts, most of which have to do with expressions referring to intentional (mental)
states— ‘..believes that..’, ‘..desires that..’, ‘..hopes that..’ and, most importantly,
‘..knows that..’. The worst, but nonetheless interesting, thing about intensional contexts
is that they spell immediate trouble for validity\ For example, the argument
169
Jay Garfield raised this objection both in correspondence and in Garfield (1996). Though this isn’t a
widely discussed objection, I suspect that it’s a suspicion that many philosophers immediately have— or,
perhaps, should have— upon first encountering the Knowledge Argument. Note that this objection is very
closely related to another objection which is very widely discussed— namely, the Different
Descriptions/Modes Objection, discussed below.
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JKezza knows that Jezza=Jezza
Jezza=The author of Rubbish
Therefore, Kezza knows that Jezza=the author ofRubbish
is obviously invalid. The premises are true, but the conclusion might well be false. This
is the mark of invalidity.
The Intensional Fallacy Objection to KA is simply this. The expression ‘..knows
that..’ is an intensional expression. As with the case of Kezza, so too with the case of
Mary, intensional expressions create invalidity. It’s always and everywhere a fallacy to
infer conclusion that uses an intensional context from premises that use intensional
contexts. Since the Knowledge Argument does this, the Knowledge Argument is thereby
invalid.
The Intensional Fallacy Objection , then, is this: Any argument that
proceeds from intensional contexts to intensional contexts (in the way
specified above) is an invalid argument. The Knowledge Argument
commits this fallacy, and so the Knowledge Argument isn’t sound.
Is the Intensional Fallacy objection a good objection? I don’t think so. There are a
couple of replies that one might make, here, but I give what seems to be the best one . 170
Intensional fallacies are indeed serious. Nonetheless, the Intensional Fallacy
Objection is false. There are cases in which an inference from intensional contexts to
intensional contexts is valid. Suppose, in particular, that Kezza knows everything about
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Jezza. Adding this assumption to argument J yields a valid argument— despite the fact
that each premise employs an mtensional context. Indeed, all the cases in which the
mtensional fallacy applies are cases of ignorance in one respect or another. (Lois Lane
believes that Superman can fly, but she doesn’t believe that Clark Kent can fly- despite
the fact that Superman is Clark Kent. What Lois is missing, of course, is knowledge of
the relevant identity.) When ignorance is missing, the intensional fallacy doesn’t arise.
Thus, the best response to the Intensional Fallacy Objection to KA is this: Mary
knows all the physical facts. If materialism is true, then Mary thereby knows all the facts
simpliciter. Hence, there s no relevant ignorance to make for an intensional fallacy
unless materialism is false. But if the objector concedes that materialism is false, then the
Intensional Fallacy Objection is hardly damaging to the spirit of KA. Thus, the
Intensional Fallacy Objection doesn’t work.
4.2.2 The “no metaphysics from epistemology” Objection
The main problem with the Knowledge Argument, according to the “no
metaphysics from epistemology” objection, is that it attempts to draw substantial
metaphysical results from epistemological ones. 171 But this effort, in any context, is
misguided.
170
Jackson (1995a) gives this reply, which I endorse fully.
171
Churchland (1985) made this objection famous. Again, I suspect that this objection is one that many
philosophers would likely have to the Knowledge Argument. In many cases, they’d be right; but, as I'll
argue below, the objection doesn’t clearly work in this context. (Note, however, that a very close cousin of
this objection— the Question-Begging Objection— is a stronger objection, I think. I discuss this
objection in section 4.2.3.)
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Suppose that we’re limited in what we can know about some domain of facts. Call
the domain ‘0\ Suppose that Q contains 129 facts- just to pick a number! Suppose
that we’re cognitively such that we can’t know 7 of the §-facts. If the Knowledge
Argument is sound, then those 7 facts must not exist! For if the Knowledge Argument is
sound, then what we can know has direct bearing on the way the world is like. After all.
the Knowledge Argument proceeds from premises about what Mary knows to a
substantial metaphysical conclusion— namely, that some parts of the world aren’t
physical. This, however, is a mistake.
Given the mere fact that some facts of our world can obtain despite our complete
and unending ignorance of these facts, it s clear that what we know or how we know it
has no bearing on what the facts are. But, then, given that the Knowledge Argument
proceeds from Mary’s epistemological condition to the condition of the world at large
,
it’s equally clear that the Knowledge Argument fails.
The “No metaphysics from epistemology" Objection , then, is this: If the
Knowledge Argument is sound, then epistemological results have a direct
bearing on the metaphysical nature of our world. But epistemological
results don’t have such a bearing. The problematic premise is (KA.3).
For (KA.3) is true only if metaphysical results follow from
epistemological ones; but they don’t.
Is this objection a good one? I think that it’s an interesting one, but I also think
that, ultimately, it fails. And it fails, again, for much the same reason that the Intensional
Fallacy Objection fails. Let me explain.
Normally, it is indeed a fallacy to infer from metaphysical facts from
epistemological ones— except, obviously, the metaphysical fact that our world is
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epistemologically such and so, but this isn’t at issue. Indeed, the current objection is
virtually the same objection used (successfully) against the Perspectival Objection to
zombie worlds. (See Chapter 2 for discussion.) In this case, however, the objection
doesn’t clearly apply.
The main problem, here, is that Mary knows all the physical facts. Once this is
granted, then the “no metaphysics from epistemology” doesn’t apply. After all, if Mary
does indeed know all the physical facts, and if as per materialism these facts exhaust the
facts, then one can validly infer the entire nature of the world from the body of Mary’s
knowledge. As with the Intensional Fallacy Objection, then, the mistake here is
forgetting that Mary knows all the physical facts. Once this is remembered, it’s easily
seen that all metaphysical facts follow from what Mary knows— unless materialism is
false. If one grants that materialism is false, then this objection may succeed; but, again,
it hardly damages the spirit of the Knowledge Argument.
Thus, the “no metaphysics from epistemology” objection fails. Though the slogan
of this objection is generally true, a mere appeal to the slogan doesn’t damage the
Knowledge Argument. But, in the end, this is all that the current objection amounts to—
an appeal to a slogan.
At the same time, a very, very close relative of this objection is in waiting. The
relative in question is in many ways an extension of the “no metaphysics from
epistemology” objection, but it’s generally treated independently in the literature. Turn
to this relative— the Question-Begging Objection.
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4.2.3 The Question-Begging Objection
The Intensional Fallacy Objection and the “no metaphysics from epistemology”
provide primafacie evidence against the soundness of the Knowledge Argument. 172 As
above, however, this evidence seems to be at most primafacie and, upon reflection, it
ultimately fails to undermine the argument. The current objection is stronger, but
ultimately seems to fail as well.
The Question-Begging Objection runs as follows. The Knowledge Argument
simply assumes that Mary cannot know what it s like to see red unless she has seen it—
or unless she has been in a state, artificially or naturally created, that’s similar enough to
seeing red. But why think this? Granted, current textbooks, monographs, et cetera on the
nature of perception are probably— very’ probably— incapable of conveying what it’s
like to see a red rose, or taste a Big Mac, or undergo the painfulness of pain. Simply by
reading current research or viewing (black and white) current videos on perception one is
unlikely to fully understand the phenomenal features of seeing red. But Mary’ has much
more than the current stock of textbooks! Mary is supposed to know the full physical
story of perception. According to the Knowledge Argument, even this full story would
be insufficient to convey the phenomenal features of our minds. But, again, why think
this?
In the end, it seems that perhaps the only reason one would endorse the Knowledge
Argument is a lack of imaginative resources. In short, we’re simply not in a position to
172
This objection is raised by various philosophers, including Churchland (1985), Conee (1994), Dennett
(1991) and, in some ways, Levin (1986). Garfield (1996) likewise raises this objection. (Special thanks to
Jay Garfield for discussion of this objection.)
134
imagine just how much Maty is supposed to know- prior to her release from the black
and white room. But this is merely a limitation of ours, and in the coming years it may
well disappear. In the end, Mary might very well know exactly what it’s like to see a red
rose before her release. After all, what it ’s like to see a red rose may very well be a
physical property!
This point cuts to the core of the Question-Begging Objection. In the end, what it 's
like to see a red rose may well be a physical property. If it is, then the Knowledge
Argument fails. If it s not, then materialism fails. But the point is, to assume that it’s not
a physical property is simply to beg the question against materialism. But without this
assumption, the Knowledge Argument doesn’t get off the ground.
The Question
-Bezeine Objection . then, is this: The Knowledge
Argument, on pain of failing altogether, must assume that what it ’s like to
see red or, simply, any quale — is not a physical property. But to
assume this begs the question against materialism. It may very well be
that Mary, before her release, knows exactly what it’s like to see red. That
this strikes us as implausible reflects at most an as yet immature
imagination. An immature imagination, however, is compatible with the
physicality of what it’s like to see a red rose. Thus, the Knowledge
Argument assumes what it sets out to show — namely, that the what it ’s
like features of our world are nonphysical. But, then, the Knowledge
Argument begs the question.
Is the Question-Begging Objection a good objection? I think that it’s a strong
objection in some ways, but I also think that it fails. Let me explain.
It’s no doubt true that, given our current state of knowledge, our ability to fully
imagine what’s at Mary’s disposal is hampered a bit. As the objection says, perhaps if
we really were in Mary’s position, it would seem quite ordinary that we should know all
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about the phenomenal features of perception before ever leaving Mary’s environment.
So the objection is right to suggest that there’s reason for caution, here. In particular,
there s reason to be cautious about the accuracy of our imaginings with respect to what
Mary would or wouldn’t know before her release. (This caution, incidentally, ties in
closely to the “no metaphysics from epistemology” objection.)
The objection is correct, too, to say that if what it ’s like to see a red rose is a
physical property, then the Knowledge Argument fails. This much is true, and probably
obvious.
At the same time, the objection is incorrect to say that the nonphysicality of what
it s like to see a red rose is a question-begging assumption of the Knowledge Argument.
It’s not. The Knowledge Argument is constructed in such a way that a question-begging
charge is understandable; but upon further examination, it’s fairly clear that no questions
are being begged.
The structure of the Knowledge Argument— the dialectic, as it were— goes
something like this. We’re to assume, by stipulation, that Mary knows all the physical
facts. In turn, we face a question: When Mary is released, does she leam something or
not? According to the Knowledge Argument, Mary does indeed leam something. As a
result of this answer, what it ’s like to see a red rose counts as a nonphysical property.
But this is only one possible answer! Obviously, if the answer is that Mary doesn’t leam
anything new, then what it 's like to see a red rose isn’t nonphysical. But in none of this
is a question being begged.
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Look at it this way . 173 The Knowledge Argument, in the end, turns on the
following claim:
K. If Mary (upon release) learns something new, then qualia are nonphysical.
All sides agree with (K). The Knowledge Argument uses (K) to mount a modus ponens.
The question is, what reason is there for using (K) to mount a modus tollens? The
Question-Begging Objection gives no answer, here— aside from saying that //qualm are
physical, then (K) makes for a good modus tollens, which is trivial.
Of course, the Question-Begging objection does attempt to attack the reasons
behind using (K) for a modus ponens. In this regard, the Question-Begging objection
says that we’re too ignorant at the moment to know whether (K) should be used for a
modus ponens that our imagination is currently too uneducated, too immature. But
this is hardly a reply that will help materialism ! After all, if our imagination is currently
too weak to know whether (K) makes for a sound modus ponens, then presumably our
imagination is too weak to know whether materialism is true. For ifwe can’t judge—
for one reason or another— whether (K) makes for a sound modus ponens (or, for that
matter, modus tollens) then, other things being equal, we can’t judge whether the
phenomenal mind is physical . 174 And if we can’t judge this, then we can’t judge the truth
of materialism. In this case, nobody has reasonable grounds on which to endorse
materialism.
173
Thanks, again, to Lynne Baker’s work for pointing out the ubiquity of the “one philosopher’s modus
ponens is another’s modus tollens” phenomenon.
174
1 should note that I, myself, am not convinced that currently we can accurately imagme what Mary
knows. However, I also think that there’s a very good reason to treat (K) as the makings of a sound modus
tollens. This reason, in part, is given in subchapter 4.3. It’s further discussed in the final chapter—
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In the end, then, the Question-Begging Objection fails for at least this reason: The
Question-Begging Objection fails to provide materialism with a good reply to the
Knowledge Argument. As far as the Question-Begging Objection goes, the only reason
against treating (K) as the start of a modus tollens is our (alleged) inability to judge
whether (K) makes for a sound modus ponens. But, then, as above, this puts materialism
in a very bad position overall— at least with respect to qualia. That is, as above, we
wouldn’t be in a position to judge whether qualia are physical. But, then, the Knowledge
Argument ultimately wins the war, if not the particular battle at hand.
For these reasons, I think the Question-Begging Objection should be rejected. The
objection is interesting, and it highlights the importance of (K). Nonetheless, it fails to
undermine the Knowledge Argument— either in letter or in spirit. Turn, then, to another
common objection.
4.2.4 The Language Objection
The language objection points to an analogy of knowing one but not another
language— or knowing some but not all functions of a language
.
175
For example, you
might know English very well, but you may have no clue about how to speak or read
German. Suppose you’re an expert on snow. You’ll be able to easily say “Snow is
white” but, given your ignorance of German, you won’t be able to say— in German—
“Der Schnee ist weis.” This inability, however, has nothing at all to do with your
Chapter 5. The trouble with the Question-Begging Objection is that it doesn’t offer any reason beyond
“limited imagination” to treat (K) as the makings of a modus tollens.
175
This is an objection that overlaps with others, but it’s frequently heard in conversation as an independent
objection. Hints of this objection— these objections— can be found in Churchland (1985) and Tye (1986,
1996), as well as in Garfield (1996), Conee (1994), and Levin (1986).
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knowledge of snow; rather, it merely reflects an ignorance of a particular language.
Moreover, the relevant language needn’t be a completely different language. For
example, suppose that an utterance of ‘white stuff, in some contexts, means ‘it is
snowing’. You may know how to express that it’s snowing by using ‘it is snowing’ but
not ‘white stuff
. As above, though, this ability has nothing at all to do with your
knowledge of snow; rather, it merely reflects an ignorance of language.
The same sort of situation, according to the language objection, applies with
respect to Mary. She knows very well how to express the phenomenal features of
perception in “scientific terms”— functional roles, perhaps, or neuroscientific dynamics,
or et cetera. What she lacks is the knowledge of how to express these features in
ordinary language— for example, ‘what it is like to see red’ or et cetera. On this
objection, Mary learns something new when she’s released from her room; but this
something new has only to do with language, and nothing at all to do with the nature of
phenomenal properties. Thus, the Knowledge Argument fails to show that qualia are
nonphysical. In turn, it fails to undermine materialism. The problem lies in the falsity of
(KA.2).
The Language Objection . then, is this: Mary does not learn anything new
about us or the world when she leaves her room. Instead, she merely
learns a new way of expressing what she already knew. Thus, (KA.2) is
false. Thus, the Knowledge Argument fails due to the falsity of (KA.l).
Is the Language Objection a good objection? I don’t think so. The reason is as
follows.
139
The mam trouble is this. Quite simply, it seems that, contrary to the objection,
Mary does learn something about us and the world, and not just something (if anything)
about language. After all, Mary is now seeing a red rose— indeed, redness— for the
first time in her life. It seems very implausible that her response will be “What a pleasant
little lesson I’ve gamed on how to use language.” Instead, she’s very likely to say “Holy
smokes! This is something interesting!”— where ‘this’ refers to what it’s like for her to
see the rose.
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The point, here, is that it seems that Mary learns much more than a new way of
expressing what she already knew— if she learns even that. Specifically, it seems that
she acquires a new concept, and with it new knowledge. A big problem with the
language objection, then, is its implausibility. 1 7 But there’s also another problem.
In particular, it s not clear that Mary, upon her release, could learn a new way of
expressing old language unless materialism is false. In short, materialism says that all
facts are physical facts. Thus, insofar as learning a new way of expressing something
involves learning new facts— in addition, of course, to gaining abilities— Mary had
better know all such relevant facts. If she doesn’t, then materialism is false. If she does,
then the language objection doesn’t work. This is a serious problem with the language
objection, a problem discussed at greater length in section 4.2.6, below. For now, given
both of the above problems, it’s reasonable to reject the language objection.
176
This is the response that Jackson gives in Jackson & Braddon-Mitchell (1996). Thanks to David
Braddon-Mitchell for helpful discussion.
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There is another, much more serious problem with the Language Objection. The problem plagues
another objection— the Different Descriptions/Modes Objection— which is treated in section 4.2.6,
below. Since the Different Descriptions/Modes Objection is much more popular than the Language
Objection, I reserve the given reply for that discussion. However, it will be clear that the reply of section
4.2.6 decisively undermines the Language Objection as well.
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In the end, then, it seems that the Language Objection to the Knowledge Argument
is both interesting but, on the whole, not successful. More could easily be said about this
objection, as well as others, but for now turn to another well-known, and closely related,
objection.
4.2.5 The Abilities Objection
An internally consistent and interesting objection to the Knowledge Argument is
the Abilities Objection. 178 Despite its internal consistency and interesting features, this
objection is highly implausible— or so I’ll argue. First, though, turn to the objection.
The Abilities Objection begins by insisting, correctly, that materialism is dead if
Mary, upon her release, learns something new about our world. At the same time, the
Abilities Objection recognizes the strong intuitive force of the claim that Mary does learn
something. Accordingly, the Abilities Objection attempts to reconcile these pieces. How
so?
In short, the Abilities Objection says that Mary indeed gains something new upon
release; but, runs the reply, she doesn’t learn anything new. Instead, she gains an ability
— namely, the ability of knowing what it’s like to see a red rose. If we insist that she
learns something, then she learns “know how.” Know how
,
however, isn’t factual
178
This objection was put forth by L. Nemirow (1980, 1990) and made famous by D. Lewis (1990, 1994).
Interestingly, it seems that this objection strikes most folks as the least plausible, despite the fact that,
ultimately, it’s one of the few objections that doesn’t wind up with internal problems for materialism—
aside from implausibility.
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knowledge; and factual knowledge, obviously, is the only sort of knowledge that can
affect materialism
.
179
This is the Abilities Objection, but let me explain a bit more.
First, the distinction between knowing how and knowing that runs as follows. You
may know that bicycles are used for riding around; you may know that they’re built in
such and such a manner; and, indeed, you may well know all thefacts about bicycles.
Still, despite your great body of factual knowledge, you may be completely incapable of
actually riding a bike! What you lack, in this case, is “know how.” The same sort of
story applies to swimming; you may know all the facts about swimming but still be a
high-priority concern to life guards. Knowing all the facts doesn’t imply that you know
how to do anything
.
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The distinction, then, is supposed to highlight the difference between knowing facts
and having certain abilities to perform various tasks or functions. In the case of Mary,
the distinction comes to this. She knows all the physical facts, so she doesn’t learn
anything new. However, what she lacks is “know how”— various abilities, including
the ability to efficiently motor around in our world. For example, prior to her release,
Mary could’ve discerned one color from another, or one odor from another, et cetera.
However, she would’ve had to do this only by performing complicated calculations—
for example, calculating wave-lengths of light. Such calculations take a long time
compared to the method afforded by the ability of knowing what it’s like to see red. With
this ability, one effortlessly motors around our world, noting that that ’s red or that that ’s
179 A lot of writers use ‘propositional knowledge’ where I'm using ‘factual knowledge’. The reader is free
to replace ‘factual knowledge’ with ‘propositional knowledge’ if it helps.
180
Another example, perhaps, involves handicapped people. (I apologize for not knowing the politically
correct term, here.) The point is, a handicapped person may well be the world’s leading expert on (say)
bicycling, but still lack the ability to ride a bike.
142
the odor of a skunk, et cetera. Thus, knowing what it’s like to see red is a very useful
ability, but the ability has nothing to do with materialism.
The only way Mary could affect materialism is by gaining factual knowledge.
According to the Abilities Objection, this is not something that Mary gains. She gains
abilities, not factual knowledge. Thus, (KA.2) of the Knowledge Argument is false at
least on the Abilities Objection. 181
The Abilities Objection
,
then, is this: Mary does indeed gain something
new upon her release. However, what she gains is “know how” rather
than factual knowledge. The relevant know-how comprises the ability to
motor around our world more efficiently; and this ability is called
knowing what it is like to see red’. But since know-how can’t affect the
truth of materialism, the Knowledge Argument fails to undermine
materialism.
Is the Abilities Objection a good objection? As above, it’s an internally consistent
objection, and, unlike some of the other objections, it doesn’t make direct trouble for
materialism. Nonetheless, there’s a significant problem with the objection.
In short, the objection is simply implausible. No doubt, Mary gains a new ability
when she first sees a red rose. Likewise, she’d gain new abilities with every new
phenomenal state. As in the objection, knowing what it’s like to see red— or smell a
skunk, or have an itch, or feel the heat of a hot stove, or undergo the painfulness of a
migraine, or et cetera— affords very, very useful abilities. Nobody denies this. The
trouble is, it just seems implausible that this is all that Mary gains.
181
Strictly speaking, the Abilities Objection has it that (KA.2) is ambiguous between ‘learning facts’ and
‘learning know-how’. On the former reading, the premise is false; on the latter, true. But on either reading,
the Knowledge Argument obviously collapses— if, contrary to what I’ll suggest, the Abilities Objection is
a good objection.
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The point is accentuated by concentrating on Mary’s response to seeing the red
rose. It seems that she wouldn’t just say “Ho hum.” 182 It seems that, along with said
abilities, Mary will indeed be pleasantly surprised by what she has gained. In particular,
she will take herself to be learning something about people and the world at large. In
short, she will take herself to be learn what it’s like to see something red— that it’s like
this (as it were).
In the end, then, the Abilities Objection is an otherwise good objection except for
one important thing: It’s simply not plausible. There just seems to be more to knowing
what it s like to see red or et cetera— than a mere ability to function efficiently in our
world. And the relevant more, here, seems to be factual knowledge.
I should note that its implausibility doesn’t undermine the Abilities Objection
altogether. Instead, it merely gives us good reason to look for a better reply to the
Knowledge Argument. The trouble, however, is that, as the Abilities Objection insists,
any such reply must not grant that Mary learns something new— learns some new fact
about our world. This is difficult to do, especially given the strong intuitive force to the
contrary. Nonetheless, as I hope to show, I do think that there’s a strong, decisive reply
against the Knowledge Argument. This will be taken up in subchapter 4.3 below. For
now, turn to another very popular objection, the final objection considered in this
subchapter— the so-called Different Descriptions/Modes Objection.
182
This is Jackson’s line from Jackson (1986).
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4.2.6 The Different Descriptions or “Modes” Objection
The Different Descriptions/Modes Objection— ‘Different Descriptions’, for
short is a very popular objection
.
184
The objection, as presented below, is a blend
of various objections along the same theme. Some of the variety are more complicated
than others, but all of them ultimately make the same objection
.
185
Furthermore, all of
the versions ultimately fail for the same reason. In any event, the versions are blended
together here to make what I’ll call the Different Descriptions Objection , 186
The Different Descriptions Objection begins by noting an important but
commonplace phenomenon. The phenomenon is that we know things under descriptions
or “guises,” as they’re sometimes called— but I’ll call them ‘descriptions’. What this
means is best illustrated through examples.
183
‘Modes’, ‘perspectives’ and ‘descriptions’ are used in the literature of this objection. I prefer
‘descriptions’, but this is inconsequential in the end. For some of the relevant literature, see the
immediately preceding footnote above.
184
This objection is popular, and Jackson (1994a, 1994b, 1995a, 1995c) spends a lot of time answering it
— though he doesn't put the objection exactly as I’m putting it. He spends a lot of time on a version of this
objection put in terms of a priori versus a posteriori identities. That material is interesting, but the
objection, itself, boils down to the current “Different Descriptions/Modes” objection and, also, the
objection agamst gomg from epistemology to metaphysics. In order to deal adequately with Jackson's own
response, quite a bit more would need to be said— including an excursion into two-dimensional modal
logic. In the end, though, I think the main point can be reduced to the response I give to the current
objection—a response that’s considerably less complicated than Jackson's own. Versions of the current
objection can be found in Churchland (1985), Garfield (1996), Horgan (1984b), Lycan (1995), McMullen
(1985), Papineau (1993), Teller (1992) and Tye (1986, 1996).
Notice, too, that this objection has close similarities to the Intensional Fallacy and Different
Languages objections. Nonetheless, the objection is usually treated separately in the literature — and I
follow suit, here.
Thanks to both David Braddon-Mitchell and Jay Garfield for helpful discussion of this objection.
185
I’m very grateful for discussion on this point with David Braddon-Mitchell and David Chalmers.
186
I should point out that the current objection is never explicitly put in terms of the “intensional fallacy.''
Alert readers will— should— notice similarities with the two objections. Nonetheless, the Intensional
Fallacy Objection, at least as it’s put in the literature, is a much weaker objection. The Intensional Fallacy
Objection merely appeals to a general ban on certain kinds of inferences. The current objection, on the
other hand, attempts to isolate precisely what is going on with Mary. As in an earlier footnote, the current
objection is sometimes put in terms of a priori versus a posteriori identities. Since the response I give to
the current objection works equally well against this particular version, I don’t bother to introduce it.
(Again, I’m grateful to David Braddon-Mitchell for very helpful discussion on this point.)
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Consider the Vietnam War. I know a variety of facts about that war. But for any
one of these facts that I know, it’s very unlikely that the same fact will be known under
the same descriptions to participants of the war. (I didn’t participate in the war.) For
that matter, the same facts of the war will appear differently to different participants of
the war. Beyond this, consider how the facts might appear to reporters, journalists, or TV
camera crews. Consider, too, how the facts might appear to the US president— or to the
families within Vietnam, or et cetera. In each case, the facts are likely to appear
differently, under different descriptions, to each party involved. The point, though, is that
the relevant facts remain the same regardless of their descriptions.
This sort of phenomenon is very common. A very classic example, at least in
philosophy, involves the planet Venus. Early Egyptians knew about Venus under two
different descriptions— roughly, ‘the first star to appear in the morning’ and ‘the first
star to appear in the evening’, each description being shortend, apparently, to ‘the
morning star’ and ‘the evening star’, respectively. Despite these different descriptions
and radically different appearances, the morning star and the evening star remained one
and the same— namely, Venus (though it wasn’t called by that name at the time!).
Other classic examples involve H2O and water, Clark Kent and Superman, Ortcutt
and the shortest spy, and others. The important point emphasized by these examples is
that we can and often do know the same facts under wildly different descriptions. But
what does any of this have to do with Mary?
According to the Different Descriptions Objection, this phenomenon has a lot to do
with Mary. In particular, just as the Egyptians knew Venus under different descriptions,
146
so too does Mary know about the phenomenal features of the mind. Let Fi be the
property of being what it ’s like to see a red rose. Let 5 be one description of this
property, and let 5' be another— the “scientific” one. Then Mary knows all about F
under 8' but doesn’t know about F under 8. This, however, doesn’t change the fact that
Fi=Fi, regardless of the description.
On this objection, then, there s no additional fact that Mary learns upon her release.
Instead, there’s only an additional description that she gains. But, runs the objection,
gaining a new description— a new “perspective,” as it were— on old facts doesn’t
undermine materialism. The only thing that could undermine materialism is a new fact.
As said, there’s no such new fact to be had. The erroneous premise, accordingly, is
(KA.2).
The Different Descriptions/Modes Objection
. then, is this: Different folks,
or even one person, may know the same facts under different descriptions.
The facts, despite this, remain the same. This is basically the case with
Mary. Before she’s released, she knows all the facts about the
phenomenal mind under one description. After she’s released, she comes
to know the same old facts under a different description. But the only
facts that can undermine materialism in this case are new facts. Since
Mary gains none of these, the Knowledge Argument fails.
Is the Different Descriptions Objection a good one? I don’t think so. In fact, there
are a couple of strong replies against the Different Descriptions Objection, and the reader
can no doubt think of some on the basis of replies to earlier objections. Accordingly, I’ll
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present a different but, I think, powerful reply against the Different Descriptions
Objection. 187
The problem (among others) with the Different Descriptions Objection is simply
this. First, as in the story, Mary knows all physical facts. (Granted, the premises speak
only of her knowledge of people, but this is for heuristic value. The story makes it clear
that she knows the whole physical story of our world.) 188 This much, the Different
Descriptions Objection claims to endorse. But this is problematic.
Suppose, as per the Different Descriptions Objection, that Mary does indeed know
all the physical facts. Suppose, further, again in line with the Different Descriptions
Objection, that there are various descriptions under which the property of being what it s
like to see red is known. Call the given property ‘Fi’ and the various descriptions r5,1 ,
for any natural numbers i. Now, knowing F] under (say) So but not under (say) Sj is to
lack something. This much the Different Descriptions Objection admits. But, now,
either this “something” is a fact or it isn’t. According to the Different Descriptions
Objection, it isn t a fact. What it is, according to the objection, is something akin to an
“ability”— similar in many ways to the Abilities Objection. This much, alone, poses no
real problem. But there is a problem.
187
This reply is an extension of the reply to the first language objection in the Different Languages
Objection. See 4.2.4.
1 88
Actually, at this point, some may fmd the story just to hard to believe! If so, let Mary be a god-like
creature, in which case matters concerning our finite minds won’t get in the way. In this case, though, she
must be confined in the appropriate ways— with respect to perception, etc.. (Indeed, I think that
considering the Knowledge Argument in terms of a god-like creature is better in many ways. One point, in
particular, is that it lends support to the otherwise less than persuasive Question-Begging Objection. For if
we consider the argument in terms of what a god-like creature would know if she knew the complete
physical story, it suddenly becomes more persuasive to say that we’re not quite in a position to trust the
intuition according to which she couldn’t know what it’s like to see a red rose, etc.. But this idea is for
another project.)
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The problem with the Different Descriptions Objection comes storming in as
follows. Mary, by hypothesis, knows all the physical facts. But, then, Mary knows all
about the different 8, under which F, is known. That is, to know F, under both 80 and 8,
is to know, at the very least, that 80=8i — or, perhaps more accurately, it’s to know that
the extensions of 80 and 8j are identical. In other words, for each 8, under which Fj is
known, there s a distinctfact according to which Fj is biown under 8
;
. In turn, there’s a
distinct fact according to which F, is known under (say) both 8 0 and 8/. But, then, by
hypothesis, Mary knows each of these distinct facts— and knows all there is to know
about them. She knows, that is, that being what it ’s like to see red is known under both
80 and 8i. Given this, however, it seems that there’s nothing, not even an ability, to gain.
(What ability would Lois be missing if she already knew that ‘Superman’ and ‘Clark
Kent’ were coextensive? Nothing at all.)
Thus, according to the Different Descriptions Objection, Mary gains a new
description, or perspective, on her old knowledge of the property being what it ’s like to
see red— call this property, once again, ‘Fj ’. But this is trouble. Unless the fact that
this new description applies to F, is a nonphysical fact, then Mary couldn’t have gained
it. If it is nonphysical, then materialism is false. Either way, though, the Different
Descriptions Objection is in trouble.
For the foregoing reason, the Different Descriptions Objection fails to undermine
the Knowledge Argument. In the end, the objection seems to work only if materialism is
false. But, then, like some of the other objections, the Different Descriptions Objection at
best undermines the letter of the Knowledge Argument while leaving its spirit fully
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intact. As above, the reader can no doubt think of other objections that are equally
damaging to the Different Descriptions, and she is welcome to use any of those. Turn,
now, to a brief review of the current subchapter.
4.2.7 Review of 4.2
In this subchapter, I ve discussed six of the most popular objections against the
Knowledge Argument. In each case, I’ve suggested that the given objection fails. For
the most part, the problems facing these objections fall into two categories. The first
category comprises those objections that, ultimately, wind up undermining materialism.
Some of these objections do in fact show problems with the Knowledge Argument; but
ultimately they make more trouble for materialism than the Knowledge Argument.
Among these are the Different Descriptions Objection, the first of language objection, the
“no metaphysics from epistemology” objection, and also the Question-Begging
Objection. If these objections succeed, then materialism fails— for reasons given above.
The second category comprises those objections which don’t undermine
materialism but nonetheless don’t provide an adequate response to the Knowledge
Argument. This category contains those objections which, in the end, are simply
implausible. Among the members of this group are the Abilities Objections and the
second language objection.
What we need, then, is an objection that undermines the Knowledge Argument,
leaves materialism intact, and, also, avoids the implausibility charge. Subchapter 4.3,
1
suggest, offers just what is needed.
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4.3 Zombie Worlds & the Real Problem with the Knowledge Argument
In this subchapter I present a new objection to the Knowledge Argument. 189 The
objection, if successful, meets all the desiderata: It undermines the Knowledge
Argument, it leaves materialism intact, and it avoids the implausibility charge. The
objection relies heavily on the results established in Chapter 3, and in particular on the
result that zombie worlds don’t exist. Consequently, the presentation of the objection
requires only a few new points.
The plan is this. In section A, I present the main premise of the argument, and then
briefly lay out the argument as a whole— an argument which, after discussion of the
main premise, will be fairly obvious. Then, in section B, I consider possible objections
that might be leveled on behalf of the Knowledge Argument. For now, turn to the
argument.
4.3.1 Zombie Worlds & The Knowledge Argument
The key idea in my objection against the Knowledge Argument is that, if sound, it
entails the existence of zombie worlds. There are two ways to see this, a longer and a
shorter way. I’ll present both— in that order.
189
Well, the argument is almost new. A version of the argument I present has recently been published by
Jay Garfield (1996). Garfield’s own approach, however, due to his argument against zombie worlds, is less
plausible overall. Moreover, Garfield’s version of the argument is very sketchy, leaving some of the most
important details out— for example, Garfield doesn’t clearly show the mam premise (and, as said, his
argument against zombie worlds is less plausible given that it merely appeals to a causal theory of
knowledge). This sketchiness, I should note, is very understandable; Garfield’s paper is actually the
transcript of a talk he gave at the University of Tasmania, Hobart Australia. Moreover, the talk was to the
general public and not geared specifically to philosophers.
In any event, I’m very grateful to Jay Garfield for ongoing correspondence about this argument, as
well as correspondence concerning this overall project. I should note, though, that the argument I give
remains original to both Garfield and me— despite the fact that Garfield published first!
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4.3.1. 1 An Argument from the Nature of Learning
Recall that the Knowledge Argument succeeds in undermining materialism only if
Mary, upon her release, learns something new. In particular, the argument works only if
Mary learns a new fact about people— the fact that there’s something it’s like for people
to see red. But Mary’s lessons are very closely tied to zombie worlds. The key
connection is this:
L. Mary learns something new only if zombie worlds exist.
In other words, if Mary learns something new, then zombie worlds exist. Alternatively,
Mary’s learning something new implies that zombie worlds exist.
It should be clear that if (L) is true then, given the results of Chapter 3, the
Knowledge Argument fails. The question is: Is (L) true? The answer is “yes.” Consider
the following.
Learning requires ruling out possibilities. 190 When you’ve learned that the price of
milk is $3.00, you’ve thereby ruled out the many possibilities in which milk costs n
dollars— for any n * 3. Likewise, when you’ve learned that the teacher’s name is ‘Bev’
rather than ‘Charles’, you’ve thereby ruled out the passel of possibilities in which the
teacher’s name is otherwise. If there weren’t any possibilities to be ruled out, then there
wouldn’t be anything to leam. If you’ve learned something, then there are possibilities
you’ve ruled out.
190
This approach to learning is inspired by Lewis (1990, 1996). Lewis, himself, I should note, takes the
account to apply to all cases of learning, including those involving necessary truths. As below, I don't
extend it this far.
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One obvious problem, here, concerns mathematics. That 2+2=4 is necessarily the
case. This means, however, that there’s no possibility in which 2+2+4. But, then, on the
going account of learning, nobody ever learns that 2+2=4! But this is surely wrong.
One solution, here, is to appeal to “innate ideas” of a sort. Perhaps mathematical
truths, or necessary truths in general, are innate, and so they never really need to be
learned. (Plato seemed to hold something like this, but not exactly.) If so, then
mathematics doesn’t pose a problem for the current view of learning. But an appeal to
innate ideas is unnecessary. There’s a simpler solution altogether: In short, the current
account of learning applies only to contingent truths. That mathematical truths are
learned— that they’re even informative— is a genuinely perplexing problem. For now,
however, the current account of learning applies only to contingent truths.
So, how does this apply to (L)? Straightforwardly. Given that learning requires
ruling out possibilities, Mary learns something new only if there’s some possibility that
she rules out. In Mary’s case, however, one of the possibilities ruled out must be a
zombie world. If this is right, then (L) is true. But is it right? Yes. Consider the
following.
The argument, here, is again straightforward. Mary, by hypothesis, knows the
complete physical story of our world before her release. But, as per premise (ZA.2) of
the Knowledge Argument, before her release Mary still doesn’t know everything about
our world— there’s still something she must learn. As per the story, what Mary must
learn is that there’s something it’s like to see red, or, generally, that there are qualitative
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features of our world. But if she has to learn this, then one possibility must exist:
namely, that our world isn’t a zombie world!
If Mary, after her release, learns that there are qualitative features of our world,
then before her release she hadn’t ruled out the possibility that our world is a zombie
world— a world described precisely by the complete physical story that Mary knows,
but nonetheless a world that lacks qualm. If this possibility didn’t exist, then it couldn’t
be ruled out. But, then, Mary wouldn’t learn anything new about our world— or, at
least, she wouldn’t learn that qualitative states exist.
For the foregoing reason, (L) is true. Mary learns something new only if zombie
worlds exist. But, then, given the results of Chapter 3, the materialist has a firm and
decisive response against the Knowledge Argument. The response is that, given the
nonexistence of zombie worlds, Mary doesn’t learn anything new— in which case, as all
sides agree, the Knowledge Argument fails.
By my lights, this is a very powerful and decisive objection to the Knowledge
Argument. At the same time, there is an objection that the proponent of the Knowledge
Argument might make.
The objection claims that qualia, like numbers, necessarily exist. Thus, the account
of learning doesn’t apply. But without the given account of learning, the truth of (L)
remains in question. Without (L), the foregoing response to the Knowledge Argument
falls flat.
191
191
Erik Wielenberg raised this objection in conversation.
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My response to this objection is that it cannot possibly work. Even if the objector were to
give a strong argument for the necessary existence of qualia, the objection still cannot
work— at least not as a defense of the Knowledge Argument. The reason for this should
be obvious, but if it isn’t, it will be below. To see this, turn to the alternative (shorter)
argument for the main premise ofmy objection to the Knowledge Argument.
4.3.1.2 An Argument from the Nature of the Physical
The mam premise ofmy objection, once again, is that the Knowledge Argument, if
sound, implies the existence of zombie worlds. The first argument for this premise
turned on a very plausible view of learning according to which learning requires ruling
out possibilities. Though I think that this argument is very strong, some may reject the
given view of learning, in which case another argument is needed. Fortunately, another
argument is available— and very* straightforward.
The claim in question is this:
K. If the Knowledge Argument is sound, then zombie worlds exist.
Is (K) true? Yes. The reasoning is simple. Suppose that the Knowledge Argument is
sound. Then qualia aren't physical. After all, this is the main thrust of the Knowledge
Argument! So, if the Knowledge Argument is sound, then qualia aren’t physical.
From here, it’s a swift step to establishing (K). We have it that qualia aren’t
physical. But, then, by definition of ‘physical’, qualia don’t globally supervene on the
physical. But to say that qualia don’t globally supervene on the physical is to say that
there’s a physical duplicate of our world without qualia. And, since the Knowledge
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Argument is intended to undermine materialism— even in its minimal form 192— there
must be a minimal physical duplicate of our world without qualia. But, then, there exists
a zombie world.
Thus, if the Knowledge Argument is sound, then there exists a zombie world. And
this, given the results of Chapter 3, spells the end of the Knowledge Argument.
My objection to the Knowledge Argument, then, is this: If the Knowledge
Argument is sound, then zombie worlds exist. But, by the results of Chapter 3, zombie
worlds don’t exist. Hence, the Knowledge Argument is not sound. Since an unsound
argument cannot damage materialism, the Knowledge Argument cannot damage
materialism. Thus, materialists needn’t worry about the Knowledge Argument
193
anymore.
Before turning to objections, a dangling question should be answered. As above,
one objection to the argument from learning is based on the claim that qualia necessarily
exist. As I said, the argument from learning, by itself, cannot deal with this objection.
However, given the argument from the physical, the objection is clearly seen to fail. In
short, suppose that qualia necessarily exist. Then, obviously, zombie worlds don’t exist.
But, as in the argument from the physical, the soundness of the Knowledge Argument
implies the existence of zombie worlds. Thus, no proponent of the Knowledge Argument
l9
' Jackson (1986, 1994a, 1995a, 1995b, 1996) makes it abundantly clear that he is concerned strictly with
minimal materialism. As indicated in Chapter I, Jackson is one of the philosophers who has made famous
the “minimal physical duplicates” version of materialism.
193 Of course, many will want to know which premise ofKA is false. I address this in the next section, and
again in Chapter V.
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can say that qualia necessarily exist. Thus, the argument from learning avoids the given
objection. Turn briefly to objections.
4.3.2 Objections and Replies
In the previous section, I presented my main objection to the Knowledge
Argument. As with any objection in philosophy, there are likely to be counter-objections.
In this case, however, the objections can be very swiftly dealt with. Let me explain.
What replies might be given to the above objection? One might, of course, object
to the argument from learning by rejecting the given account of learning. But suppose
that this is the reply of choice. This reply leaves the main objection intact given the
argument from the physical. So this won t work. The only apparent option, it seems, is
to object to the argument from the physical. But how might this go?
One immediate option is to object to the relevant definition of ‘physical’. In this
context, however, this won’t work. The relevant definition simply is the definition of
‘physical’ used by zombiephiles and proponents of the Knowledge Argument . 195 So this
sort of reply won’t work.
There is one other reply that the proponent of the Knowledge Argument might
give. In particular, she might say that the foregoing objection fails to clearly specify
which premise of the Knowledge Argument fails. But without clearly specifying this, the
objection is unsatisfactory— or, at any rate, it leaves a lot of explaining yet to be done.
1<>4
For the record, nobody in the given literature— zombie literature or literature on qualia, generally—
take qualia to necessarily exist. The objection is covered merely for completeness.
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My response to this objection is to concede that no premise of the Knowledge
Argument has been specified as being false. In turn, I concede that the argument against
KA doesn’t tell us everything we want to know- namely, where, exactly, it goes wrong.
Nonetheless, the argument does give us ample reason to reject the Knowledge Argument.
After all, no argument that is unsound should give us reason to accept its conclusion. As
the objector said, and as I grant, this is less satisfying than one might like. However, it’s
still a solid reason to reject the Knowledge Argument.
Still, is there anything more that can be said by way of specifying which of KA’s
premises is false? I think that there is. But what needs to be said in this regard requires
discussion of a wider objection to the project at large. Such wider objections are dealt
with in the next chapter. Accordingly, I leave the question about KA’s faulty premise
until Chapter 5. For now, we’re left like this: We know that the Knowledge Argument is
unsound; but we don’t know which premise makes it unsound. Chapter 5 will return to
this question.
Are there other replies that the proponent of the Knowledge Argument might make
to the my overall objection? As it turns out, the only remaining replies are objections to
the arguments in Chapter 3. My objection to the Knowledge Argument uses, as a
premise, the results of Chapter 3. And as it turns out, the only apparent remaining option
for proponents of the Knowledge Argument is to object to the reasoning behind those
results. Since those objections were discussed at length in Chapter 3, there’s no reason to
rehearse them here.
195 As in Chapter I, Dpp— the definition of ‘physical property’ — is the definition given by prominent
zombiephiles, including Jackson. For further references, consult Chapter 1.
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4.4 Review of Chapter 4
In this chapter, another famous qualia attack against materialism was discussed
namely, the Knowledge Argument. Six of the most interesting and popular objections to
the Knowledge Argument were examined and, in the end, rejected. I then presented my
main objection to the Knowledge Argument. This objection, unlike the other six,
succeeds in undermining the Knowledge Argument, leaving materialism intact and, also,
avoiding the charge of implausibility.
My main objection to the Knowledge Argument, though successful, does leave
some questions unanswered. One question, as above, concerns which specific premise of
the Knowledge Argument is false. But the answer to this question is related to the
answer to others. One of the biggest questions left unanswered is simply this: What,
exactly, are qualia, and “where” (as it were) in the physical world are they? Not only
does my objection to the Knowledge Argument leave this question open, but the same is
true ofmy argument against zombie worlds. The trouble is, this is an important question!
In the end, though the most powerful qualia attacks against materialism have been
defeated, we still don’t know exactly— perhaps even roughly .— what qualia are. Are
they properties of the brain? of the whole body? of the body plus bits of other bits of the
external world? None of these questions, I admit, have been answered by my main
objections to zombie worlds or the Knowledge Argument. Indeed, beyond these
questions, some may still wonder whether it has been established that qualia are physical ,
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let alone the particular sort of physical property they might be. 196 This question was
hinted at in the last Chapter, but it, like the other complaints and leftover questions,
deserves further attention. The best way to address these concerns, I think, is by way of
general objections and replies. This is precisely the role of the final chapter.
For now, it’s important to realize that zombie worlds and, with them, the
Knowledge Argument have gone away. This is an important result, at least with respect
to the ongoing saga of the mind versus materialism.
The question left, now, is where this result leaves us with respect to the mind’s
place in our world. For this issue, turn to Chapter 5 — a chapter devoted to general
concerns, complaints and important leftover questions.
196
Incidentally, it’s this question— or, better, its answer— which affords a clear answer to which premise
of the Knowledge Argument is false. I return to this in Chapter V.
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CHAPTER 5
OVERALL OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES
One of the most powerful arguments against materialism rests on the qualitative
side of the mind. Indeed, qualia are arguably the most difficult challenge confronting a
materialist view of our world
.
197
The current project has been an extended defense of
materialism against qualia attacks. The defense has been an offense. In particular, this
project has undermined the most fundamental qualia attack against materialism—
namely, the Zombie Argument. In addition, another powerful and popular qualia attack
has been undermined namely, the Knowledge Argument. Since these two attacks
have been the primary concern of this project, their demise makes the project a success.
At the same time, there remain some important concerns and questions with respect
to qualia and its place in the materialist’s picture. Despite the demise of both zombie
worlds and the Knowledge Argument, some may still wonder about both the general
status and the precise status of qualia. Perhaps the most important of these lingering
concerns are:
Qa Are qualia physical?
Qb If they are physical, what sort of physical property are they?
197
Lewis (1993) seems to think that qualia are the biggest challenge. He’s not alone. Other notables
include Tye (1996), Chalmers (1996), McGinn (1993), Kim (1996) and many others. Frank Jackson and
David Braddon-Mitchell (both, in correspondence) take qualia to be the greatest challenge to materialism.
For the record, I agree with this assessment.
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In both Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, Q a was raised but, I admit, not sufficiently
answered. In no chapter thus far has Qb been addressed. 198 But these questions are very
important. Given the nature of this project, however, it seems that Qa is the most pressing
question— and for that reason, it receives slightly more attention. For ifQa receives a
negative answer, then materialism is dead— plain and simple. On the other hand, Qb is
likewise quite important. Without an answer to Qb , we remain ignorant of the details of
qualia; we remain ignorant of the details of the place qualia have in the materialist’s
picture. Given an affirmative answer to Qa , materialism may be true; but without an
answer to Q , a full understanding of qualia is out of the question.
The current chapter is intended to address Qa and Qb . Related issues will be
addressed, but these two concerns are the focus. 199 Since in many respects Qa and Qb can
be seen as objections to the current project, I will treat them as such in the following
discussion. Taking this approach offers, at the very least, a more concise treatment of the
questions. At the same time, the approach is intended to answer the genuine objections
that some may raise on the basis ofQa and Qb .
The plan, then, is this. Subchapters 5.1 and 5.2 will examine the two objections to
the overall project based on Qa and Qb , respectively. The aim, here, is to address general
concerns that one may have about the overall project. Qa and Qb , it is hoped, capture
most of the relevant concerns. Along the way an unanswered question from Chapter 4
will be answered— namely, the question as to which premise in the Knowledge
198
Chapters I and II do allude to it, in a way, especially by reference to the “explanatory gap” and general
complaints about global supervenience. But the question hasn’t been explicitly raised. It deserves to be.
199
Incidentally, I take Q' to be the main question behind the so-called explanatory gap problem of qualia.
In Chapter I, I promised to discuss the explanatory gap problem in Chapter 5. My promise is kept in virtue
of discussing Q 2 . (Along the way, I will point out exactly how the explanatory gap comes into play.)
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Argument is false. Subchapter 5.3, the final subchapter of the project, offers a review of
the overall discussion.
5.1 The “But are they physical?!” Objection — and reply
In this subchapter I treat the first of two outstanding and important questions
namely, Qa . This question forms the basis for an objection to this overall project, and it is
presented accordingly. I will argue that the objection fails. For now, turn to the
objection.
The Objection : 200 The main issue of this project has been qualia versus
materialism. The main target of the project has been zombie worlds— and, also, the
Knowledge Argument. Strong arguments have been given against both targets. Indeed,
suppose it’s granted that the project is a great success— that the given targets have been
decisively undermined. This means that there are no zombie worlds. This also means
that the Knowledge Argument leaves materialism intact. But— a “big” but— this
doesn 7 mean that materialism is free from the problem of qualia! After all, nothing said
so far shows that qualia are physical. But if they’re not, then materialism remains under
threat. What we need to know, then, is simply this: Are qualia physical?! The current
project doesn’t answer this question, and at least in this respect, the current project’s
success is at best very limited.
200 Lynne Baker, in conversation, raised this objection. Actually, she raised a fair number of objections
that, after long reflection, appeared to me to be reducible to the current objection. In any event, for this
important objection and for her help in general, I’m greatly indebted. Thanks, too, to David Braddon-
Mitchell, Erik Wielenberg, and Richard Trammell, for discussion of this objection and my reply to it. .
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The Reply. I think that this objection is very important. Before replying to the
objection, I want to make it clear exactly why the objection is a good one. That is, I want
to expand a bit on the objection so as to show its full force. After doing so, I will also
show why the objection ultimately fails. In particular, I will show that, contrary to the
objection, the current project has answered this question— at least modulo the
parameters of the current debate. (I, of course, make no claims to establishing results
beyond the given parameters. This is an issue to be briefly discussed in section 5.1.3.)
To see the full force of the current objection, it’s necessary to recall a few key
points from earlier chapters. To begin, it’s necessary to recall that, ultimately, the main
argument of this project is an argument against the existence of zombie worlds. Granted,
the Knowledge Argument remains an important target against which this project is
aimed. As in Chapter 4, however, the main objection against the Knowledge Argument
turns on the objections in Chapter 3 — objections leveled against zombie worlds. So,
again, the main thesis of the project is that zombie worlds don’t exist. The question
raised by the “But are they physical? !” objection comes to this:
Qc Does it follow from the nonexistence of zombie worlds that qualia are
physical?
The current objection says “no.” I will argue that, strictly speaking, the current objection
is correct in this answer. However, I will also argue that, on the whole, the objection
fails. In the end, the current project does provide us with enough to conclude that qualia
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are physical— at least modulo the parameters of the current debate. 201 Before giving my
argument, however, it’s important to see why, strictly speaking, the answer to Qc is “no.”
In order to see why the answer to Qc is “no,” a number of key points from earlier
chapters must be recalled. First, recall, from Chapter 1, that ‘zombie worlds’ is
ambiguous between two different readings. On both readings, a zombie world is a
physical duplicate of our world. On both readings, a zombie world is devoid of qualia.
However, on only one reading is a zombie world a minimal physical duplicate of our
world. On the other reading, a zombie world has “extra stuff’— extra nonphysical stuff.
Call the minimal sort of worlds ‘zombie worlds’. (This follows the discussion at large.)
Call the eXtra stuff sort of worlds ‘zombie worldsx ’. Then the logical space of zombie
worlds can be represented as in the following Figure 5.1:
Figure V.l: The logical space of zombie worlds.
201 Some might be concerned about the given parameters of the debate, and indeed some might object to the
current project on the basis of those concerns. As above, I 11 address this issue briefly in section 5.1.3
below. Meanwhile, note that many of these concerns have been addressed in Chapter 1
.
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As the diagram makes clear, zombie worlds x subsume zombie worlds. In other
words, anything in a zombie world is in a zombie worldx Alternatively, any (positive)
fact that obtains in a zombie world also obtains in a zombie worldx
.
202
The converse
however, doesn t hold. After all, zombie worldsx
,
by definition, contain extra
nonphysical stuff. W ith extra stuff comes extra facts. So, not everything in a zombie
world is in a zombie world. This is the important difference between zombie worlds
and zombie worldsx
.
Now, what does this difference between zombie worlds and zombie worldsx have
to do with Q c? Why should this difference lead anyone to answer Qc negatively? The
answer, here, lies with another important topic raised in Chapter 1 — namely, the
definition of ‘physical’. Let me explain.
With respect to the current discussion, what is it for something to be physical?
Well, a physical property, fact, or et cetera
,
is given by Dpp :
Dpp F is a physical property iff {F } at least globally supervenes on
the properties of completed microphysics.
As in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, it’s an assumption of the current debate— an assumption
endorsed by zombiephiles — that, with the exception of qualia, everything in our
world at least globally supervenes on the microphysical bits of our world. In other
202 The parenthetical ‘positive’ is required to avoid a technical difficulty. Consider the fact that there 's no
nonphysical stuff in world a. This fact, for obvious (grammatical) reasons, is called a negativefact. Notice
that this fact holds in all zombie worlds— the minimal sort. However, it doesn’t hold in any zombie
world*. In the end, this issue isn’t of great concern— at least with respect to the current objection.
Indeed, the issue is relevant only with respect to the accuracy of the diagram given above. Having noted
the issue, I trust that the diagram will be properly understood. For a good discussion ofpositive and
negativefacts
,
see Chalmers (1996). Special thanks to David Chalmers for correspondence on this point.
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words, as throughout, it’s an assumption of the current discussion that our world is
completely physical— except for qualia, of course, which is the main issue. Since this
assumption has been discussed in earlier chapters, it needn’t be rehearsed here. What’s
important, for now, is Dpp . For Dpp , coupled with the ambiguity of ‘zombie worlds’, is
precisely what might lead some to give a negative answer to Qc .
Suppose, as the current objection grants, that zombie worlds— the minimal sort!
— have been ruled out. Suppose, that is, that, as argued in Chapter 3, zombie worlds
simply don t exist. What we have, then, is that there’s no minimal physical duplicate of
our world that lacks qualia. As in chapters 1 and 3, once we have this, we have enough to
undermine the Zombie Argument, and also enough to undermine any qualia attack that
presupposes the existence of zombie worlds— including, importantly, the Knowledge
Argument. But this is precisely where Q arises. The question is: Does the nonexistence
of zombie worlds— the minimal sort! — imply that qualia are physical?
The answer, I’m afraid, is no. The reason has to do with the nature ofglobal
supervenience. In order for qualia to be physical, they must satisfy Dpp . But in order to
satisfy Dpp qualia must at least globally supervene on microphysics. Since, as per the
common assumption above, everything but qualia is assumed to be physical, the relevant
requirement is that qualia at least globally supervene on everything else in our world.
Unfortunately, this isn’t ensured by the nonexistence of zombie worlds. After all, recall,
again, the definition of ‘global supervenience’:
203
See references in both Chapter 1 and Chapter 2. See, also, “objections and replies” in Chapter III for
relevant discussion of the zombiephiles’ view of our world.
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GS
- y ^obally supervenes on Cj if and only if any two worlds with
the same distribution of ^-properties have the same distribution
of ^-properties.
The import of GS and Dpp— coupled with the common assumption above— is this: In
order for qualia to be physical, there can’t be any physical duplicate of our world that
lacks qualia. As in the diagram above, however, this means that both zombie worlds and
zombie worldsx must be eliminated before we can conclude that qualia are physical.
Hence, the nonexistence of zombie worlds— the minimal sort! — doesn’t imply that
qualia are physical. Thus, the answer to Qc , as per the “But are they physical?!”
objection, is “no.”
So, the first part ofmy reply to the “But are they physical? !” objection is to
concede that ruling out zombie worlds— as defined throughout the debate— is not
sufficient for the physicality of qualia. The answer to Qc , I admit, is “no.” However, the
answer to the current objection at large is: Yes— they are physical! Or, at the very
least, there’s good reason to think so. And this good reason, contrary to the current
objection, is provided within earlier chapters. Let me explain.
The question at hand is whether qualia are physical. This question is equivalent to
the question: Is there any physical duplicate of our world that lacks qualia? This
question, in turn, is equivalent to the question: Are there any zombie worldsx ? I suggest
that the answer is “no”— modulo the parameters of this debate . 204 I suggest, that is, that
given the common assumptions of this debate, there is strong reason to maintain that
qualia are physical. In particular, given CCP and the assumption that intentional states
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are physical, we have excellent reason to deny the existence of qualia-less physical
duplicates of our world. In other words, we have excellent reason to deny the existence
of zombie worlds'". If I’m right, then, as above, qualia are physical.
The question is, am I right? Well, recall that zombie worlds— the minimal sort
were ruled out by way of the epiphenomenal
p argument. This argument showed that if
zombie worlds exist, then qualia are epiphenomenalp. The question at hand is whether
this argument applies equally well to zombie worldsx
. The answer, I suggest, is that it
does.
That the argument of Chapter 3 against zombie worlds applies equally well against
zombie worlds'" is easily seen. One way of seeing this is to notice that the only
difference between zombie worlds and zombie worldsx is that the latter sort of worlds
have extra stuff.” That is, zombie worldsx
,
unlike zombie worlds proper (as it were),
contain nonphysical stuff. Zombie worldsx are just as physically indiscernible from our
world as zombie worlds are. The only difference is that they, but not zombie worlds,
have nonphysical stuff. 205 But, then, it should be clear that the relevant argument against
zombie worlds applies equally well against zombie worldsx .
Consider the epiphenomenalp argument. The main premise of that argument is that
qualia are epiphenomenalp if zombie worlds exist. This premise was established using,
for the most part, only CCP and the minimal constraint on causes— namely, that they
204
Again, concerns about these parameters are taken up in section 5.1.3, below.
205 Of course, if materialism is true, then this is where zombie worlds" differ from our world too. (Of
course, the relevant nonphysical stuff does not include qualia— even if, as per the zombiephile’s view,
qualia are nonphysical.)
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have some sort of effect in some domain of our world. How could the addition of extra
nonphysical stuff affect the soundness of this argument?
One might suggest, here, that the existence of powerful, clever gods could mess up
the argument. 206 (Note, of course, that zombie worldsx certainly include worlds in which
gods exist. They’re physically indiscernible from our world, they lack qualia, and they
have gods. Such worlds are no doubt “somewhere” in logical space.) The idea, here,
might be that gods could divinely interfere with CCP in some way, thus making CCP
false in zombie worlds
. But without CCP, the argument for the epiphenomenalp result
falls flat.
Obviously, this suggestion won’t work. True, without CCP the argument for the
claim that zombie worlds imply epiphenomenalp qualia falls flat. At the same time,
without CCP, any world claiming to be a zombie worldx is not a zombie world. As in
Chapter 3, CCP is part and parcel of the physical story of our world— at least, once
again, modulo the given parameters. Hence, any “zombie worldx” without CCP is at best
a fake zombie worldx— close in some respects, but not really a zombie world. But fakes
won’t help, here.
The point is that the addition of extra nonphysical stuff won’t affect the soundness
of the argument in Chapter 3. Regardless of whether we’re talking about zombie worlds
or zombie worldsx
,
it remains true that if there is a zombie world— of either flavor—
then qualia have no effect on the physical domain of our world. Coupled w ith the
minimal constraint on causes
,
this is enough to show that zombie worlds— of either
206 Thanks to Erik Wielenberg for suggesting this objection.
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stripe— imply epiphenomenal
p qualia. But, then, this is enough to reject zombie
worldsx
.
Thus, the “But are they physical?!” objection is both right and wrong. It’s right
about the answer to Qc . It’s wrong, however, to claim that the main argument of this
project has failed to provide an answer to the question of whether qualia are physical.
The epiphenomenalp argument applies equally well to zombie worldsx
. As above, qualia
are epiphenomenalp if such worlds do exist. But this, for reasons given in Chapter 3, is
strong reason to reject such worlds. Thus, contrary to “But are they physical?r
objection, there’s enough in the arguments of this project to answer the question: But are
they physical? The answer, as this section has attempted to show, is: Yes, qualia are
physical.
This is a very significant result with respect to the qualia-vs-materialism debate.
What it shows, in the end, is that materialism is not only free from the most fundamental
or popular qualia attacks, but it’s free from any qualia attack. After all, given that qualia
are physical, qualia can hardly be used to undermine materialism.
Unfortunately, undermining materialism isn’t the only game in town! One might
grant that qualia are physical, and so also grant that materialism cannot be undermined by
qualia. But, one might argue, this doesn’t mean that materialism can’t be damaged. The
next section discusses this sort of objection.
Before turning to the next objection, however, it’s important to see how the results
of this section answer an unanswered question from Chapter 4. The question is: Which
premise of the Knowledge Argument is false? The current results give an answer.
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The current results have it that qualia are physical. The key premise in the
Knowledge Argument is premise (KA.2)- that Mary, upon her release, learns
something new about people. According to the story, and more specifically the rationale
for (KA.2), what Mary learns is something new about qualia. But, now, given the current
results, it’s clear that this premise must be rejected.
In short, (KA.l), which is stipulated, says that Mary, before her release, knows all
there is to know about the physical story of people— and, for the matter, the physical
story of our world. 207 Given the results of this section, qualia are physical features of our
world. Thus, it follows that Mary knows all there is to know about qualia. Hence,
premise (KA.2) of the Knowledge Argument is false. Mary can’t learn anything new if
she knows the whole physical story of our world— or, at any rate, she can’t learn
anything new about qualia. 208
The Knowledge Argument was already disposed of in Chapter 4. However, it’s
nice to know which premise fails. This is now known. Still, one might feel a sense of
unease here. In particular, one might think that, notwithstanding responses to the Zombie
Argument and the Knowledge Argument, we still don’t know exactly what qualia are.
This is an important concern that gives rise to the next main objection.
207
See Chapter 4 for relevant discussion.
208
Given the parameters of this debate, this amounts to learning nothing new (of relevance, anyway).
Jackson, in particular, is famous for his “almost materialism” stance. See Jackson (1995c).
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5.2 The “OK, but what, exactly, are qualia?!” Objection
In the previous subchapter, the question of whether qualia are physical was settled
- at least modulo the given parameters
.
209
In this section, a new objection to the overall
project emerges. This objection runs as follows.
The Objection: Grant, for reasons above, that qualia are indeed physical. This
means that materialism cannot be undermined, or refuted, by the existence of qualia. But
notice how very little this tells us! Notice, in particular, that for all the physicality of
qualia tells us, qualia may well be properties of automobiles, toasters, or the mereological
sum of both! All that’s required of a physical object is that it globally supervene on the
microphysical facts of our world. But this is consistent with the view that qualia are
properties of anything in our world, or for that matter everything in our world
including the entire world itself! 210 But if this is all that the physicality of qualia amounts
to, then materialists can have it. What we want, but what the current project doesn’t
provide, is a plausible view that explains how qualia relate to other more common
physical items— brain states, for example. The trouble is, the current project gives no
clue as to “where” in our physical world qualia may be; that is, it gives no clue as to
what sort of physical property qualia may be— whether they’re properties of the brain,
or of trains, or perhaps even of planes.
209 Some readers will no doubt want to question some of these parameters. They are important to the
current debate. As Lynne Baker (in conversation) pointed out, a Cartesian dualist maintains that mental
states are both nonphysical and non-epiphenomenal
p
. The Cartesian dualist avoids the arguments given
here by denying CCP— among other assumptions.
210
This follows, at any rate, given the common assumption of this overall discussion— viz., that aside
from qualia (which are in question), everything else in our world is physical, that is everything else at least
globally supervenes on the microphysical. See Chapters 1 and 2 for discussion.
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The current project, it’s granted, leaves us with physical qualia. But the point, here,
is that this isn’t much. By leaving us with mere physical qualia, the current project also
leaves us with a so-called explanatory gap: We simply don’t know which physical
properties qualia are, and we’ve been given no clue to help in this matter. For this
reason, the current project is insignificant.
The Reply. My reply to the current objection is that, unfortunately, it’s in many
ways right. On the other hand, it seems to me that the very question of the physicality of
qualia is an important one; at the very least, it has been a question of great debate. So for
this reason, I think that the current project has merit at least on that score. Nonetheless, I
do concede that this score leaves a lot unsaid. In the remainder of this reply, I’ll briefly
discuss the heart of the problem addressed by the “OK, but what, exactly, are qualia?”
objection, and I'll also briefly suggest a few possible solutions
.
211
As in the objection, it’s indeed consistent with the physicality of qualia that they be
properties of trains, planes, toasters, or even, if such a beast exists, the mereological sum
of all such objects. This result follows from the global supervenience approach to
‘physical’. The problem is a problem for any definition that proceeds in terms of global
supervenience. The problem, in the end, is that knowing that F is physical is to know not
much— at least with respect to details . 212 And this is the heart of the objection. The
point is, despite knowing that qualia are physical, we still haven’t a clue as to what,
exactly, qualia are.
211
This objection, like that in 5.1.1, owes much to conversation with Lynne Baker.
212
It’s important to recall, of course, that the current definition of ‘physical’ is the one given by those in the
current debate. Furthermore, the definition has independent argument in its favor. See Chapter 1 for
discussion and references. Despite its virtues, however, the objection at hand is right that being physical
174
The problem is sometimes put by saying that there’s an explanatory; gap between
qualia and the physical world
.
213
The idea is that, try as we will, it just seems downright
difficult to understand qualia in terms of other physical properties with which we’re
familiar. Sometimes, the existence of this gap is used as an argument against
materialism .
~
14
The argument goes something as follows.
We want to know exactly what qualia are. If materialism is true, then we want to
know, for some physical property, F, that qualia and F are the same property— or, at the
very least, that they re necessarily correlated. Moreover, if materialism is true, then
there must be such an identity between qualia and some suitable physical property. The
trouble is, it seems that for any alleged identity— or, for that matter, mere necessary
correlation— a question remains: “But why should F be at all correlated with qualia?”
For example, suppose that qualia are said to be activity in the pyramidal cells involving
reverberations through circuits to the thalamus .
216
Fine. But there remains a coherent
question: Why should such pyramidal activity be in any way even correlated with
qualia? Indeed, it seems perfectly coherent that there’s a world full of pyramidal activity
but devoid of qualia altogether. Given the coherence of this, it’s not the case that qualia
are identical to such pyramidal activity.
offers few details. See Mellor & Trout (1995) for a good recent discussion of relevant views ofphysical
properties.
2lj
See Davies & Humphreys (1993) and, especially, Metzinger (1995) and Block, et al., eds., (1996) for
very good discussion of the explanatory gap. The expression ‘explanatory gap' comes from Levine (1983).
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Jackson (1993, 1994a, 1995a) and Chalmers (1995, 1996, 1997) are two among the most prominent
philosophers to argue this point. In the end, though, their arguments, here, appeal zombie worlds.
Chalmers' arguments do so explicitly, while Jackson's, as in Chapter 4, do so implicitly.
215
See Kim (1993, 1996) for a good discussion of identity accounts versus necessary correlation accounts.
216
This, incidentally, is the suggestion by Crick (1994). (The suggestion, of course, is much more detailed
than I give here.)
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The trouble is, the argument goes, it seems that for any alleged identity between
qualia and some physical F, it’s perfectly coherent that there be a world full of F but
completely devoid of qualia . 217 But, then, this is trouble— big trouble for
materialism. For without an account of qualia in terms of the physical, materialism
amounts to no more than a faith claim— the claim that, though it’s beyond us right now,
there must be an account ! 218 But a materialism clinging to faith, at least with respect to
something as significant as qualia, is a materialism not worth having.
What to say? Well, as for myself, I think that the objection has some genuine
force. In particular, I think that the intuition concerning any given identity claim has
some force. I grant, too, that there must be an account of qualia in terms of the physical
if materialism is true. What’s worse, no current account seems to be satisfactory . 21
9
And
the reason they don’t seem to be satisfactory is the one given— namely, that for each
account, it seems to be coherent that there exist worlds which falsify the given
accounts. Thus, in response to the argument against materialism based on the
explanatory gap, I grant quite a bit.
On the other hand, despite the intuitive force of the intuition about any identity
claim, one thing remains fairly clear: It cannot be that the explanatory gap has any
bearing on the physicality of qualia. After all, if the arguments of this project are sound.
217 Chalmers (1995, 1996) takes this line frequently. Thanks to David Chalmers for correspondence on this
point, as well as others in this chapter.
2,8
Jackson (1994a) puts this point in terms of a faith claim.
219
For a survey of recent accounts and their troubles, see Block et al., eds., (1996).
220 The Crick (1994) example, above is a good example. Another prominent example is the approach of
Nemirow (1990) and Lewis (1990), which is discussed in Chapter 4.
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then qualia are physical. 221 And for this reason, I deny, pace the running argument, that
materialism rests on a faith claim with respect to qualia. If the arguments of the previous
section, coupled with those of Chapter 3, are sound, then materialism needs no faith with
respect to the physicality of qualia. On that score, the given objection to materialism
goes wrong.
But this brings us back to the original question: “OK, but what, exactly, are
qualia? All that the current project offers is an argument that qualia are physical.
Knowing this, however, doesn t offer us a way of genuinely understanding qualia in
familiar physical terms. It doesn t tell us, as it were, “where” in the physical world qualia
are though it does ensure that qualia, however loosely, are in the physical world. For
all that s been said, it could be that the physicality of qualia is ensured only by the
disjunction of all physical properties— and this, beyond being somewhat controversial,
isn’t very satisfying.
222 What the current objection highlights is that it would be nice to
have a more detailed picture of the place of qualia in our world. But this is where the
story becomes sad.
Unfortunately, I don’t have a plausible account that affords the details of “where”
qualia are in the world. This is the sad news. Nonetheless, I do think that there are some
viable directions to which we might turn for such details. Here, I want to briefly indicate
how such details may come about.
Alas— they’re sound, once again, only modulo the given parameters. However, I should note that
proponents of the explanatory gap argument include, as primary proponents, zombiephiles. Thus, since the
parameters of this discussion are those endorsed by zombiephiles, the qualification here is less pressing.
Moreover, other primary participants in the explanatory gap discussion, for example Levine, is a
materialist; and, hence, would likewise endorse the relevant assumptions. See Levine (1983).
222
For an excellent discussion of the status of disjunctive properties, see Kim (1993, 1996).
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First, notice what it is that’s really wanted, here. What’s wanted, ultimately, is
some way of explaining- or, in a loose sense of the term, reducing
- qualia to some
common physical feature of our world. Since, as most people tend to think, qualia are
likely to be properties of the brain, one would like to have some way of explaining
(reducing) qualia to brain states— neurological properties, or et cetera. Here, I will very
briefly indicate three directions in which such a search might go.
Some philosophers think that the answer might come via an analysis of ‘qualia ’.223
And indeed, if we could get such an analysis, we’d be in much better shape with respect
to the current question. Consider, for example, both the satisfaction and the
understanding that an analysis can give . 224
Suppose that the right semantics of ‘water’ involves a rigid description to the effect
that water is (dthat)
225
the liquid thatfallsfrom the sky, fills n% ofthe earth and so on.
What we have, then, is an analysis according to which:
r. ‘water’
=<jf ‘dthat [the liquid that falls from the sky, fills n% of the
earth, et cetera ]’.
226
Now, the wonderful thing about our analysis, (r), is that, assuming it’s true, we have a
perfectly satisfying answer to the question: Where does water fit into the materialist’s
picture of the world? The answer comes by way of (r) coupled with empirical
investigation. In particular, the answer comes when science tells us:
223
Jackson (1993), Levine (1983) and Chalmers (1996) think that this is where the answer must come from.
If they’re right, then, for reasons given below, I think we may well be doomed. But I'll also suggest,
below, that another approach may well serve to “close the gap”— to give an answer. So, I don’t think that
they’re right, here.
224
The following follows Jackson (1994a). See, too, Almog et ai, eds., (1989).
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r'. H20 - the liquid that falls from the sky, fills n% of the earth, etc..
Where, exactly, does water fit into the materialist’s picture of the world? (r) and
(r'), coupled with the transitivity of identity, tells us that it fits precisely where the H 20
facts fit. And this is about as detailed an answer as one could hope for— assuming that
(r) is indeed correct.
There’s no doubt that such an analysis would serve to close the gap between qualia
and its precise place in the physical world. Likewise with any other feature of our world;
analyses offer a great way to place them squarely in some given domain. The trouble is,
this works only if the analysis is correct— and complete. But, obviously, (r) above is far
from complete. And the trouble is, it doesn’t seem promising that (r)— or any other
analysis— will likely be completed in the near future. 227 One need merely consult the
last 2000 years of unsuccessful analyses to see that an alternative route to closing
explanatory gaps is desirable.
But without analyses, how do we solve the current problem? How, that is, do we
come to “reduce”— in a loose sense— qualia to some definite physical place in our
world? If what we need is an identity or, at the very least, a necessary correlation
between qualia and some particular property in the physical domain, how do we get this
without something like an analysis? The answer, perhaps, may be found in the practice
225
‘dthaf is from Kaplan. It’s a rigidifying operator. For details, see Almog et al., eds., (1989).
226
This is being put loosely, of course. It’s for illustrative purposes only.
227
Block & Stalnaker (1997) argue this point well, as does Harman ( 1994a). Moreover, the inductive
evidence against successful analyses continues to steadily grow— without a hitch! From Socrates through
Gettier’s famous counterexamples, analyses haven’t done well. True, this is merely inductive evidence; but
at the very least it makes one hope for another route to closing the gap. I briefly suggest two others below.
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of science. In particular, the answer may be found in the use of simplicity. Let me
explain
.
228
First, consider how the gap between life and physical processes was closed
.
229
At
one time, people— smart people— once thought that you couldn’t have life unless some
extra, nonphysical vital force was present. By their lights, life couldn’t be “reduced” to
physical properties or otherwise explained in physical terms. Thus, there once existed an
explanatory gap between life and the physical. But today this gap no longer exists.
People today take life to have a perfectly well-rooted (physical) place in the physical
world. But how did this happen? How was the gap closed?
One might argue, following the first suggestion, that the gap was closed via
conceptual analysis of life itself. They might argue that life is (dthat) the process
realizing some given set of functions— functions including, for example, reproduction,
digestion, locomotion and so on. But this won’t work. Clearly, nothing in the concept of
life precludes the possibility of an immortal being who happens to lack the capacity to
reproduce. Similar objections will apply to any proposed analysis of ‘life ’. 231 So, how
did the gap close?
On the current suggestion, the gap was closed along the following lines. There are
paradigm cases of life on a very simple scale— plants, insects, etc.. Gradually, people
2 8 The following is a rough sketch of the account developed in Block & Stalnaker (1997). Along these
lines, Smart (1959), Harman (1989, 1994c) and Kim (1996) discuss this sort of approach.
229
This example, and the following discussion, is due to Block & Stalnaker (1997). Chalmers (1996)
likewise discusses the example.
"30
Alas, there are no doubt people who don’t think this. Indeed, my own grandparents would probably
disagree with this. But I think it’s at least safe to say that most philosophers and scientists today reject
vitalism and, in addition, take life to be a perfectly physical property.
231
For an interesting discussion of prominent (unsuccessful) analyses of ‘life’, see Feldman (1992).
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formulated powerful models of these cases. Eventually, as the given models yielded
more and more successful results, people saw no principled reason against extending
these models to all forms of life. Since the models at issue employed only physical
properties, life itself eventually came to be seen as having a perfectly physical spot in our
world.
Of course, the foregoing suggestion is fuzzy and far from complete; and perhaps its
plausibility, if any, derives from this fuzziness. Still, the suggestion at least points toward
a way of closing an explanatory gap without conceptual analysis. The suggestion grows
particularly plausible when the methodological pressures of simplicity are added.
Consider the following, perhaps stronger, example
.
232
Suppose that, after much observation, one formulates a principle according to
which there’s heat if and only if there’s molecular kinetic energy. Suppose that after time
this principle becomes firmly entrenched due to ample observation, successful prediction,
and so forth. At this point, simplicity kicks in. Considerations of simplicity lead us to
say that heat and molecular kinetic energy aren’t merely correlated; instead, they’re
identical. Once this identity is accepted, any question as to what explains the identity is
ill-placed. Identities just aren’t explained\
Of course, if one didn’t believe that heat and molecular kinetic energy were
genuinely identical, then explanation remains appropriate. And it may well be that many
wouldn’t accept this identity, though they would accept the correlation principle. If this
is the case, then any explanatory gap between heat and molecular kinetic energy (or other
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physical properties) will remain. As above, however, it seems that simplicity
, as briefly
suggested here, at the very least might play a part in closing explanatory gaps.
Thus, beyond the analysis suggestion, there’s also the suggestion that the normal
course of science might help to close the gap between qualia and the physical. In the case
of qualia, correlations would have to be established between qualitative states and
particular physical states— be they brain states or something else. This, of course, is no
easy task. ‘ But if the correlations can be established, then perhaps simplicity and other
methodological constraints may help to eventually close the gap between qualia and the
physical.
234
For now, turn to one final suggestion.
One final way of closing the explanatory gap is simply to get rid of it! In short, one
could say that qualia, like space
,
arefundamental features of our world. Given the
results of section 5.1.1 and Chapter 3, it’s open to say that qualia are fundamentally
irreducible features of our world which, given said results, are nonetheless physical
features.
235
This is a consistent and, in some ways, attractive approach.
232
’ Again, this example, too, is from Block & Stalnaker (1997). (Of course, the example is common in
philosophy.)
233
For an excellent discussion of some of the difficulties involved, here, see Flanagan (1991, 1992).
Metzinger (1995) also contains useful discussions of this issue.
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Lynne Baker, in conversation, raised the very interesting point that this model of closing the gap may
work with qualia but it’d be unlikely to work with intentional states. Qualia seem like the right sort of
properties to afford empirical discovery of correlation. (Following Flanagan (1992), one approach is
simply to trust the “patient.” When she says “Yes, I’m experiencing pain right now” or etc., then you take
note of what’s happenmg in her brain or body, etc..) As Baker noted, however, it seems that beliefs aren't
likely to afford such observations.
235
This is a suggestion of Chalmers (1996). Chalmers, himself, takes qualia to be nonphysical features of
our world. His argument, like the argument of other zombiephiles, rests squarely on the (alleged) existence
of zombie worlds. In both his (1996) and conversation, however, he has said that if (as I’ve argued) there
really aren’t any zombie worlds, then he would still take qualia to irreducibly fundamental features of our
world, right along with space and other fundamental features postulated by science. (I’m grateful to David
Chalmers for valuable correspondence on this issue.)
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Of course, many materialists won’t like this approach
.
236 Many materialists might
not like the irreducibility claim, while others might not like the
.
fundamental claim— that
is, that qualia are both irreducible and fundamental properties. Nonetheless, the approach
has some virtues.
The main virtue is that on this approach the explanatory gap problem does indeed
disappear. Granted, one doesn’t in any sense get an explanation of qualia in terms of
other physical properties— or other properties in general. This follows from the
suggested fundamental nature of qualia. But this fact isn’t a problem if qualia really are
fundamental. After all, there’s certainly an explanatory gap between space and other
physical properties, since there’s no available explanation of space in terms of other
properties at all. Space is a fundamental property of our world! But there’s no
explanatory gap problem of space. Likewise, there’s no explanatory gap problem with
qualia— if, as per the current suggestion, they really are fundamental.
Whether qualia really are fundamental is a question I leave open. For now, it’s
important to note that there are a few potential ways of closing the explanatory gap.
Conceptual analysis may work, but its history gives this a low prior probability. The
normal practice of science may also serve to close the gap, especially if suitable
correlations between qualia and other physical properties can be established. And, again,
perhaps qualia simply are fundamental. But at the very least, it’s important to note that
we have some options open. In the end, I admit that I don’t know, exactly, “where
236 The likes of Lewis, Kim, Smart, the Churchlands, Armstrong, and many, many other prominent
materialists certainly won’t like this approach. So-called nonreductive materialists (Baker, Post, et al) may
be more sympathetic with it; but even they mightn’t like taking qualia to be fundamental properties on par
with space, etc.. Fortunately, the Truth isn’t a popularity contest!
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qualia are in our physical world. This is an important and difficult question. For now.
however, I leave it alone.
My reply, then, to the “OK, but what, exactly
,
are qualia?” objection is this. I grant
that the current project has said very little by way of “where” qualia are in the physical
world. I grant, too, that it would be extremely valuable to know the answer to this
question. I deny, however, that establishing the physicality of qualia is insignificant. It
doesn t help to close the explanatory gap, but it does help to close one long-standing
debate that over qualia and materialism. Given the popularity of this debate, this is a
significant result. As for the explanatory gap, we at least know that there are some
options. At the very least, this gives us work to do!
Turn, now to a brief review of the current subchapter.
In this subchapter, I have tried to answer general questions and concerns about this
overall project. In particular, I’ve tried to answer Qa and Qb . These questions, I hope,
cover most of the concerns that readers may have. Nonetheless, there may be others that
haven’t been duly addressed.
Perhaps the most pressing leftover concern centers on the narrow confines of this
overall discussion. The parameters of this discussion have been set by the assumptions of
zombiephiles. These assumptions include minimal materialism about our world with the
exception of qualia. Included in these assumptions are the causal closure of the physical,
the global supervenience approach to defining ‘physical’, along with, as said, the view
that our entire world, including intentional states, et cetera
,
are physical (in the given
sense). By my lights, these assumptions are both reasonable and plausible on grounds
184
independent of this discussion. At the same time, some philosophers might not share this
view. For this reason, some philosophers might be concerned that not enough has been
said to justify these assumptions; and, in turn, not enough has been said to justify the
significance of the results which, I’ve argued, follow from these assumptions.
In response to these concerns, I unfortunately don’t have a lot to say, beyond noting
them. Of course, the concerns above will not be the concerns of most materialists. For
the most part, materialists of any stripe will accept the parameters of this discussion. 237 If
anything, as mentioned in Chapter 1, some materialists will complain that the relevant
materialism defined by Dm is too weak. But obviously any stronger version of
materialism is going to be just as affected by zombie worlds as minimal materialism is.
So this isn’t a pressing concern.
The philosophers for whom the given parameters will be a concern are simply those
who reject minimal materialism, CCP, or any of the other assumptions given throughout
the discussion. To them I would like to offer a full-scale examination of these issues. (A
very small-scale examination takes place in Chapter 1, but this indicates the line I take on
the relevant issues.) Unfortunately, this is well beyond the scope of this discussion. For
now, as above, I note the concerns but leave it at that.
Turn to a brief review of, and a few final comments on, the overall project.
237
For an excellent collection of material on contemporary materialism, see Moser & Trout (1995). See,
also, Kim (1996) for an excellent overview of contemporary materialism— especially with respect to the
reductive versus nonreductive debate..
185
5.3 Overall Review & Final Comments
My overall aim in this project has been to develop a defense of materialism,
minimally construed, against two prominent qualia attacks— the Zombie Argument and
the Knowledge Argument. My defense against the latter is an immediate application of
the defense against the former. If the defense against the Zombie Argument fails, then so
too does the defense against the Knowledge Argument. Nonetheless, I’ve tried to show
why both arguments succeed, and I’ve tried to do this by way of answering the strongest
objections leveled against them.
If I’ve been successful, then both of these popular and powerful arguments can be
put away. Personally, this will be a great treat— as indicated in the preface. On a
broader scale, however, putting these two arguments to rest has significant implications
for the debate over materialism and qualia at large. If the reasoning in Chapter 5 is
sound, then we have strong reason to conclude that qualia are physical— modulo the
given parameters. In this case, not only are the Zombie Argument and Knowledge
Argument undermined, but so too is any other argument that attempts to show that qualia
aren’t physical. At any rate, this is so provided that my arguments are sound, and the
parameters of the given discussion are true. At this point, further examination of these
issues are left to the reader.
As for the issue of “where” exactly qualia fit into the physical world, this issue
remains wide open. I’ve tried, very briefly, to hint at some ways in which this question
may be answered. I don’t pretend, however, to have come close to answering it. The one
186
virtue of this is that there’s more work to be done— both for philosophers and scientists.
But that’s work for another time.
In the end, I hope that this project has shown where its target arguments fail, and
why, for what its worth, materialism remains intact. At the very least, I hope that this
project has been interesting to the reader.
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